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ABSTRACT
The Transatlantic Oarsmen Cooperative:
Doubling Down on a Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime
by
Joselyn Muhleisen
Adviser: Professor Ming Xia
This project argues that, in the wake of the 2007-09 financial crisis, the United
States (US) and European Union (EU) are doubling down on finance-led domestic
growth strategies and that this is their goal in constructing a transatlantic financial
regulatory regime. The regime’s goal privileges the input of industry actors over other
civil society actors. The construction of this regime is in response to pressure from
emerging markets and to service domestic industry actors after the financial crisis. The
regime is intended to allow the US and EU to maintain their dominance within the
international financial regulatory regime and continue to enjoy finance-led growth. In the
emergent transatlantic regulatory regime, there has been a new division of labor emerging
between the state and civil society, best illustrated with a nautical analogy: civil society
and industry are steering regulatory activity and the state is rowing by creating regulatory
institutions to serve industry. I thus propose the term oarsman state to explain this
division of labor and assert that the EU and US are operating a transatlantic oarsmen
cooperative.
Empirically this project demonstrates that the financial crisis was a critical
juncture that caused institutional and functional changes in the (i) EU, (ii) US, (iii)
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international and (iv) transatlantic financial regulatory regimes. In order to address the
first empirical dimension of institutional and functional change, the research method of
process-tracing will be used to compare the regimes before and after the financial crisis.
The second goal of this project is to explain how the changes in the EU, US and
international regimes triggered an escalation in the creation of the transatlantic financial
regulatory regime. This project applies an analytic framework that combines top-down
and bottom-up approaches to explaining regulatory and institutional change to address
the second question regarding causation. The changes in the EU, US, and international
financial regulatory regimes are analyzed as causal factors that contribute to the
emergence of the transatlantic financial regulatory regime.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“A clear lesson of history is that a sine qua non for sustained economic recovery
following a financial crisis is a thoroughgoing repair of the financial system. The
necessary steps are occurring now, but restoration of the financial system to full health
will be a long, drawn out process.” Janet Yellen, Current Chair of the Federal Reserve,
January 2009 (Yellen 2009:1)
“The crisis has also reminded us of the lessons of the technology bubble, Japan’s
experience in the 1990s and of the US Great Depression – that finance-led growth is
problematic. In retrospect, the fact that 40 per cent of American corporate profits in 2006
went to the financial sector, and the closely related outcome – a doubling of the share of
income going to the top 1 per cent of the population – should have been signs something
was amiss.” Lawrence Summers, Former Treasury Secretary and Former Director of the
National Economic Council, October 2008 (Summers 2008)
“While the immediate causes of the crisis currently affecting the European Union are
indeed financial and economic, they are also, on a more fundamental level, the product of
a crisis of values and of the non-respect of the norms. […] The present crisis has shown
the limits of individual action by nation states. […] We need more integration, and the
corollary of more integration has to be more democracy. This European renewal must
represent a leap in quality and enable Europe to rise to the challenges of the world today
by giving it the tools it needs to react more effectively and to shape and control the
future.” José Manuel Durão Barroso, Former President of the European Commission,
September 2012 (Barroso 2012)
Policymakers in the United States (US) and European Union (EU) hastily
declared that the financial crisis of 2007-9 would be a turning point in financial
regulation, prompting tighter regulation and more oversight of the financial industry.
Using comparisons to other crises, policymakers announced that they had learned a
lesson. The EU and US each created new legislation and regulatory agencies to regulate
the financial services industry.1 At the same time, the international financial regulatory
regime expanded its mandate to tackle the threat that failing financial institutions posed
1

EU is broadly used to mean the antecedent institutions that have evolved to now be part of the EU,
including the European Economic Community and the European Community. For more information about
the history of the EU, visit European Union, “The History of the European Union.”
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en.
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to global economic stability. American and European policymakers also reaffirmed that
the immediate solution to the crisis was to restore the stability of the existing global
financial system. They consulted industry actors for guidance on how to create this
stability while maintaining finance-led growth strategies. The EU and the US have
sought to shore up their dominance in the international financial regulatory regime
by establishing new transatlantic institutions and expanding the role of existing ones
to transform the transatlantic regulatory regime to serve industry actors.2
The financial crisis presented an opportunity to change the way financial
regulation is created and whose interests it serves. The crisis of pro-market AngloAmerican capitalism led to domestic and global challengers to policies that promote
financialization. However, despite these challengers to financialization the new
regulations adopted by the US and EU still promoted finance-led growth strategies
because of deep ideological capture. The EU and US are doubling down on their existing
strategy in financial regulation: financial regulatory regimes are designed to encourage
finance-led growth by creating regulation made in the interest of the regulated.
This work argues that while the EU and US continued to pursue finance-led
growth in their domestic regulatory regimes the financial crisis marked a period of
change that altered the existing transatlantic regulatory regime and the relationship of
industry to the state within that regime. Pro-market, financialization ideology is shaping
EU and US policymaker preferences on financial regulation. This financialization
ideology was a constant before and after the financial crisis. Policymakers in the US and
United Kingdom (UK) have expressed a preference for regulation that encourages
2

This analysis covers the time period up to and including 2015. The epilogue addresses
developments after 2015.
2

finance-led growth. Policymaker preferences are also influencing the transatlantic
regulatory regime, notably by privileging the input of industry. The international and
domestic pressures that arose from the financial crisis incentivized the EU and US to
continue to privilege and institutionalize the preferences of industry. These efforts to
continue to compete globally with a finance-led growth strategy have culminated in the
creation of a transatlantic financial regulatory regime.
The coordinated transatlantic response to the financial crisis is being driven by
domestic pursuit of financial-led growth and compounded by external pressures from the
international regulatory regime. Initially the financial crisis of 2007-9 disproportionately
negatively affected the US and EU compared to emerging market economies. This posed
a challenge to the leadership of the US and EU in the international financial regulatory
regime and necessitated the creation of a transatlantic regulatory regime. In card games
and casinos, gamblers have the opportunity at certain junctions in the game to stay with
the original bets they have already placed or to increase their bets. Some gamblers use
this opportunity to double their bets, and potential winnings, in an action called doubling
down. Oxford dictionary describes the action of doubling down as, to
“[s]trengthen one’s commitment to a particular strategy or course of action, typically one
that is potentially risky” (Oxford 2016a). The financial crisis of 2007-9 made it clear that
finance-led growth is inherently risky to domestic economies and the global financial
system. The US and EU have used the opportunity created by the financial crisis to
double down on their finance-led growth strategies and have created new institutions to
organize industry input and allow that input to directly influence the content of a
transatlantic regulatory regime. Previously, the regulatory state directed the service
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provision activities of civil society by providing regulation and regulatory agencies.
Transatlantic institution building is a new form of service provided to industry, which is a
new paradigm in the relationship between state, industry and civil society in regulatory
policymaking.
Background
The global economic and financial crisis that began in 2007 has spurred a
realignment of financial oversight in the international political economy much like the
Asian financial crisis of 1997 did. However, unlike the Asian crisis, this crisis originated
in the West and impacted advanced economies more than emerging market economies.
The EU, US, and international regulatory regimes had disparate reactions to the financial
crisis. The crisis prompted a shift in participation in the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and a reliance on a broader group of states for international financial regulation,
including mandates for the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The expanded voice and
vote granted to emerging market economies in the IMF and FSB accompanied new
powers given to the IMF and FSB. This is significant because the IMF is responsible for
determining the conditions of loans to states suffering during subsequent crises.
Increasing the participation of emerging market economies in the IMF and Group of 20
institutions is a significant development because global regulatory outcomes may be
changed by their input. Other states do not pursue finance-led growth to the extent that
the US and EU do, so it is likely that increased participation of emerging market
economies in the international financial regulatory regime will lead to regulation less
favorable to finance-led growth strategies.

4

In areas in which the US and the EU seek to promote a harmonized transatlantic
regulatory regime, they dominate global governance (Drezner 2007; Ziegler 2012). Since
the US and Western European nations have privileged positions and structural power in
international institutions such as the IMF and Group of number formations (such as the
G7 and G20 groups), they are able to decide the rules of international regulatory regimes
(Woods 2010; Wade 2011). This governance is in policy areas as diverse as industry
regulation, food labeling rules, transport, property rights, and sanctions. Though their
agendas diverge occasionally, mostly in substantive areas in which they compete, their
dominant positions in the international system and similar gross domestic product growth
strategies encourage them to seek similar governance measures. The EU and US have
traditionally agreed on structural power issues and sought similar arrangements in
international institutions. In some issue areas they have different regulatory regimes and
this leads to competition (Drezner 2007).3 The transatlantic relationship has a massive
impact on global governance, particularly in influencing regulatory standards (Drezner
2007; Mattli and Woods 2009; Posner 2009). A harmonized transatlantic financial
regulatory regime could define the contours of the international financial regulatory
regime.
Examining the existing status of their cooperation in the international financial
regulatory regime is especially important because of the series of international conflicts
the EU and US have collectively sought to diffuse by working through international
organizations. Many transatlantic and international institutions formed at the end of the
Second World War continue to be influential in both the security and economic spheres.

3

The World Trade Organization is an example of a forum in which this regulatory competition between the
EU and US has taken place. This period will be addressed in Chapter 4.
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Initially created to counter the communist threat, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) became the dominant regional security organization. Rather than disband
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO transformed its raison d’etre to
focus on out-of-area missions; the EU and US have effectively used NATO to address
new global security governance challenges. The Bretton Woods Institutions, and notably
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were similarly used to pursue the agenda of
neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s as part of the Washington Consensus. The IMF
surveillance function has also undergone a transformation following the 2007-2009
financial crisis.
When the EU and US pursue a common policy or outcome, they often attempt to
use international institutions or regimes in their pursuit. Transatlantic regulatory regimes
are projected internationally.4 Existing institutions in the transatlantic financial regulatory
regime have intensified their activities. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, the TransAtlantic
Business Dialogue (TABD) and the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) have
increased their activity. New institutions, such as the High Level Working Group on Jobs
and Growth (HLWG) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP),
have also been added to the transatlantic financial regulatory regime. A transatlantic
financial regulatory regime is being created to be projected into the international financial
regulatory regime.

Literature Review
The transatlantic financial regulatory regime is the main subject of inquiry of both
research questions in this work: (i) has there been a change in the transatlantic financial
regulatory regime following the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and if so (ii) why.
4

One example detailed in Chapter 5 is the transatlantic intellectual property rights regime.
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Transatlantic financial regulatory regimes lay at the intersection of three fields that are
traditionally not mainstream political science: (i) international political economy of
finance, (ii) transatlantic affairs, and (iii) regulatory public policy. This literature review
will address the relevant literature in the three subfields, discuss the points of departure
for this work, and identify the gaps in the literature that this project will fill.
The international political economy of finance literature is largely focused on the
history of financial development and the power of individual nation states in setting
financial regulation. Those works with an institutional focus have addressed the
emergence of the Bretton Woods and contemporary monetary systems (Eichengreen
2006; Eichengreen 2008), the significance of embedded liberalism in shaping the role of
the state and the policies of international economic institutions (Ruggie 1982; Keohane
1984), and how nation states use their power to create international institutions that then
replicate their power (Dreyer and Schotter 1980; Strange 1986; Strange 1999; Leech
2002; Gilpin 2001; Smaghi 2004; Woods and Lombardi 2006; Perry and Nolke 2006;
Nolke and Perry 2008). The last stream of scholarship attempts to explain how
institutions are created to preserve and reproduce power inequalities but the focus is
firmly on structural power rather than the content of the regimes; this project will extend
this stream of the literature to argue that the transatlantic regulatory regime is being
created to preserve and reproduce the power inequalities created by financialization. The
transatlantic financial regime is being built to stave off the challenges of emerging market
economies and allow the US and EU to continue to be rule-makers in the international
financial regulatory regime.

7

One gap in the international political economy of finance literature that this
project fills is explaining the interactions between civil society and state actors in
international regulatory regimes that include trade processes, that is, using the lens of a
regulatory regime and applying regulatory state theory. Many authors have addressed the
interaction of civil society and state actors in the negotiation of trade agreements and at
the World Trade Organization (Scholte 1999; Robertson 2000; Dunoff 2000; Orellana
2009; Hopewell 2015). However, there has generally been a separation between
regulatory literature and trade literature because traditional trade agreements have tackled
tariffs and focused less on non-tariff barriers to trade. Overlap in the discipline exists in
subjects like regional trading blocs, such as the European Union, and more work will fill
the gap as new generation trade deals tackle mostly regulatory, non-tariff barriers to
trade. This work studies interactions of civil society and the state using the lens of the
regulatory state and sees trade agreements and regulatory cooperation councils as parts of
a regulatory regime.
The second gap is reconciling the top-down and bottom-up dynamics of
regulation. The international political economy literature has focused on either explaining
how domestic institutions and interest groups shape international regulatory regimes
(Rogowski 1989; Lake 2009), or how international regimes impact domestic regimes.
Farrell and Newman (2014) have labeled an emerging body of scholarship that tries to
reconcile these approaches by “ask[ing] how interdependence transforms the distribution
of domestic interests and the institutions of the system’s units” as the “new
interdependence approach” (334-335). According to Farrell and Newman, the authors of
the new interdependence literature first:
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“examine how domestic institutions affect the ability of political actors to
construct the rules and norms governing interdependent relations and thus offer a
source of asymmetric power. Second, they explore how interdependence alters
domestic political institutions through processes of diffusion, transgovernmental
coordination, and extraterritorial application and, in turn, how it changes the
national institutions mediating internal debates on globalization. Third, they study
the shifting boundaries of political contestation through which substate actors
affect decision making in foreign jurisdictions. Hence, they challenge prevailing
notions that interdependence, domestic institutions, or interest group distributions
are static or exogenous” (332-333).
This project will continue in the tradition of this burgeoning literature and explain
how the transatlantic financial regulatory regime is emerging because of both the US and
EU regulatory regimes and the changes to the international financial regulatory regime
after the financial crisis.
The transatlantic affairs literature applies a foreign policy lens to transatlantic
institutional cooperation by explaining institutional dynamics by focusing on the state of
relations between the US and EU (Sola and Smith 2009; Peterson and Steffenson 2009).
Another stream of transatlantic affairs literature focuses on the paradigm of transatlantic
economic competition and cooperation. Petersmann and Pollack (2003) and Damro
(2006) address the dynamic of regulatory competition in the EU-US relationship that led
to disputes in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Less attention has been paid to transatlantic relations in regulation; this literature
also explores the dominant cooperation and competition paradigm. Evenett and Stern
(2011) provide a systematic review of transatlantic regulatory institutions and examine
transatlantic competition and cooperation by policy sector but omit finance. They find
that in some sectors increasing interdependence coupled with failed multilateralism
motivate the US and EU to cooperate. According to Drezner (2007) the US and EU
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decide whether to compete or cooperate with their respective regulatory standards
depending on which standards other countries adopt. Posner (2009) argues that after the
financial crisis regulatory centralization in the EU empowered the EU vis-à-vis the US
and this was the major impetus behind a new round of transatlantic cooperation.
Fewer studies have focused on transatlantic cooperation in financial regulatory
standards and its implications for other countries (Porter 2014b). Daniel Hamilton and
Joseph Quinlan (2005) argue that the economic integration between the EU and US is
driving globalization and that this increases prospects for a deeper regulatory relationship
between them. In testimony to the US Congress, Hamilton has asserted that transatlantic
regulatory cooperation can “strengthen the ground rules of the international economic
order” by setting standards preferable to the EU and US (Hamilton 2012, 8). However,
overall, the literature fails to provide an account of the relationship between the
transatlantic financial regulatory regime, the international financial regulatory regime and
the broader international political economy. This project will fill this gap by identifying
the dynamic of regulatory competition and changes in the international political economy
after the financial crisis as drivers behind the establishment of a transatlantic financial
regulatory regime.
The third field of public policy has also neglected regulatory policymaking and
tended to focus instead on regulation as a part of implementation in public administration
and public management studies (Bartle 2006, 1). Lowi (1964) identified regulatory policy
as one of three types of policy, alongside distributive and redistributive and asserted that
each type of policy has its own policymaking process characterized by a power arena. He
later (1972) identified constituent policy as another type of policymaking. He describes
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regulatory policy as being the “residue of the interplay of group conflict” (Lowi 1964,
692). Public policy scholars studying regulatory policy focused mostly on national
contexts (Kelman 1980; Vogel 1986) until the European Union became a significant
subject of inquiry (Majone 1994; Majone 1996). Reinicke (1998) argues that the
outcomes of interaction between states, corporations, NGOs, regional and international
organizations can be understood as global public policy. Stone (2008) has asserted that
global public policy is made in a “global agora” and is delivered by “transnational policy
communities” (1).
Since regulatory public policy mostly focuses on national contexts, scholars have
largely analyzed the input of domestic interest groups to determine the role and
composition of civil society. One stream of this scholarship considers the conflict among
the groups and the winners and losers; the other stream is preoccupied with the access
and influence of interest groups. Regulatory capture is a concept from the latter stream.
Bernstein (1955) identified regulatory capture as the way US independent agencies,
removed from political control, make regulatory policy. In the broader global governance
literature scholars have studied an emerging transnational civil society. (Florini 2000;
Price 2003; Nash 2008) Other scholars have focused on the role of business interests
groups and trade associations in influencing global and transnational financial
governance (Koppell 2006; Young 2012; Tsingou 2015). Young (2012) finds that there is
not total regulatory capture at the transnational level at the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS). Tsingou has developed the concept of “transnational veto players”
to describe lobby groups, firms, and regulatory authorities who block change in the
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financial regulatory regime by “ideational bargaining on the feasible” (Tsingou 2015,
330).
The concept of the regulatory state came from public policy scholars analyzing
the changing role of the state in relationship to civil society in the UK, EU and US
(Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). Osborne and Gaebler (1992) initially explained that
ideally the state authority would be responsible for steering by guiding and directing and
that civil society would be responsible for service provision. Braithwaite calls this
division of labor the regulatory state and distinguishes from the other divisions of labor
between the state and civil society (Braithwaite 2000). The table below has been adapted
from Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004) to identify the steering and rowing roles for the
Nightwatchman state, postwar or interventionist state, and the regulatory state.
Figure 1: Steering and Rowing Roles
Type of State

Nightwatchman State

Postwar/Interventionist Regulatory State
State

19th Century-1930s

Era

1945-late 1970s

Late 1970s-mid
1990s

Steering

Civil Society

State

State

Rowing

Civil Society

State

Civil Society

Source: Adapted from Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004.
This project will build on the regulatory state literature by identifying a new phase
in the division of labor between the state and civil society that I call the oarsman state
and by applying the concept to transatlantic regulatory policymaking. The public policy
literature will benefit from an account of the transnational regulatory policymaking
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institutions in a trade process because transnational regulatory policymaking is
increasingly made through trade.
Regulation is an interdisciplinary topic, spanning economics, law, and political
science (Bartle 2006). The prominent work on regulation in economics has set the terms
of the conversation for the other disciplines and much of the terminology in regulatory
studies was defined in economic terms. For example, in the previously mentioned
division of labor between civil society and the state, industry and business are
incorporated into the category of civil society. In political science, civil society is a
distinct category from business or industry. However, this project includes business and
industry in the category of civil society for the concept of the transatlantic oarsmen
cooperative because the transatlantic regulatory regime is defining civil society to include
them. The regime is operationalizing civil society to allow business and industry to be the
dominant voices guiding the oarsmen cooperative’s activities.

Theory
This project answers two major research questions: (i) was there a change in
the transatlantic regulatory regime after the financial crisis and (ii) why or why not.
Answering the first empirical question, I use a critical junctures framework to analyze the
structure and intensity of cooperation in the transatlantic regulatory regime before and
after the financial crisis of 2007-2009. This project maps the transatlantic institutions,
paying particular attention to those in financial regulatory governance, in snapshots
before and after the crisis, and classifies the degree of cooperation in each institution as
strong, moderate and weak by measuring two criteria: activity and institutionalization. To
answer the second question, I propose an analytic framework that combines approaches
from comparative politics theory and international relations theory to provide an account
13

of causation in regulatory cooperation. The framework employed explains that the
multilevel nature of regulatory regimes creates competition between jurisdictions to
create regulation that attracts people and businesses. As a result globalized, transient
actors are often more empowered in the formulation of regulatory policies than domestic
state actors.
Specifically, this project applies regime theory to state and international financial
regulatory systems. Krasner defined regimes as, “principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area”
(1982, 185). Regime theory is an ideal approach to studying regulatory governance
because of its diverse modes and mechanisms. There are many definitions and levels of
abstractions for the concept of regulation. For example, Baldwin et al. (1998) and Jordana
and Levi-Faur (2004) develop three layered meanings of regulation; at the most narrow
definition as a “specific form of governance: a set of authoritative rules, often
accompanied by some administrative agency, for monitoring and enforcing compliance”,
in the second intermediate sense, “as governance in a general sense: the aggregate efforts
by state agencies to steer the economy”, and in the broadest sense as “all mechanisms of
social control” (Jordana and Levi Faur 2004, 3). The principles, norms and rules of
regime theory are all potentially forms of regulation. Regime theory also asserts the
importance of decision-making procedures to setting actor expectations. In this project,
the focus on decision-making is essential to explain the interaction of actors in different
levels of regulatory regimes. For example, the concept of a regime can be used to analyze
how and why EU member states interact to create EU financial regulation. Finance is the
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issue area of the four regulatory regimes discussed in this project; those are the EU, US,
transatlantic, and international financial regulatory regimes.
The framework is primarily concerned with interaction between the regimes and
two categories of actors: the state and civil society. At the domestic level, regulatory
regimes are created by interaction between the state and civil society. The state includes
all governmental actors and agencies. Civil society is defined, as it is by the EU and US,
to include labor, consumers, industry and nongovernmental actors. However, the
transatlantic regulatory regime has been structured with formal opportunities for
categories of globalized civil society actors to directly influence the course of regulation
and the development of the regime. This is distinct from other global regulatory regimes
that are structured to formally accommodate only state actor input, in intergovernmental
institutions like the World Trade Organization, or to negotiate differences between two
domestic regulatory regimes, like a technical regulatory dialogue.
Figure 2 below maps the connections between the actors in the transatlantic
regulatory regime. The category of global civil society overlaps with the categories of US
civil society and EU civil society since some civil society actors operate both
domestically and globally. Applying this framework to the empirical evidence of changes
in the transatlantic financial regulatory regime reveals that civil society actors organizing
at the transatlantic and global level are successfully influencing the shape of the regime.
Global civil society is driving the process towards a strong transatlantic financial
regulatory regime rather than domestic civil society actors or state actors.5

5

This project deals with activity at the international, transnational or global, and domestic levels.
International refers to interactions and institutions between national governmental actors or representatives.
Transnational and global refers to phenomena extending or active across national boundaries. Domestic
refers to phenomena within national boundaries.
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Figure 2: Transatlantic Regulatory Regime

Source: Author generated.
This theoretical approach is designed to overcome deficiencies of two competing
theoretical perspectives on regulatory cooperation dynamics: the top-down and bottomup approaches. As noted in the literature review, the international political economy
literature is only beginning to address the interdependence of multilevel regulatory
regimes. Frieden, Lake and Broz have noted the disparity in the internationalist and
domestic institutional approaches (2009, 6-9). This project considers the impact of both
domestic regulatory regimes and civil society actors on the transatlantic regulatory
regime and the impact of the transatlantic and international regulatory regimes and civil
society actors on domestic regulatory regimes.
To determine why a transatlantic institutional response to financial regulation has
emerged, I first address the US and EU domestic regulatory regimes. Comparing the US
and EU domestic regulatory regimes before and after the financial crisis, I use a critical
juncture framework to demonstrate that changes have occurred and identify the
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underlying causes. In historical institutionalism a critical juncture represents an event or
moment that acts as a catalyst to break with past institutional structures and prompt
dramatic change (Pierson 2000; Pierson 2004; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). The change
can shift the trajectory of the institution, or its self-reinforcing path dependency.
Financial crises are often categorized as “critical focal points for public debates and
policy makers’ interventions” (Battilossi and Reis 2010, 6). Recent work in economic
history has reaffirmed that critical junctures are useful for determining causality in the
path dependency of states (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).
After presenting empirical evidence that changes have occurred in the regimes I
will consider the actors, institutions and ideology contributing to those changes. Dahl has
asserted that groups and individuals compete to influence policy outcomes in pluralism
(1961; 1978). While Dahl’s theory of pluralism is relevant, it cannot be used to
completely account for the nature of the domestic regulatory regimes in the EU and US.
This project instead uses the theory of regulatory capture to explain the US and EU
regulatory regimes. Regulatory capture is a claim that there is a distinct policymaking
mode in which regulation is made in the interest of the regulated. Marvin Bernstein
initially investigated seven independent US federal regulatory agencies and their
susceptibility to private pressures in his 1955 work, Regulating Business by Independent
Commission. The agencies he analyzed regulated transportation, utilities, and industry
practices; the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was the only regulator of the
financial services industry included in the project. His work considers the work of these
agencies in light of their removal from political control and ambiguity about the extent of
their power and connections to a legitimate democratic government (Bernstein 1955, 14-
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15). He determined that agencies “tend to define the interest of the regulated groups as
the public interest” (Bernstein 1955, 296).
Bernstein’s theory is used to explain the capture of regulators and legislators in
the domestic EU and US contexts. The operationalized definition of regulatory capture
used in this analysis is borrowed from legal scholar Lawrence Baxter who states,
“whenever a particular sector of the industry, subject to the regulatory regime, has
acquired persistent influence disproportionate to the balance of interests envisaged when
the regulatory system was established” (Baxter 2011, 176). This project addresses how
civil society actors interact with and organize around the domestic regulatory regime in
the area of financial regulation. Particular attention is paid to the ideology that makes
financial industry actors considered part of civil society in the oarsmen cooperative and
to the domestic narratives that governments and financial industry members rely on to
increase the salience of the financial industry and manipulate the relationship of the
regulated to the regulators (civil society to the state).
Most scholars have applied the concept of regulatory capture to domestic
regulators who have international roles. Applying capture to trade, Bhagwati argues that
domestic industries capture the United States and European Union and that they
subsequently push for the inclusion of issues not related to trade in World Trade
Organization (WTO) rounds on behalf of those domestic industries (Bhagwati 2008). In
legal scholarship, Margot Kaminski argues that the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) is particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture as it is exempt
from legal constraints that apply to other regulatory policymakers and commits
regulatory paraphrasing (Kaminski 2014). Condon and Sinha also argue that the USTR
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effectively exported domestic regulatory capture to the WTO in intellectual property
rights and that national capture becomes “de facto” capture when the state has a large
influence in an international institution (2008, 168-169; 2013, 10). However, these are
principally domestic applications concerned with how domestic capture occurs and how
it is projected to the international level. This work will apply the concept of capture to a
phenomenon occurring at the transatlantic level by connecting highly mobile multinational corporations (MNCS), their trade associations, and cross-sector organizations to
the emergence of the transatlantic financial regulatory regime.
Ideological capture, or “deep capture” (Baxter 2011, 182), in the US and EU
financial regulatory regimes puts industry in a privileged position to set the agenda of the
transatlantic financial regulatory regime. This is distinct from the “shallow concept of
visible capture” of individual regulations created in the interest of the regulated (Baxter
2011, 182). Policymakers in the US and EU are captured by the ideology of
financialization and Anglo-American finance-led capitalism and prioritizing this above
other policy options prompts them to consider the input of industry actors above other
civil society actors.
As regulations are increasingly established in trade agreements and international
technical dialogues, when extending the existing theoretical concepts from the domestic
context to the global one it is imperative to understand who participates and exerts
influence in regulatory regimes. Carpenter acknowledges that understanding the
mechanisms through which capture occurs is one important line of inquiry (Carpenter and
Moss 2013, 68). This project assesses the access of different civil society and industry
groups to the transatlantic regulatory regime by reviewing formal advisory institutions,
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open consultations and stakeholder presentations. This project also maps the connections
between the institutions in the transatlantic financial regulatory regime to demonstrate the
centrality of different institutions in the policymaking process. These connections will
demonstrate that industry is the predominant agenda-setter for the financial transatlantic
regulatory regime.
The state contributions to the regulatory regimes are also considered, though in
the case of the EU not all member states have equal influence over the financial
regulatory regime. Multilevel intergovernmental theory is used to explain the decisionmaking of twenty-eight member states in the European Council. Putnam developed twolevel game theory to explain how states formulate negotiation positions for international
level agreements. Two-level game theory posits that domestic groups anticipating
international level negotiation strategically alter their domestic negotiating positions to
compensate for the later negotiation (Putnam 1988). Moravcsik (1991; 1993) built on this
theory to explain how EU member states formulate domestic preferences and negotiation
positions ahead of EU level negotiations. His theory of intergovernmental decisionmaking will be used to explain financial regulatory decisions taken by the European
Council that favor Anglo-American, finance-led capitalism. As a key veto player in the
European Council, the United Kingdom’s ideological capture is often replicated at the
EU level.
This project also assesses the role that the international regulatory regime has
played in the emergence of the transatlantic regulatory regime. Network theory is used to
explain that some states, and particularly the US and UK, have a disproportionate
influence over the international financial regulatory regime because of the relative
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strength of their regulatory systems and their domestic financial industries. One important
consequence of this disproportionate influence is domestic and global industry actors are
relatively empowered within the transatlantic regulatory regime. Network theory explains
the connection between system position and influence; the more central the position of an
actor in a system, the more influence the actor has over the content and operation of the
system. Scholars have applied network theory to financial and regulatory activities.
Castells (2000) and Pike and Pollard (2010) have mapped financial flows to identify
central nodes of significant activity. Strange (1998) and Sassen (2002) have asserted that
these nodes are influential because they are hubs of activity within their broader
networks. Drezner also discusses nodes of dominant regulatory activity (2007). He posits
that regulatory influence is directly correlated to market size. According to Drezner the
EU and US are regulatory standard setters in finance because of their large developed
markets. Network regulatory theory will be used to explain that the EU and US choose to
cooperate and seek to adopt a common transatlantic approach in a transatlantic regulatory
regime in part because of the alignment of UK-US financialization. The EU and US
cooperate in creating a transatlantic financial regulatory regime partially because of the
UK dominance in the EU financial regulatory regime and because of the London-New
York nexus of financial services.
Empirical and Theoretical Contributions
There are two major contributions of this project, one empirical and the other
theoretical. Empirically, this project maps the differences in the transatlantic
regulatory regime before and after the financial crisis. Evidence is presented to
demonstrate that a period of institutional development and revitalization in the
transatlantic regulatory regime followed the financial crisis; existing transatlantic
21

institutions took on new functions and adopted new goals. The EU-US High-Level
Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) was steered by industry input to
recommend the launch of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and
include financial services in the agreement despite the existence of the Financial Markets
Regulatory Dialogue (FMRD). Civil society actors responded to and encouraged this
process. In some cases, EU domestic civil society actors and US domestic civil society
actors reorganized on the transatlantic level to respond to and influence the emerging
transatlantic financial regulatory regime. The traditional theoretical approaches of
international relations to explaining international institutions and regimes are statecentric. The major empirical finding of this project challenges these approaches: the
financial industry is driving the shape and deciding the content of the transatlantic
financial regulatory regime. Though the financial crisis could have reduced the salience
of input from the financial industry, the EU and US have doubled-down on the ideology
of financialization and have given the financial industry a guiding role in the regulatory
regime.
The empirical evidence of changes in the transatlantic financial regulatory regime
fills gaps in existing literature. First, transatlantic literature with a historical institutional
dimension has been largely focused on developments in the defense relationship (Cogan
2001; Kagan 2002; Peterson and Steffenson 2009). Second, thus far scholars like Posner
and Nolke have addressed developments in individual spheres of financial regulation
(securities in 2009 and accounting standards in 2010, respectively), but have not
undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of EU-US cooperation in all
spheres of financial regulation.
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The theoretical contribution of this work is combining two seemingly disparate
approaches to regulatory cooperation and institution building to explain a new role for the
state. Specifically, this project proposes the oarsman state meaning that there is a new
division of labor between the state and civil society, best illustrated with a nautical
analogy: civil society is steering regulatory activity and the state is rowing by creating
regulatory institutions to serve industry. Regulatory state theorists assert that the state is
steering regulatory activity while civil society is rowing. In Reinventing Government
(1992), Osborne and Gaebler propose that the ideal division of responsibility between
government and civil society is one in which government is steering, by guiding and
directing activity, and civil society rowing, by doing entrepreneurial activities and
traditional service provision. Braithwaite distinguishes this as the most recent form of the
division of responsibility between civil society and the state, identifies the other divisions
that preceded it, and associates the division with the contemporary regulatory state that
emerged with neoliberalism in the 1980s (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite and
Drahos 2000; Braithwaite 2000). In the 1980s and 1990s, many of the works developing
the theory of the regulatory state emerged from studying the US and EU (Majone 1996;
Moran 2002).
This work proposes a new phase in the relationship between the state and
civil society at the transatlantic level: in the oarsman state global civil society and
industry actors are steering regulatory activity and the state is rowing by providing
services and building institutions for civil society and industry. This claim is
supported by examples of US and EU civil society and industry actors steering state
provision of services at the transatlantic level. Rowing now encompasses not only
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conventional service provision but also institution building. The state is creating
regulatory institutions in the service of industry preferences.

Statement of the Argument
This project argues that, in the wake of the 2007-09 financial crisis, the US and
EU are doubling down on finance-led domestic growth strategies and that this is their
goal in constructing a transatlantic financial regulatory regime. The regime’s goal
incorporates industry actors into the category of civil society and privileges the input of
industry actors over other civil society actors. Financialization ideology underpins the
convergence of EU and US regulatory approaches. The construction of this regime is in
response to pressure from emerging markets and to service domestic industry actors after
the financial crisis. The regime is intended to allow the US and EU to maintain their
dominance within the international financial regulatory regime and continue to enjoy
finance-led growth. In the emergent transatlantic regulatory regime, there is a new
division of labor between the state and civil society, best illustrated with a nautical
analogy: civil society is steering regulatory activity and the state is rowing by creating
regulatory institutions to serve industry. I thus propose the term oarsman state to explain
this division of labor and assert that the EU and US are operating a transatlantic oarsmen
cooperative.

Research Design and Chapter Plan
To demonstrate the changes in the transatlantic regulatory regime after the
financial crisis, I use a critical junctures framework to analyze the structure and intensity
of cooperation in the transatlantic regulatory regime before and after the financial crisis
of 2007-2009.
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This work uses the research method of process tracing to demonstrate that the
2007-2009 financial crisis was a critical juncture in the regulatory regimes of the EU and
US. It compares the policies, institutions, and ideology of the regulatory regimes before
and after the financial crisis. The evidence presented makes it clear that the critical
juncture has not delivered what policymakers initially presumed the outcome would be—
domestic financial regulation made in the public interest—but rather the long-term
outcome has been regulation made through deep regulatory capture of policymakers by
global industry.
In order to determine if a critical juncture has occurred, first the antecedent
conditions need to be addressed and later compared to the legacy of the critical juncture.
(Collier and Collier 1991; Pierson 2004) I address the history of financial regulation in
the US in Chapter 2 and the history of financial regulation in the EU in Chapter 3 to
establish the baseline of the antecedent conditions. I compare the policies, ideology, and
institutional structures and procedures of the US and EU financial regulatory regimes
before and after the financial crisis. The data I use are laws, directives, and regulations.
The data collection included official US government documents, EU Council and
Commission directives, and secondary source literature written about these
developments. However, regulatory change manifests gradually. For example the DoddFrank bill, a highlight of the US regulatory response to the crisis, was first passed in July
2010, but the public comment periods on certain provisions have extended well into 2015
and some rules, mandated under Dodd-Frank, have not been proposed yet. Until these
provisions take effect, the shape of implementation is ambiguous.
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By comparing maps of the regimes before and after the financial crisis, I
demonstrate that the financial crisis was a critical juncture resulting in change in the
policies and institutions of the regimes but that financialization ideology remained fairly
constant. In the case of the EU, this also requires comparing the relative influence of
different member state regulatory approaches in creating the EU financial regulatory
regime and reviewing EU decision-making procedures. I use multi-level governance and
network theory in order to explain the interaction of EU member states which creates the
EU regulatory regime.
Critical junctures theory also requires identifying the stability of core attributes
which could provide alternate explanations for the legacy of the critical juncture. In
Chapters 2 and 3, I identify financialization ideology backed by pro-market, AngloSaxon capitalism ideology as a stable core attribute and latent variable in both the US and
EU regulatory regimes. Financialization is commonly defined as an increasing reliance
on profits from financial activities rather than profits from production-based activities,
the latter activities comprising the ‘real economy.’ Financialization ideology is ideology
which prioritizes finance-led economic growth over other forms of growth.
Financialization persists before, during, and after the financial crisis with few
interruptions. I find that financialization ideology partially overwhelmed the presumed
causal relationship6 between the financial crisis and regulation (that regulation would be
more restrictive of the financial industry and made in the public interest) and led

6

Several policymakers (see Introduction and Chapters 2 and 3) in both the EU and US have suggested that
the financial crisis is a “lesson learned” and that it would lead to fundamental reform in financial
regulation. Although some EU and US regulations have become more restrictive and these are addressed in
Chapters 2 and 3, the domestic level is just one level of financial regulations. The international and
transatlantic levels give industry actors and policymakers an opportunity to impact domestic level
regulations.
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policymakers to support industry actors through domestic mechanisms such as bailouts,
and seek to service industry actors and further the financialization strategy. Regulatory
capture occurs.
In order to conduct both the longitudinal and case study comparisons, I need to
define the scope of regimes and the scope of regulation. Using Krasner’s definition,
regimes will be operationalized as rules, norms, principles, and decision making
procedures that set actor expectations in the issue area of finance. In this project
regulation will be defined as all activities undertaken by governance authorities to steer
behavior.
Financial regulation does not consist merely of regulation of financial activity
and products. Governance authorities formulate and implement financial regulation. The
term governance authorities allows multilevel governance actors to be included in this
analysis by incorporating national state agencies as well as transnational, transatlantic and
international public and private governance organizations. This project will use
Keohane’s definition of governance: “Governance can be defined as the making and
implementation of rules, and the exercise of power, within a given domain of activity.
‘Global governance’ refers to rule-making and power-exercise at a global scale, but not
necessarily by entities authorized by general agreement to act. Global governance can be
exercised by states, religious organizations, and business corporations, as well as by
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. Since there is no global
government, global governance involves strategic interactions among entities that are not
arranged in formal hierarchies” (Keohane 2003: 121).
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While the economy is essential to understanding the substantive content of the
regulation in this project, national government agencies have also attempted to steer
individual behavior and interactions with finance to produce social good and not just
economic outcomes, for example by encouraging people to buy a home in order to
establish security or a sense of community. Financial regulation will be defined as all
activities undertaken by governance authorities to steer behavior towards or interaction
with financial activities, providers, and products. Because of the breadth of activities
which govern not only financial activities but also how individuals and industry actors
interact with financial activities and products a holistic examination of EU and US
approaches to finance rather than regulation of finance is necessary.
The elements of EU and US regulatory regimes that are compared are policies,
institutions, and ideology. I operationalize policies by looking at directives, rules, and
actual laws and codifications of financial regulation. I operationalize institutions by
identifying new institutions or institutions that have had change in their procedures. I
operationalize ideology by surveying existing literature about historic attitudes towards
finance, public speeches of national and European Union politicians during and after the
financial crisis on the subject of finance, finance’s role in the national economy, and
opinion polls. The predominant idea and phenomenon driving both the EU and US
financial regulatory regimes is financialization ideology.
Financialization is a concept that has been developed to explain corporations’
increasing reliance on profits not from value added production but from investment or
rentier activities. Financialization has also been used to explain governments relying on
these strategies to grow gross domestic products (King and Levine 1993; Foster 2007;
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Van der Zwan 2014). The later version of financialization is also described as finance-led
growth. The degree of financialization is operationalized by measuring the contribution
of the financial sector to gross domestic product in the EU member states and US. I use
statistics collected by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and supplement them with official national statistics. This methodological
approach to measuring financialization has been applied elsewhere in the financialization
literature, notably in Epstein and Power (2003) and Nolke and Perry (2008).
Next, in Chapter 4 I consider the impact of the international financial regulatory
regime on the emerging transatlantic financial regulatory regime. The financial crisis was
a critical juncture that took place more or less simultaneously at the global level. Though
it produced disparate responses, one external force on both the US and EU has been a
challenge to the existing international financial order. During the crisis emerging market
economies initially fared better than the US and EU and challenged the structural power
and dominance of the US and EU member states in international financial institutions. I
demonstrate the changes in the international financial regulatory regime that reduced the
power of the US and EU. This challenge to the dominance of the US and EU in the
international financial regulatory regime incentivized policymakers in the US and EU to
establish a strong transatlantic regulatory regime to compete globally: they doubled-down
on financialization. I will trace the development of the transatlantic institutions before
and after the financial crisis to demonstrate this.
A primary contention of this project is that the role of the TransAtlantic Business
Dialogue, Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, Transatlantic Labour Dialogue, and
Transatlantic Economic Council changed after the financial crisis and that the High Level
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Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) and the TTIP were new institutions in the
regime. In the 1990s the EU and US created new transatlantic groups for civil society and
some were given an advisory status. After the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA)
subsided, some of these advisory groups fell into fallow. However, when the HLWG and
then the TTIP negotiations were launched some of these civil society channels were
revived. To assess the internal dynamic of the changes I categorize the two dimensions of
function and institutionalization in the relevant transatlantic institutions as weak,
moderate or strong in 2006, 2007 and again in 2015. For the dimension of function the
activity of each institution is rated on an index with two factors: the frequency of
meetings and the number of outcomes or deliverables. The degree of institutionalization
is rated on an index with two factors: the number of staff and the number of members. I
made the distinction between the weak, moderate and strong categories by comparing the
institutional factors (such as number of staff, and frequency of meetings) to those of other
international organizations. Appendix 5 contains a full accounting of my methods.
In Chapter 5 I identify the ongoing political and institutional processes that
produce and reproduce the legacy of the critical juncture: the pursuit of a transatlantic
financial regulatory regime and a fundamental change in the relationship between
regulators and the regulated. I identify the regulatory authorities in the US and EU and at
the transatlantic level, and the methods of access and input given to different stakeholders
groups, such as consultations, hearings, and meetings.
At the transatlantic level I identify the transatlantic institutions, governmental and
private, that cooperated on regulatory issues before the crisis and compare them with
those that do so after the crisis. These institutions are then analyzed for the methods of
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access and input open to stakeholders. In the case of the High Level Working Group on
Jobs, the data used are the agendas and list of stakeholder meetings, and responses to
public consultations conducted in the EU and US. For the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership the data used are agendas and lists of stakeholder meetings
conducted, transcripts of hearings before legislative bodies in the EU member states as
well as in the European Parliament and the US, responses to public consultations
conducted in the EU and US as well as the profiles of the members of the official
advisory groups to the EU, US and to the Transatlantic Economic Council. The
limitations to this data set are that not all meetings have transcripts which are publically
available. Further, unlike the EU the US does not publish its negotiating position papers.
Another contention of this project is that the EU and US are privileging the input
of one category of civil society in transatlantic institutions, namely, industry actors. To
assess the external dynamic of the changes, I map the connections between the
institutions in 2006, 2007 and in 2015. This mapping will categorize the institutions
according to type and will chart the relationships between them. Revitalized and new
interstate and industry institutions design the transatlantic regulatory regime. The
industry institutions include the Trans-Atlantic Business Council (TABC) and the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) advisory groups.7 The interstate
institutions include the TTIP regulatory chapters and the Transatlantic Economic Council

7

In 2013 the TransAtlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) merged with the European-American Business
Council to become the Trans-Atlantic Business Council (TABC). Since 2013, the TABD refers to the
executive council within the TABC and is composed of, “chief executive officers and C-Suite executives
from leading American and European companies operating in the U.S., Europe, and globally” (TABC
2013).
In this work, TABD is used unless it is comparing the activity across after 2013 and then TABC/D is used
to avoid confusion.
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(TEC). These institutions provide service primarily to industry and enable the pursuit of a
financialization-fueled growth strategy.
Finally, in the conclusion, I use the gathered evidence to propose the concept
oarsman state to explain this new division of labor. The oarsman state is the emergence
of a new stage of regulatory relationship in which the state serves civil society actors in
the creation of regulation and institutions. I consider the potential impact of the
transatlantic financial regulatory regime on the EU, US, and international financial
regulatory regimes. The conclusions look broadly at the implications of this arrangement
and mode of policymaking for other international regulatory regimes and for domestic
actors.
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Chapter 2: US Financial Regulatory Regime
This project argues that the financial crisis was a critical juncture in the US, EU,
transatlantic and international financial regulatory regimes, and that the changes to the
US, EU, and international regimes partially explain why the US and EU are changing the
transatlantic regulatory regime. This chapter will use within-case process-tracing to
compare the US financial regulatory regime before the financial crisis of 2007-2009 to
the US financial regulatory regime after the financial crisis. Identifying the changes in
policy, and institutional processes and structures will demonstrate that the financial crisis
was a critical juncture in the US financial regulatory regime that centralized the regime’s
institutions under the Financial Stability Oversight Council, added new surveillance and
rule-making functions to existing institutions, and established the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau and the Office of Financial Research. The underlying ideology of
financialization did not change and the US financial regulatory regimes’ commitment to
financialization is identified as an underlying cause of the emergence of the transatlantic
financial regulatory regime.
The US changed its financial regulatory regime after the financial crisis, and the
elements of its regime influence the transatlantic regulatory regime. The fragmented US
system comparatively empowers industry, while financial regulation at the EU level
increasingly originates from technocratic bodies with an abridged role for organized
industry. Establishing the role of industry at the domestic level is important to later
determining the role that industry has been afforded at the transatlantic level in the
process of regulatory cooperation. The different roles for industry can be attributed to the
development of two distinct models regarding the role of finance to the economy, the
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Anglo-American market model and the German model, a difference in political salience
for industry in the regulatory policy processes, and internal dynamics at the EU level.

Identifying Regulation
Regulation is a concept fraught with political and social expectations and
understandings as well as divergent meanings in subdisciplines of political science. Once
constrained to explaining state limits on economic activity, regulatory policy studies have
spilled over into the social sphere (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). Regulatory politics and
policy scholars have conceived of three levels of definitions for regulation. The most
narrow definition conceives of regulation as specific rules or standards set by the state;
this is a limiting definition because much regulation seeks to encourage or incentivize
certain behaviors rather than limit them. One such example is the variety of tax breaks
related to home ownership. The second, broadest level covers all activity by a state. This
work will use the term regulation in the sense of a middle level general concept: all
actions undertaken by the government or other legitimized regulatory actors to prohibit,
direct and incentivize the behavior of individuals and firms.
Another division over the concept of regulation is whether the regulation targets
the demand or supply side. In the financialization section of this chapter, I address the
way that federal taxation policy has incentivized individuals to use financial services.
Taxation policy is therefore one element of demand-side regulation. Demand-side
regulation targets individual behavior. The field of behavioral economics considers how
firms and government can encourage certain behavioral changes. Thaler and Sunstein
identify a number of ways to make small changes to the “choice architecture” to “nudge”
individual behavior towards a desirable outcome or decision; one pertinent example is the
suggestion that employers should auto-enroll employees into 401(k)s and force them to
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opt-out in order to ensure higher enrollment rates and higher retirement savings (Thaler
and Sunstein 2009). The federal government regulation of the financial industry, through
agencies, laws, and tax code, is part of supply-side regulation. Policymakers usually
present supply-side regulation as the entirety of financial regulation.
Before and After the Financial Crisis
The United States has created financial regulation incrementally and in response
to crises, market failures, and shifts in productivity in the real economy (White 2009;
Farrell and Newman 2010). The financial crisis of 2007-2009 served as a critical juncture
in US regulation but not one with the legacy many policymakers and pundits anticipated
it would. The developments occurred in three categories of regulation, (i) policies, (ii)
institutional structures and processes, and (iii) ideas. In this section I will detail the US
financial regulatory regime before and after the financial crisis to demonstrate that the
financial crisis was a critical juncture in the US financial regulatory regime. This is
central to explaining why there has been a change in the transatlantic regulatory regime.
In the industrialization period (1790s-1910s), advances in technology contributed
to a robust growth in US finance as a result of the connections between production and
banking institutions. This was then followed by a period of reregulation and contraction
(1910s-1920s). States enacted Blue Sky Laws in the 1910s to regulate the nascent
securities industry and protect incumbent interests (Battilossi and Reis 2010). However,
the fragmented approach to regulation by states was not sufficient to stave off the stock
market crash in 1929 and the Great Depression. Historical attitudes which had viewed
financial activity as dangerous, swindling, gambling, or immoral and questions about the
level of state intervention in markets were not completely set aside and contributed to a
substantial wave of regulation during the Great Depression (Banner 2002; Busch 2008).
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The stock market crash in 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression in the United States
precipitated significant changes. The Securities Act of 1933 required the sale of
instrumentalities (securities) across states to be registered with the government in an
attempt to establish disclosure. In 1934 the Securities Exchange Act established the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to centrally regulate securities trading in
stock exchanges and punish fraud (Sherman 2009). The Roosevelt administration closed
banks temporarily in 1934 to fend off the permanent folding of banks (Busch 2008, 36).
The Glass-Steagall Act, which partitioned the sale of securities from traditional
bank activities (deposits and loans), was a part of the Banking Act of 1933 (White 2009,
7) One of the most influential provisions of Glass-Steagall was Regulation Q. Regulation
Q put limits on the interest rates that banks could offer depositors but notably made an
exception for institutions involved in mortgage lending. Mortgage lending institutions
were given a quarter-percent advantage (Johnson and Kwak 2011, 35-37). This
advantage, “was explicitly designed to encourage a flow of money into housing”
(Sherman 2009, 4). Even in a period of regulation in response to the Great Depression,
the federal government sought to support financing in the social sphere rather than
potentially alter American attitudes towards finance. Partially as a result of the new
restrictions on financial activity following the Great Depression, advanced countries
including the US were more financially developed in 1913 than they were until the 2000s
(Rajan and Zingales 2003).
In the 1970s and 1980s as the US encouraged deregulation in the global economy,
the US Congress removed some of the existing regulations for finance. In 1978, the
Supreme Court decided in Marquette v. First of Oklahoma to allow banks “to export the
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usury rate laws of their home state nationwide” (Sherman 2009, 1). As a result of the
decision, states competed to have the least regulated usury rates in a race to the bottom.
In 1999 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act or Financial Services Modernization Act allowed
commercial banks to engage in investment activities with deposits, deregulating a
provision of the Glass-Steagall Act (Sanati 2009).
The federalist structure of US government, in which power is shared between the
national and state governments, can create competitive regulatory regimes between states
when the national government does not create national regulation. In regulatory
competition, jurisdictions change their regulations to attract business, households, and
industries. In Tiebout’s original model of regulatory competition, regulatory competition
was meant to lead to optimal outcomes of preference aggregation, representing a race to
the top since each jurisdiction would attract only the households that desired the mix of
public goods and tax rates that it was offering (Tiebout 1956). However, a frequent
criticism of this model is that devolution inspires competitive deregulation, or a race to
the bottom, which allows industry actors to use regulatory arbitrage (Geradin and
McCahery 2005).
The trend of deregulation in finance ended sharply with the financial crisis in
2007-2009. The crisis prompted not only a change in social attitudes towards finance but
also in the policies and institutions that regulate financial services.
At the forefront of the US response to the crisis was Secretary of the Treasury
Henry Paulson. His reaction to the crisis was to bring bankers together for deal making
behind closed doors. In this way he sought to shore up the institutions facing ruin. After
realizing that the crisis was threatening to ruin not only individual corporations but the
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entire financial system he began to despair and consider more systematic action. Many
accounts paint Paulson as the policy entrepreneur who engineered the banking bailout. In
Too Big to Fail, Andrew Ross Sorkin gives an account of how policymakers were moved
to take action (2010). Secretary Paulson was moved when he appreciated that the
financial crisis was “ ‘an economic 9/11’ ” (Sorkin 2010, 420). He realized that
individual deals would not stave off the collapse of every financial institution and that an
holistic solution was necessary. “ ‘Nothing is breaking our way,’ Paulson declared. ‘We
can’t solve the problems of today; we need to think of tomorrow. We need to get ahead of
this It’s deepening, moving too quickly. This is the financial equivalent of war, and we’re
going to need wartime powers’ ” (Sorkin 2010, 421). Paulson was at the forefront of
politically securitizing finance and calling for extraordinary, interventionist measures.
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke shared Paulson’s analysis and “didn’t
believe the crisis could be solved by individual deals or some one-off solution. ‘We can’t
keep doing this,’ he insisted to Paulson. ‘Both because we at the Fed don’t have the
necessary resources and for reasons of democratic legitimacy, it’s important that the
Congress come in and take control of the situation’ ” (Sorkin 2010, 431).
On September 18, Paulson and Bernanke met with two dozen congressmen in
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s office to convince the Congressional leadership that
a politically unpopular bailout was necessary to avoid a dramatic economic collapse
(Dodd 2009). Bernanke appealed to them by referencing his research, “ ‘I spent my
career as an academic studying great depressions. I can tell you from history that if we
don’t act in a big way, you can expect another great depression, and this time it is going
to be far, far worse’ ” (Sorkin 2010, 446). Bernanke and Paulson proposed a vague
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version of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act with a three-and-a-half page prospectus. Paulson followed up his
presentation by noting, “ ‘If it doesn’t pass, then heaven help us all’ ” (Sorkin 2010, 446).
Senator Christopher Dodd’s account of the meeting echoes the imagery of an economic
version of the devastation during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001: “It's the
economic equivalent of 9/11 in my view, having been here for both events, ... sitting in
that room with Hank Paulson saying to us, in very measured tones, no hyperbole, no
excessive adjectives, that unless you act, the financial system of this country and the
world will melt down in a matter of days. There was literally a pause in that room where
the oxygen left” (Dodd 2009). Dodd spent three days expanding what he considered an
“insulting” three-and-a-half page bill into 80+ pages (Dodd 2009).
Opposition from Republicans to TARP led to immense frustration amongst the
Democratic leadership and Paulson literally took a bended knee in front of Speaker Pelosi
begging her to keep TARP alive to a House vote. Bernanke and Paulson made a
concerted effort to emphasize the potential catastrophic consequences if TARP was not
enacted. After the initial bill was voted down on September 29, staff hustled to revise the
bill and it was passed by the Congress and signed by President Bush on October 3.
Criticisms of TARP centered around the lack of conditions on the capital
infusions. Two Democratic Senators and chairmen of relevant committees, Christopher
Dodd and Barney Frank, were particularly vocal in criticizing TARP and worked on
legislation that would address reforms to the US financial regulatory regime. In 2010 the
US Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank), to add protection against the series of regulatory failures that culminated
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in the financial crisis. While the impact of the legislation is unclear as several provisions
have yet to be implemented, it restructured the fragmented system of regulators and
added new requirements for financial service providers.8 Dodd-Frank creates policy
changes, but it also has implications for institutional structures and processes.
This chapter will not seek to describe all of the changes to the regulatory system
but rather highlight the changes which represent significant breaks with the past, such as
new legislation and the creation of new regulatory agencies. Critical junctures are not
only about change, but also about continuity of systems. In the next section about the
relationship of the regulators to the regulated, I will argue that there has been continuity
because of the underlying narrative and ideas of financialization. Where possible, this
chapter distinguishes between policy change and institutional structural or procedural
change.
The first significant policy change was that commercial banks were banned from
proprietary trading and investing in hedge funds and private equity funds with their own
accounts. A solution proposed by the former United States Federal Reserve Chairman,
Paul Volcker, the Volcker Rule targets the speculative activity of banks that contributed
directly to the financial crisis (Carney 2013). Proprietary trading allowed insured deposit
banks to take excessive risks with deposits, so partitioning the activities of investment
and commercial banks would theoretically protect those institutions from the large losses
possible through those speculative investments. This partitioning is not a new idea. The
Glass-Steagall Act also separated investment and commercial bank activities. However,
in 1999 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act or Financial Services Modernization Act

8

The delay itself is indicative of the state serving industry actors.
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effectively repealed that provision (Sanati 2009). The partitioning of investment and
commercial activities is a policy change that has implications for the structure of banks.
The second change occurred in institutional structures and procedures with the
creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The FSOC has been
granted very broad oversight of the activities of the individual regulatory agencies as well
as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Since previously states and
different agencies have had fragmented regulatory purviews, the centralization of
responsibility for the stability of financial markets marks a major turning point in US
regulation.9 The FSOC has the ability to designate SIFIs, which must then meet more
stringent regulation and reporting requirements than other financial institutions. SIFIs fall
into two categories, Nonbank Financial Companies and Financial Market Utilities, and
there are different threat tests for their identification.10 In order to be designated a SIFI,
the head of the eight regulators,11 an independent member with insurance experience, and
the Treasury Secretary must vote (Winkler 2014). The Treasury Sectary has a veto
power, as s/he must vote for an institution to be designated. Figure 3 below details the
institutions that have been designated in each category thus far as well as the threat test
required in order to qualify as such an institution.

9

The FSOC website acknowledges this fact by noting that, “The Financial Stability Oversight Council has
a clear statutory mandate that creates for the first time collective accountability for identifying risks and
responding to emerging threats to financial stability” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘About FSOC’).
10
Banks which are deemed to be globally systemically important are identified by the Financial Stability
Board.
11
The eight regulatory bodies are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the Federal Reserve (FRB), National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA), the US Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).
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Figure 3: US Systemically Important Financial Institutions
Threat
“material financial distress at the
U.S. nonbank financial company, or
the nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, or
mix of the activities of the U.S.
nonbank financial company, could
pose a threat to the financial stability
of the United States” (DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act)
Financial Market
“failure of or a disruption to the
Utilities
functioning of a financial market
utility or the conduct of a payment,
clearing, or settlement activity could
create, or increase, the risk of
significant liquidity or credit
problems spreading among financial
institutions or markets and thereby
threaten the stability of the financial
system of the United States” (DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act)
Source: Author generated.
Nonbank Financial
Companies

Designated Institutions
American International
Group, Inc. (AIG), General
Electric Capital,
Corporation, Inc.,
Prudential Financial, Inc.

The Clearing House
Payments Company
L.L.C., CLS Bank
International, Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, Inc.,
The Depository Trust
Company, Fixed Income
Clearing Corporation, ICE
Clear Credit LLC, National
Securities Clearing
Corporation, The Options
Clearing Corporation

The FSOC designations are significant because they politically securitize
financial institutions;12 institutions are only identified if they pose a threat to the financial
stability of the US. After the financial crisis, the narrative politically securitizing finance
was successful in making speculative activities a threat to the health of not only the US
12

Securitization is used with two meanings in this project: financial securitization and political
securitization. When the term is used in the latter sense, it will be referred to as political securitization to
avoid confusion. Initially developed to apply to security studies, political securitization is a process through
which political actors commit a speech act to convince the public that there is a threat posed to a referent
object (Buzan et al. 1998). Successful completion of the speech act then convinces the public to allow the
political actors to use extraordinary measures to prevent the threat from damaging the referent object.
In the financial sense, securitization is “the process of creating securities by pooling together various cashflow producing financial assets. These securities are then sold to investors. Securitization, in its most basic
form, is a method of financing assets. Any asset may be securitized as long as it is cash-flow producing”
(Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, “Securities: An Overview”).
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economy but also the world. This is evidenced by Secretary Paulson and Senator Dodd’s
remarks comparing the potential of a financial system breakdown to the devastation of
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
Dodd-Frank also expanded the authority of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), the US Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The extent of their new responsibilities
is addressed in Figure 5.
Figure 4 below maps the institutions in the US financial regulatory regime
immediately before the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and lists their responsibilities.
Notably the individual agencies and commissions are decentralized. There is a division of
responsibility for regulating traditional commercial banking and regulating securities
activities; the FDIC and Federal Reserve were responsible for the former and the SEC
was responsible for the latter. Figure 5 on the following page illustrates the changes to the
financial regulatory system after Dodd-Frank.
Figure 4: Pre-Crisis US Financial Regulatory Regime Map

Source: Author generated; adapted from Dimon 2012, 20.

43

Figure 5: Post-Crisis US Financial Regulatory Regime Map

Source: Author generated; adapted from Dimon 2012, 20.
In Figure 5 the new functions and responsibilities of the agencies are listed below
their original responsibilities and have a shaded background. The connections between
the agencies and FSOC denote that the chairperson, director, or comptroller of each
agency serves on the Council. The Office of Financial Research supports FSOC directly
by responding to its requests for information. The two new institutions are the Office of
Financial Research and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Though CFPB is an
independent agency it is located in the Federal Reserve.
The establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was a
significant institutional change. CFPB was created in 2011 to educate consumers, and
collect and investigate complaints against financial institutions. Before the financial crisis
there was no centralized body that collected consumer complaints. State authorities and
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attorneys general are responsible for enforcing the rules that CFPB writes. Thus far CFPB
has focused on financial products that extend credit to citizens, including mortgages,
college loans, and credit cards.
Dodd-Frank enshrined the main policy and institutional changes in US financial
regulatory regime after the financial crisis. The Volcker rule was a policy change that
separated commercial and investment banking activities. Dodd-Frank changed the
institutional processes of the CFTC, SEC, and FDIC. It also created new institutions: the
CFPB and the FSOC. The new policy of identifying SIFIs politically securitizes financial
institution. Thus, the US response to a crisis in financialized capitalism was to secure, via
new policies and oversight institutions, the nation’s financial institutions.

Financialization
The financial crisis was a critical juncture that produced changes in the policy and
institutions of the US financial regulatory regime, centralizing and increasing regulatory
oversight over financial activities. However during and after the financial crisis,
financialization ideology remained a fairly constant influence on the regulatory regime.
The form of the regime changed but the function of prioritizing finance-led growth
strategies persisted. This section addresses the extent of financialization in the US and its
impact on the US financial regulatory regime. The high-degree of financialization in the
US economy and its ideological regulatory capture of the US financial regulatory regime
are driving modifications to the transatlantic regulatory regime that make the regime
promote finance-led growth. Financialization of Anglo-American capitalism has
increased the political salience of input from the financial industry into regulatory policy
formulation, decision-making and implementation.
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Scholars have noted that since the 1970s businesses have gradually begun to rely
on profits from investments in financial products rather than production based profits. For
example, in a number of members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) profits of financial activities/rentier income have increased as a
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) relative to profits from other sectors.
(Epstein and Power 2003) Financialization is commonly defined as the separation of
financial activities and profits as removed from production-based activities and profits,
the latter activities comprising the ‘real economy’ (Foster 2007; Foster and Magdoff
2009; Van der Zwan 2014).
Another debate in the development literature is whether financialization of the
economy leads to economic growth, represented in GDP (King and Levine 1993;
Jayaratne and Strahan 1996; Bordo and Rousseau 2012; Law and Singh 2014). Though
there is no consensus about the relationship between growth and financial development, it
seems that solid legal and banking institutions are preconditions for financialization to
contribute to economic growth (Chinn and Ito 2006; Law et al. 2013). These
requirements would prime the US and EU for financialization, since they have some of
the most developed legal and regulatory systems (Quaglia 2011).
Financialization has not just happened in the economic sphere but in the social
sphere as well. Financial inclusion refers to the degree to which financial institutions and
services are embedded in states. Measurements of financial inclusion include the number
of loans from financial institutions, the number of bank accounts at formal financial
institutions, and the number of points of service (bank branches) per capita (World Bank,
Global Project for Financial Inclusion). The more central financial products and services
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are to everyday life, the more financial regulatory policies are likely to affect not just the
financial service and product providers but also consumers and clients. This potentially
creates a new broader interest group with political salience but without direct access to
the regulatory regime. This process is reinforced by the prevalence of the financialgrowth narrative; citizens can be made to believe that finance is central to their economic
success and growing their net worth. This is perhaps no more prominent than in the
United States, as will be discussed below.
Financial regulation as a substantive policy area is different from other types of
regulation. First, the pace of innovation in financial products and techniques is quick.
Some official accounts of the financial crisis suggest it was not deregulation or
speculative investments which were to blame but rather a failure of regulatory agencies to
keep up with industry innovation (Bernanke 2010). Susan Strange has argued that
policymakers have routinely shirked their responsibility to regulate financial markets
(Strange 1986; Strange 1999). The corollary argument is that individuals working in the
financial industry, either through a revolving door or self-regulation, are best poised to
regulate finance because they are keeping up with industry innovation. This is a
suggestion that regulation should be created by the regulated. This mode of regulatory
policymaking has several consequences for the regulatory regime. The first is that former
finance industry insiders heading regulatory agencies may be more sympathetic to or
familiar with the desires of industry than to the desires of the American public; second,
the access and relationships they have to other members of the financial industry may
inappropriately influence their decisions; and third, they may plan their return to the
financial industry after their turns as regulators.
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These three scenarios might result in regulation in the interest of the regulated, or
regulatory capture. Regulatory capture emerged in public interest theory to describe
undue influence of one interest group over the decision-making of a regulatory agency
(Bernstein 1955; Stigler 1971; Posner 1974).
The second reason financial regulation is different from other types of regulation
is that financial activity is a phenomenon relatively unrestrained by borders. Nationallevel financial regulation is responsive to what occurs at the international level and to
developments within global markets.13 Some financial regulation seeks therefore to limit
or block exposure to global markets or financial flows, treating them as exogenous,
potentially destabilizing forces. But the very act of having a currency traded
internationally can expose states to the whims of markets composed of transnational
forces. This is distinct from other economic regulation targeting exogenous forces that
can be identified as within or of another state. This creates a very dynamic and
interdependent regulatory process and again can increase reliance on industry
representatives who represent the abstract markets to shape regulation. It also has led
some states to use political narratives to securitize markets and financial activities.
Assessing the structure of the US financial industry, the financial sector’s size as a
percentage of GDP, the narratives of financialization present before and after the crisis,
and the dynamics that have dominated the regulatory policies will provide a basis for
understanding if the role of civil society actors or state actors have changed in the US
domestic regulatory regimes after the financial crisis.

13

This project will treat the market as an exogenous sphere of activity which is mostly independent from
states and governments. Government intervention into markets is one form of regulation.
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Financialization of the Economic Sphere
The US financial industry is marked by its diversity, size, pervasiveness in
everyday life, and political influence. The extent of financialization in the economic
sphere changed very little after the financial crisis and puts the financial industry in a
privileged position to contribute to the content of the US financial regulatory regime.
There are a wide variety of financial products and services provided by the
financial sector in the US and the process of disintermediation has increased the typology
of financial industry actors.14 The major subsectors are asset management, banking,
insurance and venture capital (U.S. Department of Commerce). However, the trend
towards consolidation of firms means that the US financial services industry is dominated
by a relatively small number of firms in each sector (Berger et al 1999).
In 2014, the industries of insurance and finance alone accounted for 7.2 percent of
US GDP (U.S. Department of Commerce). It is important to consider this percentage as it
relates to finance’s increasing contribution to GDP and as a smaller part of the entire
financial sector’s overall contribution to GDP. Epstein and Power used Organisation of
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data to determine the finance sector’s
contribution to US GDP in every year from 1960-2000 (Epstein and Power 2003). Figure
6 shows that rentier income, or the income generated from economic rents, such as
securities and other applications of existing wealth, has sharply risen as a percentage of
GDP from the 1960s to the late 1980s. Non-financial sector profits have not declined as
drastically as a percentage of GDP, hovering around ten percent, but compared to the

14

Disintermediation is the process by which steps or intermediaries are removed from a supply chain; in
finance, different financial services and products are made directly available to consumers and firms rather
than requiring a bank, for example, as a means to attain a financial product. As will be discussed later, this
process has led to a broader lobby in US regulated politics and has increased the imperative for industrywide and transnational lobby groups.
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other sources of contribution to GDP it has lagged behind. If larger contributions to GDP
are made by the finance industry, combined with income from financial products, than
are made by manufacturing or the totality of the non-financial sector industries, then
policymakers may privilege industry input into regulation to prevent a decrease in GDP.
Financialization ideology prioritizes finance-led economic growth in GDP. This ideology
leads policymakers to consult industry actors. Privileging industry input into regulation to
keep finance-led growth assumes that states are competing to have GDP growth and
larger GDPs than other states. States are in a financial regulatory competition with other
jurisdictions. Beginning in the 1970’s the US has relied on financialization in order to
grow the economy and as a result has politically securitized the economic success of the
financial industry. That is, what is good for the financial industry, which will also be
preferable to other industries that earn profits through financial activities, is treated as
what is good for the US.
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Figure 6: Rentier Income Share and Non-Financial Sector Profit Share: US GDP
1960-2000

Source: Epstein and Power 2003, 17.
Financialization in the US, reliance on growth from investment in and creation of
financial products rather than growth in the real economy, is deeply entwined with a
consumer and investor culture which fuels a seemingly boundless expansion of credit and
securitization. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 revealed how much of the US financial
system was driven by a desire to extend credit and securitize existing credit. The earliest
signals of a crisis came from pundits who noticed the unsustainable housing bubble in the
US. Individual borrowers took large loans to purchase homes with exponentially
increasing value, regardless of poor credit scores. As mortgage lenders made larger and
larger sub-prime loans the prices of homes across the country were inflated beyond their
actual values, creating a supply-side driven bubble (Coffee 2009). Mortgage firms have
been labeled as irresponsible and blamed for their risky lending practices. When the
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bubble did ‘burst’ it was alongside a large financial systematic failure that quickly
overtook the housing market failure as the focus of both political inquiry and societal
outrage.
Mortgage lenders are culpable for issuing loans to borrowers who could likely
never repay, but the motivation for lenders to issue the loans existed because of another
larger market distortion. With the advent of structured finance, investment banks were
able to make large profits from buying existing debt and repackaging it as securities. One
source of products to securitize was mortgage loans, even sub-prime mortgage loans.
Many banks even sought to acquire mortgage firms in order to assure a steady supply of
loans to securitize.15 Securitization, in the financial sense, is a phenomenon essential to
understanding the financial crisis and the different types of capitalism pursued in the US
and continental Europe.16
“Securitization provides funding and liquidity for a wide range of
consumer and business credit needs. These include securitizations of
residential and commercial mortgages, automobile loans, student loans,
credit card financing, equipment loans and leases, business trade
receivables, and the issuance of asset-backed commercial paper, among
others” (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association,
“Securities: An Overview”).
The securities created by investment banks to be resold for profit are rated by
credit rating agencies. This rating is supposed to act as a form of quality-assurance of
complex structured products. However the two large credit-rating agencies, Standard &
Poors and Moodys, disregarded their role as “gatekeepers” in order to pursue profit
(Partnoy 2006; Partnoy 2009). Investment banks pay fees to the credit-rating agencies for
their services, creating an incentive for the agencies to inflate their ratings to obtain more
15

This risky vertical-integration strategy was especially fatal to Lehman Brothers Holdings and Merrill
Lynch (Coffee 2009, 16.)
16
An initial definition is in footnote 12, on page 42.
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business from the investment banks (Coffee 2009, 9). The rating agencies also faced
competitive pressure from a new firm and may have inflated their ratings to keep the
share of investment bank business they already had.
This profit-motivated interaction between credit rating agencies and investment
banks created incentive distortions that produced contagion: mortgage firms were
encouraged to produce sub-prime mortgages, investment banks were encouraged to lower
their due diligence standards and use these mortgages to create securities, and credit
rating agencies were encouraged to lower their professional standards and overvalue
securities.
The systematic overvaluation of these securities led to a confidence crisis in
American financial markets. Realizing that the securities they themselves were producing
were of less than advertised value, investment banks began to doubt the credibility of the
entire rating system, and this undermined the entire system’s perceived reliability
(Gourevitch 2009, 1-2).
Though there were very tangible causes of the 2007 crisis, an analysis that
attributed fault only to immediate tributaries would be superficial. The causal links
involved with the 2007-2009 crisis extend to a set of underlying narratives of American
financialization that fueled securitization and credit.
Financialization Ideology
The US has contributed much of its own ideology and economic culture to the
international financial industry standards. Much has been made of the Protestant work
ethic and its contribution to successful capitalist national economies, but there is a new
ethos that permeates corporations and popular culture in the US (Weber 2009). Financial
product innovation is spurred by a focus on profit-making separated from the real
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economy. A crash in 1987 led to a brief pause in the “greed is good” mentality, but the
slow and steady rise of markets during the 1990s led many analysts to proclaim
capitalism perfected (Krugman 2009, 9-10). Of course, the financial sector became aware
of the remaining volatility in both 2000 with the crash of the high-tech sector and with
the more severe liquidity implications of the 2008 crisis. The American form of
capitalism and the cyclical lack of regulation makes the entire system vulnerable to these
bubbles and crises (Miller 2008, 126; Helleiner 2009, 14). The American emphasis on
securitization and pro-market capitalism is also at odds with other models of capitalism.
Financialized capitalism suggests that it is a form that eschews adding true value or
growth to the economy in favor of adding profit and using derivatives (Miller 2008, 127131). This is an extreme form of financialization.
American financialized capitalism enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the rise
of neoliberalism. During the Reagan administration, neoliberalism championed
privatization, liberalization, and deregulation (Harvey 2005; Miller 2008, 127-8). These
principles quickly took root in the US, and the US used its global influence to advocate
an international corollary, the Washington Consensus, which scholars assert is the
primary evidence of the dominance of US interests in the international financial
institutions (Konings and Panitch 2008, 22). Neoliberal principles became the basis for
conditionality in the structured adjustment policies of the IMF and were presented as the
panacea after the East Asian crisis of the 1990’s as well as the solution to transitioning
planned economies (Stiglitz 2002).
Adoption of neoliberal tenets in the US created ideal conditions for an American
financial crisis that spread globally (Beder 2009; Kotz 2009). Liberalization led to an
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erosion of those regulations meant to protect American financial health, such as those on
leverage ratios. The pursuit of finance-led growth through deregulation made the US
extremely vulnerable to financial crises by lowering the standards to which financial
institutions were held; shoddy or no due diligence led to many structured products having
faulty foundations (Coffee 2009, 4-5). This deregulation will be examined in a later
section of this chapter. Furthermore, the deregulation of finance in the United States
created conditions which made the crisis a cold other nations couldn’t help but catch.
Liberalizing leverage ratios and financial flows, as well as having little oversight over
structured products and their ratings, created conditions for a global economic pandemic.
Neoliberal policies are applied by policymakers, economists and technocrats who
are also susceptible to the notions that the growth of finance is central to the growth of
the US economy and that the complex financial industry is too engrained in the American
economy to abandon. This has led to the political securitization of the financial industry
in the US.17 There have been some attempts to extend political securitization theory to the
economy (Aitken 2011). In the case of the financial crisis, political actors communicated
repeatedly that the collapse of major financial institutions would threaten not only
national economic stability but also elements of the ‘real’ economy, such as jobs and
wages.18
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Footnote 12 on page 42 contains a definition of political securitization.
The political actors committing the speech act were bipartisan in the US. One emblematic example is that
both candidates for the presidency in 2008, then Senators Barack Obama and John McCain, included
references to the risk posed by the threat of global financial instability. Obama’s speeches include
references to the need to grant financial regulatory bodies “broad authority” (Obama 2008b). McCain
suggested the connection of the financial system to the everyday economic activities of Americans: “any
action should be designed to keep people in their homes and safe guard the life savings of all Americans by
protecting our financial system” (McCain 2008a). He also suggested that despite the high financial cost of
the proposed bailout, it was better than the potential ripples into the real economy if financial institutions
failed (McCain 2008b).
18
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Even at the height of the financial crisis, several systemically important US
financial institutions were categorized as ‘too big to fail’ by the executive branch. The
resulting bailout packages and new regulation constitute the extraordinary measures. The
US government provided TARP funds to support financial institutions whose dissolution
was deemed dangerous to the economy as well as to shore up industries, such as the
housing industry, whose failures were the result of contagion.
One dramatic episode marked the distribution of 130 billion dollars of TARP
funds. In a meeting on Monday, October 13, 2008 nine banks were forced to accept
capital injections (TARP funds) from the federal government (Landler and Dash 2008).
Hastily summoned over the weekend, the Chief Executive Officers of the nine largest
banks in the US gathered at the Treasury Department. None of the CEOs were given any
information about what the meeting was about before hand and their confused assistants
bombarded Treasury Secretary Paulson’s office with calls and emails to inquire about the
agenda up to an hour before the meeting. Assembling the leaders all in one room,
simultaneously was a plan to build “peer pressure” so great they would agree to the
proposal (Sorkin 2010, 519). Key US regulators were waiting to meet the CEOs:
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke,
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Timothy Geithner, FDIC Chair
Sheila Bair and Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan. Paulson opened the meeting by
noting the instability of the financial system and suggested they had devised a scheme to
restore confidence. What followed was an ultimatum to either accept the capital funds or
be declared capital deficient. According to attendee Richard Kovacevich, then-CEO of
Wells Fargo & Company, he rejected the offer at first since Wells Fargo had adequate
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capital (Kovacevich 2012). Paulson interrupted him: “ ‘Your regulator is sitting right next
to me. And if you don't take this money, on Monday morning you'll be declared capitaldeficient’ ”(Kovacevich 2012). Kovacevich’s account is supported by Paulson’s talking
points: “If a capital infusion is not appealing, you should be aware your regulator will
require it in any circumstance” (Paulson 2008). The regulators threatened to lie about the
adequacy of capital in banks that had not participated in the exotic mortgage markets in
order to keep the public from speculating about good and bad banks when the
government would later lent money to several smaller banks. The regulators were
concerned about stigma (Blinder 2013, 201). In the end, all of the bankers accepted the
capital infusions rather than being painted by their regulators as undercapitalized.
In 2008 Secretary Paulson identified the institutions so central to US finance that
they were held to a higher standard of capital reserve ratios. Now, the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC), which is discussed earlier in the chapter, maintains a list of
the systemically important bank and non-bank institutions with large concentrations of
assets and is empowered to institute more restrictive regulations on those institutions.
Attorney General Eric Holder has also admitted that prosecuting large financial
institutions for breaking existing regulations is too dangerous to the national and world
economy because of the size of financial institutions.19
As key service providers to citizens as well as financial intermediaries, banks are
a cornerstone of the US financial industry. The trends towards consolidation means that
19

" But I am concerned that the size of some of these institutions becomes so large that it does become
difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit with indications that if we do prosecute — if we do bring
a criminal charge — it will have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world
economy. I think that is a function of the fact that some of these institutions have become too large."
Holder in testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, ‘Oversight of the US Justice Department’, March
6, 2013.
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‘the big five’ banks, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Inc., Goldman
Sachs, and Wells Fargo & Co, have been expanding over the past decade (Lynch 2012).
Assets at the largest banks have even increased in size by around 37% since the financial
crisis and in 2013 accounted for 67% of all assets in US banks.20 The largest banks are
only becoming larger. Bank size is a crucial feature because it signifies their centrality to
the financial system. More institutions will become ‘too big to fail.’
Financialization ideology prioritizes finance-led economic growth. The near
hegemony of financialization ideology in the US led to deregulation, liberalization, and
poor oversight before the financial crisis. Though there have been changes to the
institutions and policies in the US regulatory regime, financialization ideology has
remained the dominant force of the US regulatory regime.
After the financial crisis, some groups challenged the hegemony of
financialization ideology. This will be discussed in the section on social attitudes.
However, these groups were largely unsuccessful in dismantling financialization
ideology. One potential explanation for the nearly seamless continuation of
financialization ideology is the degree of financialization in the social sphere.
Financialization of the Social Sphere
Regulation can incentivize behavior of individuals and households and influence
social expectations and norms. Several aspects of the US regulatory regime have
contributed to the financialization of the social sphere, creating a system in which
individuals and households take for granted their reliance on finance in their everyday
lives and are encouraged to use financial products and services to accomplish social

20

This measure includes the big five and Morgan Stanley (Gandel 2013). Accounts of the expansion are
also confirmed by earlier accounts of these trends in Andrews 2009.
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tasks. Individuals in the United States are not necessarily more likely than their
counterparts in other industrialized economies in Western Europe to use financial
services, such as having savings or retirement accounts (Global Partnership for Financial
Inclusion 2011, Charts in Appendix 1). However, unique political and social regulatory
narratives shape American attitudes towards credit, the role of financial products in
personal life and a consumer culture which exacerbate reliance on credit. Attitudes
towards the role of the financial industry are important not only because they shape
financial activity but also because they can contribute to the content and focus of
regulation. As Stuart Banner put it, “One thus cannot understand why securities markets
were regulated the way they were without situating them in the broader culture […]. How
people in the United States regulated transactions in the shares of business enterprises in
the middle of the nineteenth century, to take another example, often followed from their
ideas about corporations at the time” (Banner 2002, 3).
This section will address two major dimensions of the social sphere in which the
state has encouraged financialization: home ownership and retirement. Financialization of
home ownership contributed directly to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. US government
encouragement of financialization in retirement savings and personal accountability for
retirement is coupled with an insecure domestic retirement system. This section addresses
how the US government has supported financialization of two aspects of the social
sphere. This can contribute to the salience of industry input into regulatory policymaking
because it connects Wall Street to ‘main street’ by embedding financial products in the
daily life of citizens.
Home Ownership
Home ownership in the United States is a prominent part of the American Dream
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and central to the notion of civic engagement. Housing policies at the federal and state
levels have supported this notion by providing institutions, tax incentives and lending
programs designed to enhance accessibility. These programs created pressure to provide
liquidity in mortgage markets and extend credit to a wider pool of buyers. Prior to the
housing market bust, buying a home was considered one of the safest and most reliable
long-term investments, and a method of encouraging civic participation (Brandlee 2011).
Social and political mechanisms have thus sought to extend the ability to own a home to
all members of American society, including the poorest, despite the risks inherent in
borrowing an amount that for many is a high multiple of their annual income.21
Incentivizing home ownership through first-homebuyer tax credits and mortgage interest
deductions sends the message to unsophisticated buyers that buying a home is a costsaving measure that benefits everyone. These policies are accompanied by state and nonprofit grants, which lend or gift down payments to low-income or first-time buyers (Stern
2011, 894).
In the absence of mortgage lending and down payment financing, the only people
who can afford to purchase homes are those with an accumulation of wealth equal to the
total purchase price or down payment amount. As part of a broader reform to make home
ownership more accessible to all Americans, and particularly minorities, the federal
government has supported policies that would increase low-income household home
ownership and suggested that access to financial products is important for social equality.
In fact, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has referred to

21

At the height of the housing market boom, leverage ratios increased. A leverage ratio is the amount of
credit extended, in the form of a mortgage in the case of housing, to the amount of income or capital
supporting that debt. A conservative approach to lending would entail lower ratios, since it is easier for the
borrower to fulfill the loan.
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minority and low-income households as “underserved” populations or communities,
labeling them in relationship to their position as consumers of financial products. 22 One
argument in favor of encouraging low-income household home ownership was that it
would lead to a positive social impact since new buyers would be incentivized to make
long-term contributions to the community that they would not otherwise make as renters;
the goal of these policies was to use financial products to change social behavior (Shlay
2006, 512-514). Policies seeking to extend home ownership to all Americans were
successful and between 1994 and 2006 when, “homeownership among the lowest
income quintiles grew more quickly than the national average, increasing at roughly
double the national rate during the first half of the period” (Bostic and Ok Lee 2009:
218).
Incorporating these groups in the ranks of homeowners however also created a
dangerous niche mortgage market: subprime mortgages. Mortgages made at less than
favorable terms to borrowers with poor credit, subprime mortgages expanded rapidly
between 2000 and 2006, from 2.6 to 13.5% of all loans in 2006, and loan quality rapidly
decreased (Kratz 2007; Demyanyk and Hemert 2011).23 Many subprime loans are
adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) loans, which allow borrowers to pay a much lower
interest rate during an introductory phase of the loan. These ARM mortgage rates are
considered teasers and increase after a set period of time. By coupling products with low,
introductory rates that enable low-income Americans to buy into the American dream
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This language is pervasive in HUD documents, particularly those developed by the Office of Policy
Development and Research. One prominent example is “Path to Home Ownership for Low Income and
Minority Households” published by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in fall 2012.
23
Demyanyk and Hemert define loan quality as “based on their performance, adjusted for differences in
observed loan characteristics, borrower characteristics, and subsequent house price appreciation”
(Demyanyk and Hemert 2011, 1849).
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with insufficient regulation to ensure financial literacy or credible commitments, the
mortgage regulatory process and federal government policies encouraged borrowers to
make unsustainable financial decisions. In investigating the government role in
affordable housing policy in creating the financial crisis, the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform in the US House of Representatives found that “successive
Republican and Democratic administrations made campaign promises to extend
homeownership to lower and middle income families through the action of the federal
government which were later fulfilled through extending the subprime mortgage market”
(Commission, Financial Crisis Inquiry 2011).
In a comparative lens, US government policies are among the most encouraging
of a broad use of financial products to attain high levels of home ownership in the
developed world. Tax incentives for home ownership in the US are “among the highest in
the OECD world” (Schelkle 2012, 67). In a comparative study of social regulatory
policies promoting homeownership, Schelkle finds that the institutions that the US
government established to provide liquidity (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) and guarantee
mortgage loans to lenders (Federal Housing Authority or FHA) used less targeted lending
practices than their equivalents in France (68). The effect on demand was that a very
“ambitious” market for mortgages was created; people of different income levels wanted
to and expected to be able to buy homes (68).
Homeownership support provided by the government has also increased
financialization in the social sphere by decreasing the percentage of the total purchase
price a required down payment must represent. Through the FHA loans, buyers can
qualify to make a down payment of only three point five percent on a home rather than
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the traditional ten percent down payment to establish a base of equity.24 The equity
homeowners have in their homes has decreased substantially. That is, they are financing a
greater portion of their homes initially and taking equity out of their homes by
refinancing. Figure 7 presents owners’ equity as a percentage of value of household real
estate from the early 1950s to the present.

Figure 7: Owners' Equity in Real Estate as a Percentage of Household Real Estate

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Data
Despite the risk of mortgage default, the federal government has encouraged
owners to remove equity from their homes and finance a greater portion. The Department
of Housing and Urban Development website details buying a home and loan programs
offered by the government. One suggestion the Department of Housing and Urban
24

Figures and regulations are valid for single-family homes; multiple-family homes and cooperative
apartments are subject to different regulations. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) web page on buying and loans has detailed information (Buying/Loans).
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Development website makes is that seniors who have paid off most or all of their homes
would potentially benefit from a reverse mortgage.25 A reverse mortgage allows owners
to take equity out of their home as a loan. Low equity levels in home ownership can lead
to default, especially during an economic crisis since it can trigger negative equity in
which homeowners owe more on their mortgage loans than their homes are worth
(Campbell and Cocco 2014).
US federal government regulatory activity in the sphere of homeownership has
increased household reliance on financial products and encouraged the usage of new
financial products such as types of subprime mortgages and down payment grants. This
has contributed significantly to the financialization of the social sphere.
Retirement Accounts
Federal government retirement income in the US is provided through a monthly
Social Security payment, the amount of which is determined based on the recipient’s
lifetime contributions and annual income. For some retirees, this social security income is
not sufficient to cover monthly expenses. Retirees in the US are less likely than other
countries to have other pensions provided by their jobs (Wisenberg 2014). As a result,
retirees often supplement their social security income with income from private
retirement accounts.
The US government has encouraged Americans to use financial products to save
for retirement through tax deductions, developing new government-backed products, and
even proposed automatic enrollment in private account schemes. Contributions to
25

“Are you 62 or older? Do you live in your home? Do you own it outright or have a low loan balance? If
you can answer "yes" to all of these questions, then the FHA Reverse Mortgage might be right for you. It
lets you convert a portion of your equity into cash” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
‘Let FHA Loans Help You’).
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individual or employer-provided retirement accounts are tax deductible subject to a
maximum contribution, employment status, income level, and age criteria. In 2001,
President Bush signed the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
(EGTRRA) into law. Though the law is likely most known for its reduction in the
percentage of personal income tax paid by those individuals in the top tax bracket, it also
increased the limits for tax-deductible contributions to savings accounts, allowed catch up
payments for individuals over 50 years of age, offered incentives to small employers to
offer sponsored retirement plans, and created the transfer of retirement accounts (Burman
et al. 2004, 11-14). Individual retirement accounts (IRAs) are not only prudent financial
planning but a money saver in years with unexpected growth in earned income. While
employer-sponsored retirement accounts are traditionally managed by a firm of the
employer’s choosing, IRAs are managed by the contributor’s choice of manager. Though
it is possible that these accounts can be kept as savings, both allow allocation in various
financial products, such as stocks, index funds, and mutual funds, and a conservative
allocation strategy is a likely outcome of self-guided or private management.26
Similar to the case with access to homeownership, although retirement savings
were initially more accessible to higher-income American workers the federal
government has also tried to extend employer-sponsored and private retirement accounts
to low-income American workers. “Pension and IRA tax benefits are mostly concentrated
among high- income taxpayers for two reasons. First, they can afford to save. Second,
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The self-guided investment services, offered by firms such as Vanguard and Fidelity, coach investors
towards using their stages of life as a way to determine investment strategy but often explicitly caution
against too conservative of an investment strategy even for those close to retirement. “While many
investors approaching retirement today may be more comfortable investing conservatively as a result of
market volatility, they could be missing growth opportunities” (Fidelity Investments 2013, 6. ‘Income
Diversification: Creating a Plan to Support Your Lifestyle in Retirement’).
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they face the highest marginal tax rates and thus stand to gain the most from tax
deductions and exclusion” (Burman et al. 2004, 1). EGTRRA introduced a Saver’s Credit
for low-income households, which currently is available to single filers with less than
$30,000 in adjusted gross income. The Saver’s Credit allows the percentage of
contributions which are tax deductible to increase as adjusted gross income decreases
(See chart in Appendix 2. Internal Revenue Service, ‘Retirement Savings Contributions
Credit (Saver’s Credit)’).
According to the White House, only half of American workers have access to
employer-sponsored retirement accounts (White House 2014). With the additional
hindrance of fees required to open and maintain IRAs, many low-income workers are
dissuaded from contributing money to any separate retirement account. In an attempt to
redress this, the Treasury Department introduced government-backed retirement accounts
called myRA. The funds allow workers to set aside small amounts of money, as little as
$5 per paycheck, towards a retirement account administered by the Treasury Department
with an interest rate tied to the Government Securities Investment Fund and no risk of
losing the principal contribution (White House 2014). This program will also encourage
employers to provide access to an auto-enroll feature, through which employees would
need to opt-out in order to not participate in the myRA program. However, these accounts
are ultimately folded into private sector fee IRAs. After either 30 years or $15,000 in
contributions participants must transfer their funds to the private sector. This feature of
the program serves two purposes, both of which demonstrate the degree to which
retirement is a section of the social sphere that has been financialized.
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First, elements of the financial industry, seniors’ organizations and the Tea Party
have noted their concern that the government was going to “nationalize” all retirement
accounts (Stern 2012; National Seniors Council 2010; Corsi 2014; TeaParty.org 2014).
The cap ensures that eventually low-income contributors will become consumers of
traditional fee-generating financial services and existing accounts are not folded into the
plan ensuring that the revenue stream from wealthy earners to the financial services
industry continues. Second, as mentioned previously myRA accounts would be earning
interest at the rate of the Government Securities Investment Fund (G Fund). The G
Fund’s stated investment objective, “is to produce a rate of return that is higher than
inflation while avoiding exposure to credit (default) risk and market price fluctuations”
(Thrift Savings Plan). The lack of volatility and risk makes the G Fund an appealing
investment choice, but those with a higher risk tolerance could earn considerably more
interest in other options or diversify their portfolios with a mix of risky and conservative
investment choices. The cap serves to ensure that those with retirement accounts of
$15,000, providing a certain security, will have the potential to earn more than the G
Fund interest rate on some of their accumulated retirement funds.
Rather than enhance the existing scheme for government-provided retirement
income in response to the burst of the dot-com bubble which eroded private investment
accounts, the federal government sought to compensate for insufficient social security
income and private savings by incentivizing private retirement accounts that earn fees for
managers and financial firms. The government solution to ensure low-income earners
have sufficient savings for retirement is to extend a new tax credit and providing free,
government-backed private accounts.
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In summation, Americans rely on financial products for key tasks in their
everyday lives. They are encouraged by policymakers to use financial products.
Policymakers are captured by financialization ideology to solicit the input of industry
actors in making financial regulation, but this is compounded by the deep financialization
of the social sphere. Despite the financialization of the social sphere, during the financial
crisis two groups emerged to challenge financialization ideology.
Financial Crisis: Challenging Social Attitudes
Public attitudes can contribute to the shape of regulation and in the US
financialization of the social sphere has influenced public attitudes and convinced
Americans that finance is necessary to grow the economy and perform essential functions
in their lives. In other states that do not pursue finance-led growth or those with less
financial inclusion, public attitudes towards finance are different. Some social forces
have attempted to counterbalance this narrative following the financial crisis of 20072009. During the financial crisis, the financial elites received a national bailout of their
risk-taking though ‘main street’ did not. For this reason, the financial crisis of 2007-2009,
much like the stock market crash of 1929 before it, caused a shift in social attitudes
towards finance. Two groups emerged in response to the bailouts: Occupy Wall Street
and the Tea Party. The Occupy Wall Street movement and Tea Party movement were
emblematic of a societal question about the role of finance in American lives and the
privileged access of the financial industry to the US government.
The Occupy Wall Street movement responded to the US government bailout of
the financial industry during the financial crisis by distinguishing itself as representing
the ninety nine percent and not the top one percent of US income earners (Piven 2012).
This deliberate effort to separate ‘main street’ from Wall Street and single out the
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financial elite allowed those involved with the movement to articulate what about the
political consequences of financialization was troubling: finance was deemed by the US
government as too crucial to the success of the national economy to fail—or be
prosecuted—but individuals were not. The bailout proved that there was a form of
financial exceptionalism. Occupy Wall Street raised public concerns about inequality in
economic distributional gains as well as inequality in justice (Jordan 2011). One account
from Investment News concisely surveys the issues that members of the occupy
movement raised, “Demonstrators have called for a variety of changes, including the
return of the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act and an enactment of the so-called Buffett
Rule, a new tax that would be assessed on individuals making more than $1 million a
year. But the movement also has raised objections to broader issues, including the dismal
job market, student loan debt and investment banks' role in selling doomed mortgagebacked securities” (Mercado 2011). There are scholars (Craven and Zhang 2012) who
would contest that the Occupy movement was too diverse and too loose of a coalition to
characterize as standing for any shared set of goals, but the sum of their individual calls
questioned the role of finance and capitalism in the American economy and questioned
the performance of the national government as an intermediary between them.
The movement inspired critiques of the government’s special handling of the
financial industry. Some went as far as to suggest the national government had been
complicit in ‘engineering’ mergers which prevented banks from failing but also exempted
them from carrying the risk of toxic debts.27
27

“First let's consider the action that was undertaken in early 2008 by the Federal Reserve with respect to
the troubled investment banker, Bear Stearns. The collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds in mid-2007 is
widely regarded as ushering in the worldwide financial crisis. Rather than permit this notorious investment
banker to fail, the Fed engineered an ‘acquisition’ of Bear Stearns by J. P. Morgan Chase (‘J.P. Morgan’)
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The Tea Party emerged as a social and protest movement opposed not only to the
bailout of financial industry actors but also of those measures designed to bailout
individual borrowers in negative equity on their mortgages. The rhetoric recognized the
government’s role in advocating the use of and even providing mortgages to individual
borrowers but did not shield those who borrowed from blame. One prominent example of
such rhetoric is an on-air statement from Rick Santelli, a Consumer News and Business
Channel (CNBC) editor: “ ‘The government is promoting bad behavior,’ Santelli said,
asking why Obama would make Americans who pay their bills subsidize the mortgages
of "losers’ ” (Perlberg 2014). The Tea Party asserted that individuals whose borrowing
behavior responds to government incentives should be held accountable for their
mortgages and that the if the Obama administration bailed the individuals out it would
contribute to moral hazard (O’Hara and Malkin 2010).28
Adherents to the Tea Party movement have since sought institutional participation
in the legislative branch of the federal government. In 2010, Representative Michele
Bachmann formed a Tea Party Caucus in the US House of Representatives and 52
Republican members joined (Zernike 2010; Gervais and Morris 2012). The
institutionalized political voice is characterized as belonging to the “militantly nativist,

whereby the central bank contributed $29 billion of U.S. taxpayer money to J.P. Morgan to accomplish the
transaction. The agreement, which was ‘negotiated’ during the weekend before the merger, provided a
sweetheart deal to J.P. Morgan, including that the funding to J.P. Morgan would be nonrecourse, i.e., J.P.
Morgan would not be required to repay the debt out of its own assets if things went bad. Instead, to ‘secure’
this massive bailout, the Federal Reserve, on behalf of the U.S. taxpayers, took some of Bear Stearns'
worst, most abysmal, toxic finance products as security” (Myers 2012, 53).
28

Moral hazard is the economic principle that individuals and firms are more likely to take risks if they do
not expect to suffer negative consequences from the risk taking. In an account of the financial crisis,
Krugman provides this definition: “any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much
risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly” (Krugman 2009, 63).
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anti-labor, and libertarian populist right” (Post 2012). In an analysis of the 52 members of
the caucus, Gervais and Morris discovered that the members of the House of
Representatives have constituencies with more similar ideology about the government’s
role in the financial system, a finding which echoes the rhetoric from the social
movement. “Our analysis also strongly suggests that voters’ ‘anger,’ which is widely
presumed to drive the movement, is not so much a reaction to desperate economic
circumstances but a reaction to government spending in response to the economic
downturn. Rather than serving the districts hardest hit by the recession, caucus members
serve the districts that are paying for the projects, programs, and payments to more
depressed areas” (Gervais and Morris 2012, 249).
One reform proposed in the US is also being considered in the EU: a financial
transaction tax. Since the financial crisis, a number of members of the US Senate and
Congress have proposed a financial transaction tax (Pollin 2012). Modeled after the
Tobin tax proposed on cross-border currency swaps, a financial transaction tax is
intended to stave off short-term and speculative trading activity and fund ‘main street’
programs. The Congressional efforts have thus far been, “stymied by Wall Street
lobbyists and the Obama administration” (Carter 2015). US Senator Bernie Sanders, a
contender for the US Democratic Party nomination for President in 2016, proposed a
national financial transaction tax and introduced the Too Big to Fail, Too Big to Exist
Act. The latter, “would break up the big banks and prohibit any too-big-to-fail institutions
from accessing the Federal Reserve’s discount facilities or using insured deposits for
risky activities” (Sanders 2016). This would address a problem discussed earlier; that
regulation has not prevented the concentration of assets in the big five banks. Senator
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Sanders’s proposed tax would apply to “speculative trading in stocks, bonds, derivatives,
and other financial instruments” (Nichols 2015). Financial industry actors are funding
studies that will question the benefits of such a tax (Baker 2015).
After the financial crisis social attitudes shifted to oppose government
intervention to support financial institutions, and, in the case of the Tea Party movement,
to support individual borrowers. However, the changes in the US financial regulatory
regime supported financial institutions and made stabilizing them a top priority. This
apparent contradiction will be explained by regulatory capture in the US regulatory
regime and developments in the international regulatory regime that US policymakers
used to justify their securitization of the US financial system.
Network Salience
Despite the transnational nature of financial flows, geographic locations still can
provide a meaningful demarcation of specialization and activity. The global financial
system has a “hierarchical network” structure and is “centered firmly on US capital
markets” (Oatley et al. 2013, 135). This section will assess the implications of this
centrality for the transatlantic, and international regulatory regimes. In the transatlantic
regulatory regime, the network centrality makes industry actors salient to the creation of
regulation because it allows for competition with other regulatory regimes. In the
international regulatory regimes, the US’s network centrality empowers it to set
regulation.
New York City is a central hub for finance in the US and the world and is
currently ranked as the number two financial center in the world (The Global Financial
Centres Index 15). The Global Financial Centre Index (GFCI) is published in March and
September every year. London took the top spot from New York in September 2015. The
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GFCI ranks centers based on measures of the business environment, infrastructure
factors, human capital, reputation, and financial sector development. Since the first index
in 2007, London and New York have always occupied the top two ranks. They also
currently hold the top two spots in all of the sub-indices (Global Financial Centers Index
15, 9).
Susan Strange (1998) and Saskia Sassen (2002) have emphasized New York’s
status as a crucial location for the finance industry because of the concentration of
financial activities which take place in the city. In network theory cities with particular
strength in an industry are seen as hubs. Connecting these hubs to financial flows, which
seemingly occur in the ether, is a task that is reputed to daunt financial regulators and a
phenomenon which has spurred several transnational regulatory bodies (Buthe and Mattli
2011). Castells has furthered the network theory by attempting to map such economic
flows over places (Castells 2000). It also creates an opportunity for interdisciplinary work
into, “the extending social, spatial, and political reach of financialization” (Pike and
Pollard 2010, 3). This concept of global financialization has been analyzed in a network
context by the disciplines of geography, economics, sociology and political science
(Buck-Morss 1995; Krippner 2005; Lee et al 2009; Pike and Pollard 2010).
Although there is a well-documented centralization of financial industry activity
in New York, the financialization of the American economy through economic liberalism
has provided additional regulatory salience. Some scholars note that American finance
has developed a power of attraction and that financial globalization is actually the
expansion of American financial imperialism (Konings and Panitch 2008; Konings 2009;
Gindin and Panitch 2012). The implications of this model are that the American financial
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firms are the most relevant to the international financial regulatory regime and have a
transnational standard-setting power and political salience. The alignment of US finance
and the global financial markets gives American financial regulators and financial
industry actors a competitive advantage in setting global financial regulations through
both intergovernmental bodies as well as private industry bodies (Oatley 2013). Drezner
has asserted that the EU and US are privileged in establishing global regulations which
favor their interests because of the size of their markets (Drezner 2007). Though it may
seem paradoxical with the plethora of global governance arrangements which include
non-state actors, his contention is that the EU and US as “great powers” have become
more relevant to international regulatory networks because other states are eager to
participate in their markets.
However, Drezner underplays the role that different levels of industry
development play in determining regulatory outcomes. High levels of industry
development attract foreign adopters of private and public industry regulatory standards.
The level of development of American financial markets, the financial depth of markets,
and the centralization of financial services in New York are the primary sources of
attraction to the US model of finance (Castells 2010; Wojcik 2013). Financial industry
development is often contingent on the financial system in which it initially operates
(Rajan and Zingales 2003). There are several suggestions about what constitute necessary
elements of a developed financial system (Ferguson 2002; Rajan and Zingales 2003).
The operations of the finance industry were initially more geographically limited,
but through advances in technology and communications, financial flows are less limited
(Eichengreen 2008). Nonetheless, those technologies must be available to industry actors
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seeking to take advantage of them; advanced, industrialized economies have an
advantage in acquiring new technologies and communications.
Countries have begun to shape regulatory standards to attract investors and win
the approval of industry, rather than try to win the approval of international regulatory
bodies. This is a form of regulatory competition between national jurisdictions to attract
investors and financial firms. In the case of the securities industry, corporate
reorganizations in the 1980s favorable to financialization of businesses29 led to
substantial growth in the US and United Kindom (UK) securities sectors (Walter and
Smith 1998, 85). During this period, the securities sector developed several new
innovations and products. Recognizing the potential of the securities sector to contribute
to growth, OECD countries began to deregulate. Emerging market economies began to
follow suit, even “leapfrogging the reforms seen in the traditional market-economy
nations” (Walter and Smith 1998, 85). Before the Asian financial crisis of 1997,
economic liberalization was a strategy employed by emerging market economies to avoid
regulatory arbitrage making them unattractive to developed financial firms (Eichengreen
2008, 135). The desire of US policymakers to maintain US network centrality in the
global financial system and the corresponding potential for finance-led growth have
contributed to the creation of a transatlantic financial regulatory regime.
Since the UK is an EU member state, the nexus of US-UK financialized, marketmodel capitalism, headquartered in New York and London—the two top global financial
centers—directly connected to the considerable power the US and UK enjoy in the
context of regulation setting in both the EU and international regulatory regimes (Wojcik

29

Specifically recapitalization of firms, during which equity is replaced by debt.
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2013). Chapter 3 will address the UK’s centrality in the global financial network and the
corresponding power it enjoys within the context of EU regulatory regime.

Relationship of Regulators to Industry
In the US financial regulatory regime, the close relationship of regulators to
industry is marked by the ideological, or deep capture of policymakers by
financialization. The relationship of the regulated to the regulators in the US financial
regulatory regime is one impetus behind the change in the transatlantic regulatory regime
after the financial crisis. The federal policymaking process in the US is designed to allow
several opportunities for input from stakeholders. American democratic policymaking
relies on the principle of pluralism in which interest groups compete to influence policy.
In a typical policymaking cycle, the opportunity to influence comes before a policy is
enacted; interest groups may try to change public opinion or directly influence legislators.
However, the regulatory policymaking process may afford interest groups additional
opportunities to influence outcomes. Interest groups may lobby a regulatory agency after
a law has been passed by the US Congress but before it is implemented and there are
often public comment periods dedicated to this purpose.30 Additionally, industry actors
are in a “privileged position” to influence regulatory policymaking if there are significant
economic implications of regulation (Lindblom 1977, 175-180). Other groups can still
influence the policy, but business may have more direct access or influence. In the case
of the US financial regulatory regime, this privilege is so great it amounts to regulatory
capture.

30

If there are state-level implications for administering the regulation, interest groups may also seek to
lobby at that level as well.
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Several critiques of the close relationship of US regulators to the regulated have
been made by the news media, citizen interest groups and scholars (Crotty 2009; Baxter
2011). The US employs former industry officials as regulators. After their turn as
regulators, some individuals do return to the finance industry leading to charges of a
“revolving door” (Crotty 2009, 577; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development 2009, 2; Baxter 2011, 197; Johnson and Kwak 2011, 93). This regulatory
capture has been pronounced following the financial crisis (Baker 2010, 652-653). In his
first-hand account of the attempt to reform Wall Street, former Sentator Ted Kaufman’s
Chief of Staff Jeff Connaughton notes the large number of former regulators who lobby
for the finance industry because it is seen as a way to career advancement (Connaughton
2012).
Secondly, individual financial firms and financial industry actor groups typically
have ample access to regulatory policymakers. Though one branch of scholarship asserts
that this lobbying is another form of regulatory capture, (Hardy 2006; Baker 2010)
financial industry representatives are unique in that they are embedded in the regulatory
process because of the financialization narrative (Johnson and Kwak 2011, 90-95).
Johnson and Kwak assert that the financialization narrative captured regulators
through group-think:
“Between the revolving door and the competition for regulatory
‘business,’ there was a confluence of perspectives and opinions between
Wall Street and Washington that was far more powerful than emergingmarket-style corruption. Wall Street's positions became the conventional
wisdom in Washington; those who disagreed with them […] were
marginalized as people who simply did not understand the bright new
world of modern finance. This group-think was a major reason why the
federal government deferred to the interests of Wall Street repeatedly in
the 1990s and 2000s” (Johnson and Kwak 2011, 95).
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In his detailed analysis of capture in the US financial regulatory regime, Baxter
explains the current privileged position of financial industry:
“[Capture] turns out, however, to be very relevant in the context of
contemporary financial regulation for two distinct reasons. First, the overt
conduct of the industry and various high regulatory officials appears to
demonstrate the kind of extreme situation in which one of the regulated
interests—namely the very large financial institutions—have secured such
dominant influence that it may be said that they have captured the
regulators, the regulatory process, and the regulated outcomes, to the
disregard of many other important interests” (Baxter 2011, 181).
Baxter goes on to cite the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) as having adopted regulatory interpretations that
aid corporations, and banks in particular, in evading existing restrictions. He
dismisses the “shallow concept of visible capture” as insufficiently representing
the current state of financial regulation and elaborates his own concept of deep
capture to explain the extent to which capture is “embedded within the financial
regulatory system” (Baxter 2011, 182). His concept suggests that the American
“financial and economic public policy process has been systematically captured
by large-scale financial interests” through significant access, the revolving door,
and lobbying efforts (Baxter 2011, 182, 191).
During the financial crisis, chief executive officers of banks were given
privileged access to the President, cabinet, and members of Congress. Former and
current CEOs as well as former government officials have given first-hand
accounts of their encounters. Former Barclays CEO Bob Diamond suggests that
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he was summoned to a meeting with Senators to suggest regulation.31
Regulators sought out the input of those they were regulating in order to craft
regulation because of the hegemony of the financialization ideology. “Most important, as
banking became more complicated, more prestigious, and more lucrative, the ideology of
Wall Street — that unfettered innovation and unregulated financial markets were good for
America and the world — became the consensus position in Washington on both sides of the
political aisle” (Johnson and Kwak 2011, 5). Financialization is an accepted ideology for

both Democrats and Republicans, and it is a norm that regulation should serve
financialization. With complex financial products and fast-paced innovation that means
allowing bankers to design the regulations to which they will be subject.

Conclusions
This chapter presents evidence that after the financial crisis there was a
reorganization of the US financial regulatory regime through the creation of new policies
and institutions, and the addition of responsibilities to existing institutions. However, the
ideas behind the regulatory regime did not change nor did the goal: to encourage
financial-led growth and secure the stability of financialized-capitalism. The high degree
of financialization in the US economy and social sphere led to political securitization of
financial institutions and deep ideological capture of policymakers by the financial
industry. This supports the project’s assertion that the financial crisis was a critical
juncture in the US financial regulatory regime and provides a basis for comparing the EU
and US financial regulatory regimes.

31

“Soon after the financial crisis of 2008 I was at a meeting in Washington with a group of US senators.
They had invited me to provide a point of view on new regulation; regulation aimed at ensuring we never
have to go through the events of 2008 ever again” (Diamond 2011).
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Chapter 3: EU Financial Regulatory Regime
This project argues that the financial crisis was a critical juncture not only in the
US and EU financial regulatory regimes but also in the international financial regulatory
regime. The reverberations from the domestic and international levels have led to
institutional changes in the transatlantic regulatory regime. This chapter will use the
method of process tracing to identify the ideology, policies, institutional structures and
processes of the EU financial regulatory regime before and after the financial crisis to
demonstrate that the crisis was a critical juncture in the regime. The institutional
procedures and structures, and policies of the regime have become centralized under the
new European Systemic Risk Board but the policymaking process in the EU has allowed
ideological, deep regulatory capture of EU policymakers. This chapter will use network
analysis of financial centers to explain how after the financial crisis of 2007-2009
finance-led growth and financialization are dominant ideas in the EU financial regulatory
regime. These ideas impact the relationship of the regulated to the regulators, notably in
the EU Commission, and at the transatlantic level it privileges the access and input of
industry actors and groups. In turn, and as will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, alignment
in the EU and US financial regulatory regimes is essential to explain the emergence of
the transatlantic financial regulatory regime after the financial crisis.

Before and After the Financial Crisis
This section will establish the antecedent conditions in the EU financial
regulatory regime and identify the changes to the regime during and after the financial
crisis of 2007-2009. This will demonstrate that the financial crisis was a critical juncture
in the EU financial regulatory regime and partially explain why there have been changes
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to the transatlantic regulatory regime. Before the financial crisis, efforts to extend the
single market to financial services were prompted by the belief that it would lead to more
competitive services and products. But creating a single market in financial services
required building an EU regulatory regime with some coordination of national regulatory
standards and processes. In 1999 the European Union endeavored to create a single
market for services and goods, but because of financial flows’ geographic peculiarities
and the differences in the varieties of capitalism practiced by member states, some
financial services and products were not subject to EU level regulation until the financial
crisis. Other pieces of the parallel international financial regulatory regime, for example
the Basel process in the banking sector, pre-empted potential EU level regulation
(Quaglia 2007).
Responding to requests by the Council and by the Economic and Financial Affairs
Council (ECOFIN), the Council formation of member state economic and finance
ministers, the Commission created a Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) that outlined
areas for harmonization. In 2001 the Lamfalussy process, so named after Alexandre
Lamfalussy who headed the high level advisory committee, created a four level
implementation scheme responsible for framework goals and specific recommendations
to add flexibility to national securities legislation (Raptis 2012, 61-62). The Lamfalussy
process resulted in three committees that were responsible for coordination between
member state’s supervisory authorities in the banking, pensions, and securities sectors;
these were the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), Committee of
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS), and the
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). Figure 8 maps the institutions of
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the regulatory regime in the European Union and their responsibilities before the
financial crisis. The committees were independent authorities in the European Union and
could offer advice to the member state supervisory authorities and the European
Commission.
Figure 8: Pre-Crisis EU Financial Regulatory Regime

Source: Author generated.
The FSAP was slowly implemented through the Lamfalussy process until 2004,
but following the financial crisis there was a renewed desire to address some of the more
speculative financial risks. The German and French governments supported a financial
transaction tax of 0.1 percent of share and bond trades and 0.01 percent of derivative
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transactions. This proposal was in contrast to the UK and US preference for a levy on
financial firms to create a bailout fund for the future.
Germany has considerable influence over economic and monetary issues in the
European Union and its Bundesbank design and principles were the inspiration for the
European Central Bank (Kaltenthaler 2005). German economic stability, fiscal prudence,
and stable growth have given German positions on economic issues in the EU a moral
salience. Within the Eurozone, the German government has a near veto since analyses
suggest the Euro currency would flounder without Germany’s continued participation in
the currency (Steinherr 2012). However, Germany has had little influence compared to
the UK in the area of the financial transaction tax (discussed below) because of London’s
network salience in finance and the EU’s consensus-oriented decision-making process
which will be discussed later in the chapter.
In 2011, the European Commission proposed a financial transaction tax (FTT) on
“financial instruments between financial institutions when at least one party to the
transaction is located in the EU” (European Commission 2011). After it became obvious
that the FTT was a policy that would not be universally approved by EU member states in
ECOFIN, ten member states are opting in using the enhanced cooperation procedure.
Many of the member states have declined to participate in the FTT explicitly because the
UK is not participating. Without UK participation in the FTT, the FTT will divert
companies and financial activity from member states participating to the UK. The UK has
refused to implement the FTT unless it is global, recognizing that Tiebout’s theory of
regulatory competition posits that without universal adoption there will be competition
between jurisdictions. According to Tiebout’s theory, the EU, and specifically the UK,
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will lose financial service providers. The assumption of mobility inherent in the
regulatory competition model is especially applicable to the financial services industry
because of the ageographical nature of financial flows. Most financial services firms can
work from any geographic location.
Despite the UK government’s position, public opinion polls have generally been
in favor of the FTT—even in financialized economies including the UK. The EU
Commission’s DG for Communication conducted a poll in April and May 2011 and
asked respondents if they in principle would favor a financial transaction tax (Directorate
General for Communications 2011). The results show that Austrians (80%) and Germans
(71%) are those most in favor while Malta (44%), Slovenia (39%) and Poland (36%)
have the highest percentages of those opposed. Those countries with high percentages of
GDP contributed by finance surprisingly show majorities in favor of the FTT:
Luxembourg (65%), Netherlands (58%), Ireland (55%), UK (65%). Appendix 3 details
the percentages for each member state. The poll also revealed the reasons why people
were in favor. Of those across the EU in favor, 41% believed the FTT would combat
excessive speculation and help prevent future crisis while 35% rather believed it would
make financial players contribute to the costs of the crisis.
Of those opposed, 22% selected a decrease in competition as their reasoning and
26% believed the FTT would only be effective if enacted at the global level. An
additional 22% suggested that they were opposed because it would only make European
financial players contribute to the costs of the crisis (Directorate General for
Communications 2011, 13). These responses would indicate that EU citizens desired to
have the costs of the financial crisis be shared with the financial industry, avoiding moral
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hazard, but that they also are sensitive to the interdependent nature of multilevel financial
regulatory regimes. The results do not demonstrate political securitization of finance.
That is, the public is not concerned with the competitiveness of the EU financial industry.
The full results of the poll are available in Appendix 3.
The financial transaction tax is a delayed response to the speculative investments
that contributed to the financial crisis but the immediate responses to the crisis were not
coordinated within the EU (Darling 2012). National ministries did what was necessary to
shore up their domestic financial institutions and protect their domestic investors and
depositors. One compelling account of the unfolding of the financial crisis comes from
the memoirs of Alistair Darling who served as UK Chancellor of the Exchequer from
2007-2010 (2012). When Ireland took the unprecedented step of guaranteeing all
liabilities in Irish banks on September 30, 2008, Darling called his counterpart, Irish
Finance Minister Lenihan to complain. Noting that Ireland’s guarantee put them in an
“impossible position” since savers could shift their money from UK to Irish banks,
Darling bemoaned the lack of coordination (Darling 2012, 148). When there were reports
that Germany had followed suit he found it particularly “surprising because the Germans
set much store on announcements being made by Europe as a whole rather than by
individual states” (Darling 2012, 148). Though Germany’s blanket guarantee turned out
to be merely a rumor, Darling lamented that his poor working relationship with the
German Minister of Finance impeded his ability to coordinate at the European level.
The Chancellor also objected to a potential sale of Lehman Brothers to Barclays
because it could lead to UK taxpayers bailing out a US bank. Darling had been working
on a plan to recapitalize UK banks since September 26, 2008 but on Tuesday, October 7,
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2008 the collapse of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) precipitated a face-to-face with
the major bank CEOs. On October 7, the Chancellor was attending an ECOFIN meeting
in Luxembourg. He excused himself several times to receive updates on the stock price of
RBS. Flagged down from the corridor, Darling searched for a place to take a phone call
from the RBS chairman after trading of RBS shares had been suspended. His staff
demanded Kim Darroche, UK Permanent Representative to the EU, leave a small
anteroom so he could use it to make calls. It became obvious to him that the capital
needed to be issued immediately.
At 7:30pm that evening the CEOs of major UK banks met in Darling’s office,
opposite Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, Adair Turner, Chairman of the
Financial Services Authority, and Treasury staff. In contrast to the nearly jubilant
behavior of most of their American counterparts when offered a similar deal, British
bankers questioned the capital they are being offered and whether they in fact needed the
amounts they were being forced to accept. “The bankers [were] exiled to a room next
door (‘Can they hear what we’re saying?’ Darling asks) while the officials in the
Chancellor’s office discuss what to do. As Darling told the bankers when he sent them
next door: this is the deal, there is no other deal, they had better get used to it or ‘God
help us all’ ” (Martin 2013, 24). However, the CEOs continued to argue until 2:30 in the
morning when they finally agreed to the capital. The next day the government announced
that 50 billion pounds would be injected into UK banks.
Though the immediate response to the crisis occurred at the national level, many
long term changes were made at the EU level. In 2011 the European Union changed the
institutional structure and processes of its financial regulatory regime. As part of the new
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European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), the EU created the European Banking
Authority (EBA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). These institutions replaced the
committee system that existed before the financial crisis. Collectively, they are
responsible for macro-prudential oversight of the financial system. The European
Commission initiated the reform following the recommendations of a Committee of Wise
Men and supported by the European Council and Parliament. The European Parliament
had been pressing for some time for a “move towards more integrated European
supervision in order to ensure a level playing field for all actors at the level of the
European Union and to reflect the increasing integration of financial markets in the
Union” (Regulation (EU No 1093/2010), 12). The centralization of supervisory agencies
under the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the post-crisis EU financial
regulatory regime is documented in the Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Post-Crisis EU Financial Regulatory Regime Map

Source: Author generated.
EIOPA and the European Commission have also changed EU pension policy by
seeking to establish a pan-EU private retirement account scheme (Ellison 2012, 319). The
EU has used the open method of coordination policymaking style for pensions and other
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elements of social inclusion and protection. In the open method of coordination the
Council sets policy goals and guidelines but member states are allowed to voluntarily
transpose these guidelines into their national legislation and tailor their implementation.
Member states then meet to share best practices and learn from each other. In 2003 the
European Commission adopted what is commonly referred to as the European Pensions
directive (officially the Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision directive,
Directive 2003/41/EC) in an effort to allow firms to provide pan-European service.32 In
2014, the Commission revised the directive to allow cross-border activity as well as
require additional supervision and professional management (European Commission
2014).
The European Commission action in pensions following the financial crisis is also
an attempt to further integrate financial services: “The European Commission following
the 2007/2008 financial crisis considered that there needs to be further regulation of EU
occupational pension plans; it has therefore reviewed the present IORP Directive,
abolished CEIOPS [Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Supervisors] and introduced a new regulator with material powers, EIOPA [European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority]” (Ellison 2012, 319).
The Commission has tasked EIOPA with creating a single market for private
pensions. EIOPA is calling this product a “pan-European Personal Pension Product
(PEPP)” (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 2015). Commission
support for a European-level private pension system is an example of ideological capture

32

“[P]ension funds can manage occupational pension schemes for companies established in another EU
country, pan-European companies can have a single pension fund for all their subsidiaries throughout
Europe” (European Directive 2003).
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at the European level. The financialization of the social sphere section will address the
significance of this development in the context of member state retirement account
schemes.
Though the EU financial regulatory regime is still fragmented by member state
variance in some policy areas, this is similar to the federalist approach to regulation in the
US. After the financial crisis, the EU introduced new financial regulatory institutions,
proposed a pan-EU private retirement account scheme, and also proposed an FTT
supported broadly by EU citizens if not national politicians. The significant breaks with
the antecedent conditions were in policies and institutional processes and structures, with
a general trend towards centralization of oversight at the EU level.
Financialization
The previous chapter documented that a high degree of financialization in the US
economy and in the US social sphere led to political securitization of financial
institutions and regulatory capture of financial regulators by the financial industry. In this
chapter the level of financialization in the EU and its impact on the EU financial
regulatory regime are addressed. By establishing the degree of financialization in the EU
and the relationship of the regulated to the regulatory regime one uncovers the motivation
and influence of EU participation in the transatlantic financial regulatory regime. This
section of the chapter will focus on the structure of the financial industry in the EU, its
contribution as a percentage of GDP, and the role of financialization in the economic and
social sphere.
The level of economic financialization varies across the member states but is most
pronounced in the UK (Baker 2010, 648). The Anglo-American market model dominates
in the UK and clashes at the EU level with the German or Continental model that is
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favored in Germany and France, which is more closely tied to the real economy.
Financialization of the social sphere in the EU varies by member state, both because of
the presence of both the Anglo-American and Continental models and because of
different social welfare models.
Much like the US, some EU member states have significant contributions by the
financial sector to their gross domestic products. Some member states even have financial
sector contributions that are larger as a percentage of GDP than the contributions made
by the financial sector to UK GDP. According to Drezner (2007), this suggests that
financial industry actors’ regulatory preferences should be a priority for these states at the
EU level but that the small size of their economies makes those preferences less relevant
than those of the UK. The UK has often been a standard-setter in financial regulation at
the EU and international level because of its network centrality. This centrality, in turn,
has contributed to the creation of the transatlantic financial regulatory regime, which will
be discussed in the network salience section.
Financialization of the Economic Sphere
The financial sector contributes most significantly to the economy of Luxembourg
compared to other EU member states, as indicated in Figures 10 and 11. Figure 10
presents the contributions of financial and insurance activities as a percentage of EU
member state GDP in 2013 and Figure 11 presents the same figures for 1995, 2009 and
2013. Luxembourg is a microstate that relies on finance and has status as an offshore
financial center. The EU is host to other offshore and onshore financial centers, including
Dublin and The City of London (Levin 2002). Though Ireland and Luxembourg both
have large contributions to their GDP from the financial industry, they do not necessarily
have the same political power in influencing regulatory outcomes, which will be
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discussed in the network salience section. This section will instead focus on the role of
financialization narratives in three of the most powerful EU states: Germany, France, and
the United Kingdom. This focus is because of the pivotal roles they play in the EU
regulatory regime.
Figure 10: Financial and Insurance Activities as a Percentage of EU Member State
GDP, 2013
Financial and Insurance Activities as a Percentage of GDP,
2013
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Belgium
Netherlands
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Source: OECD Dataset, 1. Gross domestic product. Data for Ireland is from 2012, as
2013 figures are not available.
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Figure 11: Financial and Insurance Activities as Percentage of EU Member State
GDPs, 1995, 2009, 2013
Country
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4%
3%
4%
4%
4%
4%
10%
5%
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7%
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Source: OECD Dataset, 1. Gross domestic product. *Figure for Ireland is from 2012 as
data for 2013 are not available.
Some EU member states have tailored their taxation policies and incentives in
order to attract financial sector firms and activities, adhering to policies that encourage
finance-led growth. Though London had become a premier Eurodollar financial center in
the 1960s and 1970s, Ireland and Luxembourg moved towards the financial sector in the
late 1980s at the height of neoliberalism. Changing taxation policies and liberalizing
finance in the 1980s and 1990s was viewed not only as an overall growth strategy, but in
the case of Ireland was also pursued specifically as a way to create jobs (Kelly and
Everett 2004; Levin 2002, 50). Ireland established the International Financial Services

94

Center (IFSC) in 1987 amid a rapid growth of global financial activities in an attempt to
attract some of the industry actors to its jurisdiction.
The United Kingdom embraced neoliberalism as Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher led the charge towards deregulation and privatization (Ayres and Braithwaite
1992; McDonough and Kotz 2010, 94-95). This included a deregulation of the banking
sector (Jessop and Stones 1992). The UK government has since relied on finance to fuel
growth and has resisted attempts to tax the financial sector on the grounds that it would
lead to a lack of competition and loss of GDP. Policymakers in the United Kingdom have
also politically securitized financialization, warning that a financial transaction tax,
proposed by the European Commission, would threaten pension funds, investment, job
creation and growth in the UK (Crump 2013). Former Prime Minister David Cameron
politically securitized finance repeatedly in his fight against the transaction tax, noting,
“[t]here were good innovative ideas that can help growth in Europe, but frankly there
were some bad ideas too. A financial transaction tax is a bad idea. It will put up the cost
of people's insurance, put up the cost of people's pensions, it would cost many, many
jobs, and it would make Europe less competitive and I'll fight it all the way” (AFP
2012).33 Cameron’s remarks connect the economic sphere to the social sphere. He is
asserting that by adopting the FTT the UK would lose its perceived competitive
advantage in the financial services industry and this would lead to losses for average
citizens.
Leaders in other EU member states, however, have challenged the desirability and
sustainability of the financialization of the economy. The financial crisis was a turning
33

This position is shared by the Labour Party, whose Shadow Business Secretary Chuka Umunna has said
that Labour will not support a financial transaction tax unless it applies to Wall Street as well (Coates
2013).
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point that crystallized the opposition to financialization in countries adhering to the
German model. The German model maintains close ties between the banking and
industrial sectors of the economy and limits securitization. Opposition to financialization
manifested in Germany and France, which follow the German model. The German and
French banking systems became susceptible to not only the financial crisis but also the
subsequent sovereign debt crisis because of increased trading and exposure to risk
through trading activities and internationalization (Hardie and Howarth 2009). However,
the German and French economies are still dominated by banks rather than non-bank
financial institutions, the latter of which took on more risk through securities and fared
less well during the financial crisis. Therefore, German and French resistance to
securitization and the “limited extent of financialization of the German economy”
complies with the German model (Engelen et al. 2008, 622).
The resilience of Germany during the crisis is attributed to the cautious German
approach to growing the economy (Artus 2010; Caplen 2014; Rickards 2014). The
German economy began its process of financialization in the 1990s, later than the US and
many EU member states, and the share of rentier income composing GDP steadily
increased (Dunhaupt 2012). Despite this, the financial sector is not a large contributor to
GDP. The European confidence in this model and its seeming vindication during the
financial crisis have led German politicians to assert a firmer and “unilateral” voice in the
post-crisis international regulatory regime (Schneider 2010).34
In 2008 amid the onslaught of the financial crisis German Chancellor Angela
Merkel assigned blame for the financial crisis squarely to the US and UK and

34

In the network section the role that Germany plays in the EU financial regulatory regime will be
addressed.
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distinguished their approach to financial regulation from that of Germany. “Merkel
criticised the fact that despite impending dangers, the financial markets had been allowed
to continue operating in a ‘free-range’ and ‘matter-of-fact way’, and were ‘supported by
the governments in Britain and the US’[…] ‘We did what we were supposed to do’ ”
(Quoted in Connolly 2008). In the same article Joachim Poss, a member of her coalition
party, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), was quoted as saying, “ ‘[t]he
Americans cannot hold Germany responsible for its [sic] own failure and arrogance.’ ”
The SPD spent political capital on the creation of the third German grand coalition in
2013 to prioritize the financial transaction tax (FTT) at the EU level (Jennen and Parkin
2013).35
Strong rejection of financialization and the lack of financial regulation also came
from French President Nicholas Sarkozy. In an address in September 2008 he explained
the financial crisis to the French public:
“Basically, a certain idea of globalization is biting the dust with the end of
a financial capitalism which had imposed its rationale on the whole
economy and contributed to corrupting it. The idea of the all-powerful
market which wasn’t to be impeded by any rules or political intervention
was a mad one. The idea that the markets are always right was mad. For
several decades we created conditions in which industry operated with the
aim of achieving short-term profitability. The growing risks people were
forced to take to obtain increasingly exorbitant profits were concealed.
Remuneration systems were put in place which drove dealers to take more
and more absolutely reckless risks. People pretended to believe that by
pooling the risks they made them disappear. Banks were allowed to
speculate on the markets instead of doing their job which is mobilize
savings for economic development and analysing the credit risk. The
speculator rather than the entrepreneur was financed. The rating agencies
and speculative funds were left totally unsupervised. Firms, banks,
insurance companies were forced to write down the value of their assets in
35

The term grand coalition (or GroKo in German parlance) in Germany refers to a coalition government
between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) with the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Social
Democrats (SPD). The CDU/CSU and SPD are the two largest parties in Germany. The two contemporary
coalitions lasted from 2005-2009 and 2013 to the present (A.K. 2013).
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the accounts at market prices which go up and go down at the whim of
speculators. Banks were subjected to accounting rules which provide no
guarantee on the proper management of the risks but which, in the event of
a crisis, contribute to exacerbating the situation instead of cushioning the
shock. It was a madness for which we’re paying the price today! […]We
must find a new balance between the State and the market when public
authorities the world over are being compelled to intervene to save the
banking system from collapse. A new relationship must be established
between the economy and politics through the development of new
regulations. Self-regulation as a way of resolving all problems is finished.
Laissez-faire is finished. The all-powerful market which is always right is
finished” (Sarkozy 2008).
Sarkozy cautioned against blaming capitalism itself but rather considered
speculation and financialization as a perversion of capitalism. This rhetoric from the head
of the Union for a Popular Movement, a center-right party, was intended to fend off a
turn in public opinion against capitalism and towards socialism. Though he calls for a
new organization of the relationship of politics and the economy through new regulation,
he presumes the same securitization of the financial system and its connection to ‘main
street’ as his counterparts in financialized states: “Savers who have trusted our banks,
companies, our country’s financial institutions won’t see their trust betrayed. They won’t
pay for the possible errors of the executives and possible imprudence of the shareholders.
The State is here and the State will do its duty. I make a solemn promise this evening:
whatever happens, the State will guarantee the security and continuity of the French
banking and financial system” (Sarkozy 2008). The leader of a country following the
German model proposed a solution to the consequences of the financial crisis was to
double-down by shoring up domestic financial institutions. After the crisis, EU member
states pursuing finance-led growth and EU member states not pursuing finance-led
growth had similar reactions to the financial crisis. This led to a centralization of
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authority under the new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the pursuit of
financialization at the EU level.
Financialization of the Social Sphere
The previous section documented the political commitment in the EU to protect
financial-led growth after the financial crisis. This section will show that though there has
been uneven financialization in homeownership and retirement accounts in the EU, there
is a general trend towards centralization and financialization in the social sphere.
The European Union is composed of 28 states and cannot credibly be treated in
this or any analysis as having a unified, singular social sphere. However, this analysis
does use the same indicators as the OECD to measure financialization. The indicators for
the 28 member states and EU averages are compared, and then compared with those of
the United States. This project also considers trends across member states. The
Continental social model has also credibly been contrasted with the Anglo-American
model by other scholars, both as varieties of capitalism and as parallel models of social
welfare (Hall and Soskice 2001; Ebbinghaus and Manow 2004; Hyman 2011; Schröder
2013). These models obviously impact the degree of financialization in homeownership
and retirement systems.
Continental western European states have fuller social welfare systems than the
US system. Social insurance comes in the form of unemployment support, welfare
support, and universal health insurance. The Open Method of Coordination, an EU
regulatory policymaking mode in which broad outlines are set at the EU level and
specific policy choices are made at the national level, is now being applied to social
welfare policy (Scharpf 2002). Boeri and Sapir have developed a typology of European
social models which attempts to categorize the policies of each member state (Boeri
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2002; Sapir 2006). The UK has a place notably apart from the continental states, either as
the epicenter of the Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American model (Coates 1999). The
following sections will consider the same two indicators as the US chapter:
homeownership and retirement.
Homeownership
Member states in the European Union have not prioritized home ownership
incentives and mortgages tend to have higher initial capital requirements and longer
terms for repayment than US mortgages (European Central Bank 2009). In the past
twenty years however, the trend has been for increasing loan to value ratios and
increased rates of home ownership in some EU member states.
The chart below presents the percentage of homeownership for the current 28 EU
member states in 2013.
Figure 12: EU Homeownership, 2013
EU Homeownership Percentages, 2013

Source: Eurostat 2013. *Ireland figure is for 2012 as figures for 2013 are not available.
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Homeownership rates vary greatly across EU member states, peaking in Romania
(95.6%) and Lithuania (92.2%) and at the nadir in Germany (52.6%). The EU average is
70%. The high percentage of homeownership in Romania stems from two waves of
privatization in which renters of state owned apartments were offered extremely low
prices to buy their apartments (Constantinescu 2011). Privatization is one government
policy which has led to differences in rates of EU homeownership across the EU. The UK
has only recently experienced an uptick in homeownership rates, prompted by selling
property to tenants in the 1980s. “It is clear that in the new member countries of the EU,
privatisation of the housing stock has also been a very important and in some of these
countries home ownership levels are very high. Indeed the highest rate of owner
occupation appears to be in Hungary, where 90% of the stock is owner occupied. But
depending in how the privatisations were dealt with rates can be much lower. In the
Czech Republic and Poland the rates are below the weighted average for the EU15 of
64% at 47% and 55% respectively” (Earley 2004, 28).
The trend towards increased homeownership has also been constant across nearly
all EU member states. The chart below from Demographic Change and Housing Wealth:
Home-owners, Pensions and Asset illustrates the changes since the postwar period. Only
Greece and Slovakia have experienced decreased home ownership rates as a percentage
of total housing stock in the period between 2002 and 2006-2009.
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Figure 13: Post-War Growth of Homeownership Percentage Share of Total Stock by
Year

Source: Doling et al. 2012, 27.
However, these figures obscure some of the detail about the relationship between
homeownership and financialization; homeownership does not necessarily correlate with
the use of financial products or services. Not all member states have high percentages of
participation in the mortgage markets. Participation in the mortgage markets is highest in

102

the Sweden (61.4%), the Netherlands (60.3%) and Denmark (49.2%), showing some
convergence across the two dimensions of the social sphere as they are also among the
top six states with highest participation in private pension schemes. (Eurostat 2013) The
average of EU member state homeownership rates with a mortgage is only 27.2%.
Figure 14: EU Homeownership Percentages With and Without Mortgages, 2013
EU Home Ownership Percentages, 2013
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Source: Eurostat 2013. *Ireland figures are for 2012 as 2013 data are not available.

Loan to value (LTV) ratios for home ownership in EU member states have been
increasing but most are lower than the LTV ratio in the US. The first figure below, Figure
15, demonstrates the breadth of typical LTV ratios in the Euro area and the second,
Figure 16, demonstrates the maximum LTV ratios allowed in the advanced member state
economies and in the US.
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Figure 15: Typical Loan to Value Ratio for First-Time Euro Area House Buyer,
2007
Typical Loan to Value (LTV) Ratio for First-Time House Buyer,
2007
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Source: European Central Bank 2009, 27. *Euro area includes only those states for which
data are available.
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Figure 16: US, EU Maximum Loan to Value Ratio, 2008
US, EU Maximum Loan to
Value Ratio, 2008
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Loan to value ratios are highest in those EU economies dominated by the AngloAmerican model of capitalism. The Netherlands has a typical lending rate of 101%
despite a maximum possible ratio of 125% before the financial crisis; in 2011 the
Netherlands lowered the LTV to 110%. In 2010, Sweden also lowered its maximum LTV
from 100% to 80%. The UK and Ireland also allow over 100% lending, in line with the
US. The US, UK, and Ireland have not altered their maximum LTV ratio after the
financial crisis.
In European Union member states the deregulation of the mortgage markets and
innovations in loan products have served some of the same functions as FHA policies in
the US: expanding home ownership to low-income households.
“While each country moved to a more liberalized system, there is a large variation
in what their systems offer. Overall, however, the innovations have increased the
availability of mortgage loans, including changes in the type of the interest rate
(such as variable rate mortgage and interest-only mortgages) and modifications of
repayment structure and terms of the loan (such as introducing 30 years loans). A
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consequence of these changes has been to make loans affordable for a wider range
of households including those with low incomes who could not afford owner
occupied housing earlier” (Doling et al. 2012, 34).
Government support for home ownership is also less prevalent in EU member
states than in the US. In an IMF index formulated to measure government participation in
the housing finance markets, the support offered in tax breaks to middle and low income
individuals as well as subsidies or grants to new homeowners is considered. The index,
available in Appendix 4, assigns points in several categories of government support, such
as subsidies to first-time homebuyers. The sixteen EU member states included are
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and the UK.
The findings indicate that out of these EU member states and the US, the US had the
strongest overall government participation in the housing market and was an outlier in a
number of indices, including tax breaks, subsidies, and loan guarantees. Though it is
paradoxical that European welfare-oriented states have less government support for home
ownership than the US government, one potential explanation is that the US government
has encouraged broad use of financial products to increase homeownership rates as a way
to grow the economy. Carliner asserts that in the US “[m]any of the policies supporting
homeownership were created as economic stimulus measures in response to the
depression and subsequent recessions” but remained in place after the cyclical economic
problems ended and “evolved into supports for home ownership” (Carliner 1998, 318).
This suggests the government supported lending to stimulate the economy in order to fuel
finance-led growth, a move that is consistent with financialization ideology. Encouraging
home ownership in the US, coupled with low LTV ratios, provides the finance industry
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with fodder for new financial products. Explicit US government support for home
ownership in the 1990s developed alongside securitization. In the EU, domestic and
global securitization markets were smaller than those in the US and there was lower
issuance of structured products (European Central Bank and the Bank of England 2014,
10). Simply put, securitization was not as common a practice in the EU as it was in the
US. In the US, securitization relied on the continued issuance of mortgages—even bad or
‘subprime’ mortgages. In the EU there was no continued demand for mortgages to
securitize.
Retirement Accounts
Differences in European social models can account for some of the differences
across EU member state retirement policies. Public pension systems are a vital part of the
social welfare system in countries following the Continental model and traditionally
replace a high percentage of retiree’s pre-retirement earnings (Legros 2013, 1). This is in
stark contrast to countries following the Anglo-American model, which charge lower fees
for public pensions but also replace less pre-retirement income (Sun and Hu 2014, 59).
Notably some states supplement their public pension schemes with mandatory private
retirement accounts. This is a form of state mandated financialization, not unlike the
myRA accounts being promoted by the US government. The states with mandatory
private retirement accounts are Denmark, Estonia, Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden.36
These mandatory private retirement accounts are one indicator of a strong government
commitment to financialization of the social sphere.

36

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) distinguishes between public,
mandatory private and voluntary pension schemes.
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Figure 17 shows the percentages of wage replacement rates from public and
private pensions in several EU member states as well as the US. “The gross replacement
rate is defined as gross pension entitlement divided by gross pre-retirement earnings. It
measures how effectively a pension system provides a retirement income to replace
earnings, the main source of income before retirement. This indicator is measured in
percentage of pre-retirement earnings by gender” (OECD 2016, (Gross pension
replacement rates (indicator)).
The EU average, based on the 27 member states as of 2013 omitting current
member state Croatia, does not include a measure of private accounts. Retirees rely more
on private accounts than public pensions for retirement income in the Netherlands,
Denmark, and the UK and rely on them for significant percentages of their income in
Ireland, the Czech Republic, the US, Sweden, Slovak Republic, Estonia, and Poland.
Those states without government mandated private accounts but large reliance on private
accounts are the UK and Czech Republic.
Public pensions in most EU member states account for a much larger percentage
of retiree income than they do in the US and it may be for this reason that fewer people
participate in private pension plans in the EU. Despite fundamental differences in the role
of public pensions in the Anglo-American and Continental models, in nine EU member
states private pensions account for at least 24% of retiree income replacement.
Economists promoted private retirement accounts as a safer alternative to public pensions
since public pensions could be cut during public debt crises (Bovenberg and van Ewijk
2011). Some states mandated contributions to private pensions as a way to “boost” capital
markets (Matlack 2015). This reliance on private pensions, and especially mandatory
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private pensions, demonstrates that there is moderate financialization in the area of
retirement accounts in some EU member states.
Figure 17: Gross Replacement Rate from Public and Private Pensions, 201337
Gross Replacement Rate from Public and Private Pensions, 2013
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Data retrieved from Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Statistics, Pensions at a
Glance 2013. Notably, these figures may fluctuate with the markets; in years with higher returns from
private financial accounts payouts to retirees may increase and therefore increase the percentage of
replacement from private accounts.
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However, there is not a clear trend toward financialization of retirement schemes
in the EU. A review of retirement account schemes reveals disjuncture across member
states. Some member states have strong support for financialization, while other member
states have made it more difficult for individuals to maintain private pension accounts.
After the financial crisis, support for financialized pension schemes changed in
many member states and at the EU level. This response varied not only across member
states, but between member states and the EU.
Member States Retirement Account Response
Since the financial crisis several European states have faced public debt crises and
have targeted retirement counts as a way to cut their budgets. Hungary enacted a series of
reforms in 2010 to “force” citizens who had assets in mandatory private retirement
accounts to convert back to using the public pension system (Feher 2010). The 2010
reform allowed Hungarians to elect to stay in the private retirement accounts but in doing
so they would forfeit their public pensions to which they had also contributed. Only
around 100,000 people elected to stay in the private schemes and those who did not had
their funds “transferred” to the public fund (Krzyzak 2014). The Hungarian government
used the transferred money from the private retirement account funds to pay budget
shortfalls. In 2014 a new reform was introduced that would close the private funds and
transfer the assets to the public pension funds unless 70% of Hungarians participated in
and paid fees to private pension funds; this was an impossible hurdle as only 10% of
Hungarians continued to pay private pension funds following the 2010 reform (Dunai
2014). In 2014 Poland moved half of the assets in its private pension scheme to the public
pension program and told contributors to the private accounts that their benefits would be
paid by the public pension program (Matlack 2015; Sebastian 2015). In 2012 and 2015
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Slovakia introduced reforms to allow people to opt out of previously mandatory private
retirement accounts, citing the accounts’ poor performance (Matlack 2015; Krzyzak
2015).
The Hungarian, Polish and Slovakian governments have made efforts to reduce
their citizens’ reliance on private retirement accounts managed by financial firms. Instead
they have nationalized private retirement account funds and created incentives for
citizens to rely increasingly on public retirement schemes.
European Union Retirement Account Response
While Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have implemented reforms to move away
from the financialization of retirement accounts, the European Union is moving towards
the financialization of private retirement accounts. As mentioned earlier in the chapter,
the European Commission has simultaneously instructed EIOPA to manifest a panEuropean private retirement account system. The Commission laid out this task in a 2012
White Paper. In the White Paper the Commission explains that a greater reliance on
private retirement accounts is desirable partially because, “[…] there is a need to improve
the quality of financial products for individual retirement savings not linked to
employment, such as third pillar schemes and other financial products used to supplement
the incomes of the elderly. Improving consumer information and protection is necessary
to enhance workers' and investors' confidence in financial products for retirement
savings” (European Commission 2012, 13). This demonstrates strong EU support for
private retirement accounts exists despite some member states removing them from their
national social welfare systems. The Commission proposes improving consumer
confidence in and reliance on financial products as the solution to insecurity in public
retirement schemes, demonstrating that it is doubling down on financialization of the
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social sphere after the financial crisis. In contrast to the response by Hungary, Poland,
and Slovakia, this indicates the EU has been captured by financialization ideology.
EU member state reliance on private retirement accounts varies significantly. The
evidence indicates that there is a divide between member state governments who support
financialization in retirement accounts and those who do not support financialization in
retirement accounts. This divide and the way it is settled at the EU level are central to
explaining why a transatlantic financial regulatory regime has emerged. The pursuit of
Anglo-American financialization at the EU level is not the result of a bottom-up,
consensus of member states. It is the result of an intergovernmental negotiation in which
some member states are more powerful than others. The European Commission
instructed EIOPA to establish a pan-European private retirement account. EU
participation in a transatlantic financial regulatory regime is predicated on shared
transatlantic interests and desired outcomes. However, especially in the social sphere and
retirement accounts, the EU is not monolithic. A transatlantic financial regulatory regime
with harmonized or common standards can only emerge if Anglo-American financialized
capitalism is pursued as a growth strategy at the EU level.
The next section will explain how Anglo-American financialized capitalism is
pursued at the EU level despite the varying levels of member state support for
financialization.
Network Salience
This section will address how the financial regulatory regime is created at the EU
level, and the EU financial regulatory regime’s relationship to the international regulatory
regime. This section uses network analysis to identify the salience of the individual
member states to the EU regulatory regime and the salience of the EU regulatory regime
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to the international regulatory regime. Salience in this context is a product of financial
activity, financial flows and interactions between states. This analysis indicates that
financial regulation in the EU generally favors the Anglo-Saxon model of financialized
capitalism and this is because of the United Kingdom’s position as the preeminent
financial global center and a culture of consensus in decision-making. This will support
this project’s argument that the transatlantic regulatory regime is being created to allow
the EU and US to pursue finance-led growth strategies and to stave off competing
regulatory regimes.
There are two regimes to consider in order to determine which member states are
most salient to the creation of financial regulation, the domestic EU regulatory regime
and the international regulatory regime. At the first level in the EU regime, member states
compete to attract financial activities and influence regulation produced by the European
Council and European Commission. EU member states in engaging in these regulatory
conflicts are usually divided into those practicing the Anglo-Saxon model and the
German model. At the second level, the European Union, alongside its member states,
competes to set financial standards and attract financial activity. As a result of its network
salience in the international financial regulatory regime, the United Kingdom plays a
crucial decision-maker role in the EU financial regulatory regime.
The United Kingdom is a hub of financial service firms and financial flows and
this gives its government network salience (Oatley 2013, 141-142). London is currently
the top financial center in the world, followed by New York (Global Financial Centres
Index 2015). London was also the only financial center in the EU to crack the top ten. In
2014, Frankfurt fell from 9th to 11th place while Luxemburg rose from 11th to 12th place.
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This position in the hierarchical network of global finance gives it power in the EU and
international financial regulatory regimes.
The neighborhood in which most financial institutions operate in London is even
called ‘the City’, a nickname for the county named The City of London. The Lord Mayor
of The City of London, “supports and promotes the City as the world leader in
international finance and business services” (The Lord Mayor 2012). The CityUK is a
powerful organization that lobbies for financial industry interests located within London
and the United Kingdom. It publishes reports about the concentration of the financial
services sector in The City, financial services’ contribution to the UK and EU member
state economies, and submits public comments to calls for suggestions on harmonization
or regulation of financial services. Through its government and interest group, the
financial services industry in The City has influenced the content of the regulatory regime
at the UK and EU level and sought to play a role in the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership to influence the transatlantic regulatory regime (Hilary 2014, 26).
Because of London’s status as a global financial center, the government of the
United Kingdom is consulted about standards in financial regulation in the international
financial regulatory regime and other states defer to the United Kingdom within
international organizations on financial regulatory issues (Baker 2010, 650-651). Their
deference is because the government of the United Kindgom has more experience with
the most recent innovations in global finance and should therefore make greater
contributions to global standards as a result of that experience. The United Kingdom is a
“pace setter” in financial regulation and its influence in previous EU negotiations on
financial regulation “was underpinned by the size of its insurance market; the expertise

114

and effective coordination of national policymakers, and a state-of-the-art domestic
regulatory model” (Quaglia 2011, 100). This is similar to the role that the United States
government plays in the international regulatory regime (Baker 2010, 650-651).
London’s prominence and The City’s high level of organization as a civil society
actor gave the UK government considerable influence at the EU level in the content of
financial regulation. The strength of the German model and the corresponding power
Germany wields in economic and monetary policy should have theoretically challenged
the influence of the UK in financial regulation. However, London’s status as a financial
center and the importance of the UK in the international financial regulatory regime
overwhelmed Germany’s influence.
In order to assess the role played by the UK government within the EU regulatory
regime and the potential contribution of the EU regulatory regime to the transatlantic
regulatory regime, a discussion of EU policymaking is required.
EU Policymaking
While in the US until the financial crisis there was a seeming consensus in
national political organs on the ideal of financialization-friendly regulation, in the
European Union, member states and the Commission compete to influence the scope of
EU policy and the content of financial regulation. The EU is not a state and a credible
analysis of EU public policy cannot treat the EU as if it were a state. Understanding how
EU financial regulatory decision-making takes place will support this project’s assertion
that Anglo-American financialized capitalism is a dominant impetus behind the
transatlantic regulatory regime.
The European Council, the EU political organ composed of the heads of member
state governments, is responsible for deciding political priorities of the EU as well as
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extending new EU competences, while the European Commission, the technocratic
executive departments, is responsible for implementing regulation through directives and
legislative suggestions in ‘Community’ or supranational policy areas. The European
Parliament, the legislative body of the European Union, does not possess the power of
legislative initiative and can only amend and vote on legislative proposals made by the
European Commission in Community policy areas. In intergovernmental policy areas,
meaning areas in which exclusive competence has not been extended from member states
to the EU, the Council is responsible for legislation. In the trade agreement process, the
Parliament is kept fully informed during negotiations, has the right to consent to the
agreement, and implements any legislation necessary to carry out the agreement.
In the European Council decision making is formally by qualified majority vote
(QMV) which is a weighted system based on population. However, in practice many
decisions in the Council are taken by consensus. This makes policymaking in the EU
reliant on the agreement of every member state, which can privilege the preferences of
outliers.
Consensus itself is an institution in the Union, a process with intrinsic value apart
from the outcome. “The EU’s ‘culture of consensus’ is the result of the 40-year history of
negotiations among the same partners and the acculturation of new members to those
norms” (Heisenberg 2005, 68). With consensus as a common cultural norm, the tendency
towards agreement is greater. At the Council meetings, member state representatives tend
to discuss an issue until a consensus emerges even if there is an indication that a qualified
majority vote would pass. Despite the increasing prevalence of qualified majority voting
as the formal voting requirement on EU issues, consensus continues as the informal
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practice. Furthermore, consensus has come to characterize the policy formulation process
as well as the decision making process.
The practice of consensus in intergovernmental decision making ostensibly began
with the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise. French President Charles de Gaulle objected so
strongly to proposals for the extension of QMV by Commission President Walter
Hallstein that de Gaulle held up the reauthorization of the Common Agriculture Policy
(CAP), had the French representative to the European Economic Community recalled,
and boycotted meetings for nearly six months. The “empty chair crisis” was only
resolved when the Council decided that a decision to be taken under QMV would be
postponed if a member state felt its important issues were at risk (Ginsberg 2007, 75-77).
“The Luxembourg Compromise […] represented the first major informal norm in EU
decision-making procedures. […] Although the Single European Act in 1986 curtailed
the already limited use of Luxembourg Compromise and extended QMV into many other
areas of EU legislation, the informal norms spawned by the Luxembourg Compromise
persist to this day. Most decisions continue to be made by consensus rather than by
voting” (Heisenberg 2005, 68).
Currently, consensus is still present by practice in the decision-making phase and
culturally and procedurally in the policy formulation phase.
Consensus in the Decision Making Phase
In supranational intergovernmental decision making, the Council practice of
consensus is significant because it breaks from the formal requirement of qualified
majority voting. Another feature of the EU consensus-based system that takes place in
earlier stages of the decision making is accommodation politics. Based on the
accommodation model of compensation to the ‘losers’ of a proposal, the reiterated games
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of EU Council conferences have built enough trust and enough opportunities for the
‘losers’ to be promised either compensation or concessions on another issue or later
conference (Bogaards and Crepaz 2002). These ‘accommodations’ facilitate consensus on
otherwise thorny issues, and are not that different from traditional bargaining within a
normal democracy’s legislative branch. What is unique is that this takes place on the
intergovernmental level between member state officials and not between members of the
legislative branch.
Consensus in Policy Formulation
Therefore the contrast between the rarely used formal decision making
mechanisms and the practice of consensus indicate that the EU does indeed have a
‘culture of consensus’ which dominates the entire policy making procedure. An aversion
to voting, and the absence of dissent in decision making, are contrasted with competition
in the agenda setting process.
Since the European Parliament does not have the power of legislative initiative,
the Commission legislates in supranational, Community issues. Legislative suggestions
and directives are issued by the European Commission, which is organized by functional
Directorate-Generals or DGs for short. Actors in the Commission are already meant to be
devoid of national interests and acting in the name of the Union. They work towards
common union goals and formulate policy as ‘technocrats’. However, some DGs are
considered to be biased towards the Anglo-Saxon model, including the former DG
Internal Market and Services (Quaglia 2007, 278). They also compose and host the expert
groups which will be discussed in the next section who are consulted on proposed
regulation.
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After a proposal is presented by the Commission and before it reaches the
Council’s formal decision-making stage, it is wound through the intermediary policy
process. In the EU, this institutional process is known as comitology.38 The working
groups and committees hash out initial differences, and the member states’ Committee of
Permanent Representatives (COREPER) settles all but the most important issues before
the responsible Council formation meets.39 Emblematic of its importance in the formation
process, COREPER sits in two formations: COREPER I assembles the member states’
deputy permanent representatives and settles technical issues while COREPER II consists
of the permanent representatives who are tantamount to ambassadors and deal with the
meatier issues—political, economic and institutional questions. These permanent
representatives are all located in Brussels and maintain regular contact on pressing issues
which would be otherwise difficult to achieve across 28 geographically-dispersed
member states. However, this very commitment to the EU may render them agents of the
Union and not of their member states, and therefore, they may be more committed to
reaching consensus than defending particular interests of their home countries
(Moravcsik 1991). Hooghe (2005) has found evidence that time in the European
Commission socializes European officials to be ‘Europeanized’ and support
supranationalism. The Commission has proposed more restrictive financial regulation
38

“The term ‘comitology’ is shorthand for the way the Commission exercises the implementing powers
conferred on it by the EU legislator, with the assistance of committees of representatives from the EU
Member States. [..] ‘Comitology committees’ assist the Commission in executing its implementing powers
by giving an opinion on draft implementing measures before they are adopted. They include representatives
from all EU Member States and are chaired by a Commission official” (European Commission
“Comitology Register FAQ”); “Well over 200 committees have either advisory, management or regulatory
functions with regard to the powers delegated to the Commission in the Treaty to implement legislation
enacted by the Council or the Council and the EP [European Parliament]” (Ginsberg 2007, 173).
39

The Council meets in different formations. For example, if the finance ministers of the member states are
required to address a particular issue the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) will meet;
ECOFIN is a formation of the Council composed of member state economic finance ministers.
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than the Council has been willing to adopt. Examples are of this regulation are presented
later in this chapter.
National Positions and Multi-level Games
As individual member states know that they will face the test of achieving
consensus and not majority at the intergovernmental end stage, their individual positions
are often ‘self-censored.’ One can contrast this multi-level game process with that of
inter-state negotiations in trade rounds. In traditional international organization
negotiations, each state formulates its own ‘win-set’ parameters, forms coalitions with
states with similar win-sets, and identifies strategies to advance its agenda. These
different win-sets are pursued in the framework of negotiations. In preparation for EU
Council conferences, member states also formulate their agendas, however, the culture of
consensus leads them to only consider win-sets which have a feasible chance of
achieving consensus. This self-limiting behavior leads to a smaller potential overlap
among the 28 member state win-sets. The constant temperature-taking amongst EU
member states in their Permanent Representation delegations allows each member state
very accurate knowledge of what the potential group compromise, or consensus, will be.
This is in contrast to states in international negotiations which usually push their own
favored agendas even if they are ultimately likely to accept an outcome further in the
‘center’.40
This means that initiatives that would regulate financial services deemed too
strongly in favor of either the German or Anglo-Saxon model can be effectively blocked

40

Although the institutional arrangements between member states makes the comparison with states in
international negotiations problematic, the distinction in the breadth of agendas or solutions initially
considered is necessary to understand the potential loss that could result from a narrower initial overlapping
win-set.
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by any single state. As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, there was very little
effort before the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) in 1999 to harmonize financial
services in the EU. Member states might have anticipated the conflict in desired
regulatory outcome or preferred their own system and therefore avoided harmonization at
the EU level.
The financial crisis, and subsequent sovereign debt and Euro crises, have altered
the member states’ calculations and Commission’s suggestions. There is now a
willingness to engage in conflict in the Council over the content and direction of the EU
regulatory regime and challenge the dominance of Anglo-American financialization. One
example on the point is the financial transaction tax discussed in the first section of this
chapter. The FTT had broad popular support, even in member states with a high degree of
financialization, and was proposed by the European Commission. Despite this, ministers
in ECOFIN could not reach a unanimous agreement. As a result, the enhanced
cooperation procedure was used to move forward with the participation of some member
states. Without the participation of the UK in the FTT, member states have wavered in
their commitment to the establishment of the FTT.
However, challenges to the dominance of Anglo-American financialization at the
EU level have been largely unsuccessful. The next section will present evidence that EU
institutions have been captured by industry interests and actors, and that the crisis has
allowed for greater penetration of industry actors.

Relationship of Regulators to Industry
This project argues that US and EU policymakers are captured by the ideology of
financialization and that this regulatory capture is related to increased access for financial
industry actors. This section will demonstrate this capture at the EU level. Before and
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after the financial crisis scholars and consumer groups have accused the EU institutions
of promoting financialization and being captured by financial industry actors (Alter-EU
2009; Petry 2014). The European Union suggests it seeks a broad participation of
stakeholders and yet it has been assailed by groups like Corporate Europe Observatory
(CEO) for having a revolving door of regulators similar to the US (Corporate Europe
Observatory 2014a). There is evidence to substantiate these claims. Officials who take
jobs in the private sector within two years of leaving the service of the Commission must
inform the Commission and gain approval. This procedure is supposed to prevent the
revolving door phenomenon but in 2014 the EU Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly,
investigated 54 files. In 2014 O’Reilly “found deficiencies in how decisions on
‘revolving doors’ cases are reasoned and documented” that posed a potential ethical issue
(European Ombudsman 2014). O’Reilly also called for greater transparency by
publishing the names of officials who take positions in industry after stints in the
Commission.
In July 2016, Goldman Sachs, a financial firm, announced it had hired former EU
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso. His position in London will involve
advising the firm on the UK’s exit from the EU following a UK referendum to leave the
EU (Noonan 2016). This is a prominent example of the revolving door at work in the EU.
As Corporate Europe Observatory notes, “[o]ne in three (9 out of 26) outgoing
commissioners who left office in 2014 have gone through the 'revolving door' into roles
in corporations or other organisations with links to big business” (Corporate Europe
Observatory 2015). One former Commissioner, Siim Kallas, continues as a special
advisor to current Commissioner Dombrovskis despite industry ties (Panichi 2015).
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Following the financial crisis, institutional changes to deal with financial
regulation have not been limited to new policies. The European Commission for 20142019 split the portfolio of the previous DG Internal Market and Services into three
sections; one of these sections creates a new portfolio of Financial Stability, Financial
Services and Capital Markets Union. This change indicates that the EU Council perceives
the integration of financial services and the creation of a capital markets union to be
priorities worthy of a new Commission post. The Commissioner for the post is Lord
Jonathan Hill from the UK, a former lobbyist who founded Quiller Consultants which
served several finance industry clients including TheCityUK and HSBC (Singleton
2011). His appointment indicates two potential instances of regulatory capture. First, as
Hill has represented the financial industry, his appointment represents the capture of EU
financial regulation by the financial industry. Second, as Hill has worked extensively for
TheCityUK his appointment suggests the capture of EU financial regulation by
TheCityUK.
In order to confirm his appointment, EU Commission President Juncker had to
remove responsibility from his portfolio:
“In recent private meetings in Brussels, the incoming European Commission
president has made clear that Lord Hill will have remuneration policy carved out
of his job as EU commissioner overseeing Europe’s financial sector, according to
two people familiar with the matter. The decision from Mr Juncker comes as
Europe’s banking watchdog prepares to clamp down on allowances designed to
sidestep the EU bonus cap, in an intervention next month that threatens to throw
pay policies in the City of London into turmoil. […] Mr Juncker’s decision is
highly political and emerges as Socialist and Green MEPs issue threats to veto
Lord Hill’s appointment over fears he will bend to City demands” (Barker 2014).
Members of the European Parliament were not merely concerned with
Commissioner Hill’s involvement in setting bonus caps. Indeed Members of the
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European Parliament asked Lord Hill about how his home country’s policies and attitudes
towards finance would impact his activities as Commissioner. On the question of his
independence from the financial industry, he explained he intends to comply with the
code of conduct for Commissioners and has no conflicts of interest. Hill affirmed his
commitment to promote the European interest above his national interest and explained
he would be would be willing to take action against the UK if necessary: “If a Member
State does not comply with EU rules, or tries to circumvent them, I will ensure that full
use will be made of the various enforcement tools available. […] I will promote action by
the Commission, first through EU pilot procedures, and if necessary with formal
infringement proceedings. As Guardian of the Treaties I will not hesitate to take recourse
to these measures should the integrity of the legal framework be at stake” (Hill 2014, 5).

Conclusions
Despite the decentralized nature of many aspects of the EU financial regulatory
regime, after the financial crisis there has been a trend towards centralization in
supervision and regulation of financial activities. This chapter presented evidence that the
financial crisis of 2007-2009 was a critical juncture in the EU financial regulatory regime
that prompted changes in its institutional procedures and structures as well as policies.
The financial crisis did prompt a sharp confrontation of different member state
ideas about the role of financialization but the regime has continued to be dominated by
Anglo-American capitalism and the ideology of financialization. This dominance is
because of the network salience of London in the EU and international financial
regulatory regimes and is evidenced by the weak participation of EU member states in the
financial transaction tax, the Commission pushing EIOPA to establish pan-European
private retirement accounts, and by regulatory capture in the EU Commission. The
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alignment of the EU and US financial regulatory regimes and the changes in the
international financial regulatory regime stemming from the financial crisis prompted
institutional changes to the transatlantic financial regulatory regime.
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Chapter 4: The International Financial Regulatory Regime
and the Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime
The Financial Crisis as a Critical Juncture in the International Regulatory
Regime
In Chapters 2 and 3 I demonstrated that the financial crisis was a critical juncture
for both the US and EU that led to changes in the institutional structures and processes
and policies of their financial regulatory regimes, This restructuring, coupled with the
ideology of financialization and a strategy of finance-led growth, are the internal drivers
of change in the transatlantic financial regulatory regime. However, this project argues
that the international regime changes also caused a change in the institutional processes
of the transatlantic regime. This chapter will document that the financial crisis was also a
critical juncture in the international regulatory regime by providing evidence of
institutional structural and procedural changes in the International Monetary Fund and the
Group of formations. The increased voice and vote participation of emerging market
economies posed a threat to the dominance of the US and EU, which further motivated
them to create a transatlantic financial regulatory regime. Creating this regime required
the EU and US to overcome divergent regulatory approaches.
Financial and subsequent economic crises have been studied as moments
precipitating policy learning and dramatic policy change. Eichengreen (2002),
Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) address the repeated
financial crises as cyclical and representative of a failure by policymakers to learn lessons
from previous crises and establish enduring policy changes. Gourevitch (1986) also
studies the cyclical nature of international economic crises and uses an analytic
framework that considers them as “points of choice” (10). An edited volume, Moments of
Truth: The Politics of the Financial Crisis in Comparative Perspective, published in 2013
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contains scholarly contributions which analyze the financial crisis as a critical juncture in
several institutional and national contexts (Panizza and Philip 2013).
The 2007-2009 financial crisis once again demonstrated the principle of
contagion, the interconnectedness of states’ economies, and the need for global financial
reform. A crisis that originated in a housing bubble in the US had a ripple effect through
major financial institutions in other states and impacted global financial markets.
Increased financial integration contributed to the “amplification and global spread of the
financial crisis” (Claessens et al. 2010, 1; Ozkan Unsal 2012, 29).
The financial crisis was also unlike others in recent memory because it was
“triggered by problems in the financial system of the mature economies” (Ozkan Unsal
2012, 5). The crisis spread in the most financialized economies first: the US and UK
(Ozkan and Unsal 2012, 4). Emerging market economies experienced a “relatively shortlived” and less dramatic version of the crisis, particularly markets with less exposure to
financialized assets like mortgage backed securities (Ozkan and Unsal 2012, 29).41
The financial crisis presented an opportunity to revise the international financial
regulatory regime. Much of the international financial regulatory regime was established
soon after the Second World War. Europe and the US cooperated to establish the Bretton
Woods system after the Second World War. The Bretton Woods institutions were a part
of the “postwar liberal democratic order” (Ikenberry 1996, 84). This postwar economic
system was characterized by embedded liberalism. Embedded liberalism entails support
for multilateral free trade as long as governments can provide social welfare protections
and protections against unemployment. As Ruggie noted, “the essence of the embedded
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European emerging markets were some of the hardest hit because their economic expansion had been
largely externally funded (Xafa 2010, 479).
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liberalism compromise [was]: unlike the economic nationalism of the thirties, it would be
multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its
multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism (Ruggie 1982, 393).
State intervention was used to “secure domestic stability” (Ruggie 1982, 394). Embedded
liberalism allowed Europe to develop the welfare state at the same time it benefitted from
market-opening multilateralism. Through economic contributions and structural
governance power, the US and European countries dominated the Bretton Woods
institutions.
Before the financial crisis, the United States enjoyed a veto power in the principal
international financial institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and several
European countries had quota voting shares disproportionately large compared to their
populations and contributions. The Group of 7, or G7, was an ad hoc group of countries
that coordinated international financial reform.42 Except for Canada, Japan and the US,
the members of the G7 are all European Union member states.
After the financial crisis the IMF altered its voting shares and governance
structure and the Group of 20 (G20) launched the Financial Stability Board.43 The G20
was established after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1999 to shore up international
financial stability but did not play a significant international role until summits were
established after the financial crisis.
The financial crisis revealed the insufficiency of existing monitoring and
surveillance efforts by the international financial institutions and specifically the IMF.
42

The members of the G7 are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Since 1981, the European Union has also been a nonenumerated member of the G7. (Laub 2015)
43
The member states of the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.
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First, the IMF’s monitoring efforts were primarily directed towards monitoring the
developing world or previously unstable economies rather than the West and therefore
the IMF did not provide an early warning to the crisis in 2007-2009. Second, the
monitoring system was largely reliant on states’ establishing and accepting IMF
legitimacy. In 2005 as a senior advisor for the IMF, Peter Isard recommended improving
the quality and impact of IMF surveillance to shore up the international financial system.
He recommended linking the ability of countries to borrow to their previous
implementation of policy recommendations (Isard 2005). Miranda Xafa, a former
member of the IMF’s Executive Board, summarizes the failures in the existing reporting
mechanisms meant to ensure global financial stability:
“The Fund’s Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), published semiannually since
2003, assesses key risks facing the global financial system highlighting policies that can
help mitigate systemic risks and enhance financial stability. In the run-up to the crisis, the
GFSR warned about rising credit and market risks associated with the growth in
subprime mortgages embedded in complex, hard-to-price structured products (IMF 2006
and 2007a). Similarly, the World Economic Outlook (WEO) flagged some early concerns
about the risks of house price bubbles in the United States and the dangers from large
current account deficits in emerging Europe (IMF 2007b). However, the focus of this
advice was not sharp enough to prompt policy action, and policymakers in the stillbooming global economy were less receptive to the warnings. The fact that the crisis
originated in the advanced countries, normally outside the purview of the Fund’s crisis
prevention efforts, contributed to complacency. A more evenhanded surveillance would
have enhanced the Fund’s effectiveness and legitimacy by bringing about a better balance
between peer protection and peer pressure” (Xafa 2010, 467-7).

Despite warnings about the housing market bubble and current account deficits,
the US and EU continued their pursuit of growth driven by financialization. Warnings
were not themselves enough to prompt policy change. During the financial crisis the IMF
began to provide recommendations to policymakers and regulators.
The revision of the IMF’s role, as well as most of the revisions of the Financial
Stability Board, originated with Group of Twenty (G20) action (Fratzcher and Reynaud
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2011). Ordinarily the G7 would make these decisions but the G20 was increasingly relied
on to coordinate a response to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 because of the extent of
contagion (Smith 2011, 5-6). The G20 group, itself established following the Asian
financial crisis in the late 1990s, used its 2009 and 2010 meetings to coordinate an
international response to the financial crisis. The meeting in 2009 was the first time that
there was a heads of government level meeting of the G20. The financial crisis directly
resulted in increased membership of the Group of number formation responsible for
deciding the contours and content international financial regulatory regime. This
eliminated the previous structural power enjoyed by the US and EU member states as
members of the more exclusive G7.
The members of the G20 agreed that the IMF should have a larger role in
financial stability surveillance and also created a new no-conditionality attached, quick
loan called Flexible Credit Line for qualified members with strong economies and sound
policies.44 The IMF redefined its “function in the global financial system” as surveillance
(Fratzcher and Reynaud 2011, 405).
In the middle of the financial crisis in 2008 and after a global recession in 2010,
the IMF embarked on a reform program. The quota share system, which assigns votes to
states, was reorganized to give more voting power to emerging market economies. In
2008, the IMF adopted the Quota and Voice Reforms. These reforms increased the voting
shares for 135 “dynamic countries” for a “cumulative increase in quotas” of 11.5 percent
(International Monetary Fund 2008). In 2010 the agreed reforms included shifting 6

44

To qualify a member country “Has very strong economic fundamentals and institutional policy
frameworks [,] Is implementing—and has a sustained track record of implementing—very strong policies
[,] Remains committed to maintaining such policies in the future” (International Monetary Fund 2015).
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percent of shares from over-represented states to “dynamic emerging market and
developing” states and making Brazil, China, India, and Russia “among the top ten
largest members in the IMF” (International Monetary Fund 2016). The structure of the
executive board also changed to be composed entirely of elected, rather than some
appointed, board members and “advanced European countries […] committed to reduce
their combined Board representation by two chairs” (International Monetary Fund 2016).
Notably the 2010 quota share reform removes the US veto power in the IMF, which it
held de facto with its large quota share.
The financial crisis challenged the existing order of power within the international
financial regulatory regime and the institutional structural and procedural changes to the
regime threatened the dominance and reduced the structural power of the European
Union and United States within its institutions. The changes transferred power directly
from Europe and the US to emerging market economies and developing states (Rato
2011, 89). They also challenged the “American model of global capitalism” (Oatley et al.
2013, 134). At the G20 summit in November 2008 “under the pressure of the
international financial collapse of 2007-2008, and the proximate pressure of the non-G7
economies in the room, the status quo powers of the United States and Europe agreed that
additional changes in voice and vote were needed” (Griesgraber 2009, 180).
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 also impacted the balance of power in the global
economy. According to Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick, the financial crisis also
prompted an end to Chimerica. Chimerica is a term Ferguson and Schularick use to
describe the economic relationship of China and America that created a “world economic
order that combined Chinese export-led development with US over-consumption” (2009,
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2). They assert Chimerica threatened Europe’s place in the global economy and the Euro
(2009, 4, 24, 25). The end of Chimerica was an opportunity for the US and EU to
collaborate and create a new world economic order.
Rickards has controversially argued that after the financial crisis the EU is
actually in a stronger position in the global economy than the US and will become the
“world’s economic superpower” over the next ten years (Rickards 2014, 136). Rickards
bases his assessment on the strength of the Euro and the German economic model (2014,
125-137). This position contrasts sharply with the reality of the Eurozone and fiscal debt
crises the EU has experienced and his assessment does not consider the potential negative
economic impact of Brexit on the EU.
The financial regulatory regime cannot be separated from broader economic
cooperation because financial services are one of several sectors of the economy
routinely included in international agreements and dialogues and because financialization
has been used to grow economies. Financial services have been addressed in international
trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), bilateral trade agreements,
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as
institutions designed to harmonize financial services regulations. The inclusion of
financial services within international trade agreements follows a neoliberal
institutionalist logic because the EU and US are establishing institutions with the greatest
possibility to produce their desired outcomes. The WTO is an established multilateral
forum with enforcement mechanisms that could address financial services and set global
regulations. However, the US and EU in particular have ample opportunity to forum shop
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for a venue likely to produce their desired outcomes.45 Transatlantic cooperation and
competition in the institutions of the international regulatory regime, and particularly in
the WTO, have also shaped their joint decision to address financial regulatory policy in
exclusive transatlantic institutions, such as the Financial Market Regulatory Dialogue
(FMRD) and the TTIP.
The focus on international financial regulatory cooperation within
intergovernmental meetings about economic cooperation is partially a result of the
process of financialization. As several industries rely on finance in order to generate
profits and as governments rely on finance to grow gross domestic product, financial
regulatory cooperation to avoid arbitrage losses becomes a priority within existing
institutions designed for international economic cooperation. Industry actor groups and
multinational corporations are also essential to prioritizing financial regulatory
cooperation and have existing influence in organizations like the WTO through their
national advisory committees, such as the U.S. Industry Trade Advisory Committee
(ITAC).

Transatlantic Cooperation
The first section below will survey the steps taken in institutional building and the
evolution of EU-US economic cooperation since 1945 because several of these
institutions can be used to demonstrate the trends in cooperation and competition between
the US and EU. With different financial regulatory standards, ordinarily the EU and US
would compete, but after the financial crisis they are attempting to build a transatlantic
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One excellent example is intellectual property rights. The EU and US have forum shopped several
international organizations in order to find an appropriate venue (Eimer and Philipps 2011). Ultimately the
EU and US formed the Transatlantic Intellectual Property Rights Working Group (TIPRG) which seeks
compliance in intellectual property rights cases from third states.
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financial regulatory regime. The second section will review the differences in the
transatlantic regulatory regime before and after the financial crisis to demonstrate that the
financial crisis was a critical juncture that produced a transatlantic financial regulatory
regime.
Post-War Transatlantic Cooperation: From Supportive to Competitive
The post-war cooperation of Europe and the US was focused mainly on building
international economic institutions and rebuilding Europe; however, they also cooperated
bilaterally and within international economic institutions. As discussed earlier in this
chapter, European states and US cooperated to create the Bretton Woods institutions to
extend a Western liberal democratic order.
Following the Second World War the US offered economic aid to Western
European countries under the guise of the European Recovery Program (ERP), more
commonly known as the Marshall Plan. This aid was one of many factors that supported
European integration and institutionalization. The Organisation of European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC) was established in 1948 to supervise the allocation and
disbursement of the Marshall Plan aid (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development).46 In the fall of 1949, the members of the US administration reconsidered
the aid program because they were concerned that the money was “insufficiently directed
towards economic integration” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development). Under pressure from the US, the OEEC made trade liberalization a
priority and as a result in 1950 60% of private intra-European trade had been freed
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The original members of the OEEC were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and
Western Germany (represented by both the combined Bizone and the French occupation zone).
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(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). The OEEC also attempted
to liberalize capital flows through its Committee for Invisible Transactions. After the
Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community in 1957, the OEEC was
retooled and launched as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) in 1961.
The European Economic Community (EEC), an antecedent to the European
Union, had a stated goal of integrating the economies of the member states through the
European Common Market. The United States supported the EEC because of the political
importance of European economic integration despite the fact that it would lead to
discrimination against American exporters (Brown 2003, 100). The US also supported
European economic and political integration as part of the liberal democratic order
because it offered a powerful counterweight to communism during the Cold War
(Ikenberry 1996, 88-91).
Relations and negotiations between the EEC and the US were central to the other
pieces of the post-war institutional infrastructure, including the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Signed in 1948, the GATT was a multilateral agreement that
sought to regulate trade with principles of reciprocity and mutual advantage. The
relationship of the EEC to the US was central to the early GATT negotiation rounds.
“The US Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, for instance, specifically launched the
so-called Dillon Round in the GATT ‘to keep the Community's common tariff as low as
possible’ (Dillon, 1957, 914)” (Devuyst 1995, 2).
While successive American administrations through the 1960s were largely
supportive of European economic integration as a means to create geopolitical stability
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and strong allies, as the European Economic Community began to confront the US in
GATT rounds the attitudes of the US administration and Congress shifted (Coppolaro
2013). In the 1970s, the US became sensitive about its trade balance and the EEC was
increasingly perceived as a closed community providing unfair preferences and subsidies
to its members (Devuyst 1995, 3). The US support for European project waned and the
US began to confront the EEC about potential conflicts between EEC regional
arrangements and commitments to the GATT regime. Following the improvements made
to the GATT dispute settlement process during the Uruguay Round in the late 1980s, the
US brought several cases against the European Union.47 Since 1995, the EU and US have
launched 51 complaints against one another, demonstrated in the chart below (World
Trade Organization).48 In the dispute settlement cases counted below, the complainant
(either the US or EU) is the initiator of the dispute settlement procedure and the
respondent is the other.

47

After the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 the European Economic Community became known as the European
Union and the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 established the legal personality of the European Union, replacing the
European Communities. The new legal personality allows the European Union to be a treaty signatory and
to be the named member of international organizations. These successive rebrandings reflect the
progressive integration and institutionalization in not only economic policy areas but also social and
judicial affairs committed by member states.
48
This chapter will not attempt to detail the cases within the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement
Body between the US and EU as there is already a broad scholarship detailing the challenges to and
participation of the European Economic Community, then European Community, and then EU within the
GATT and WTO. See Petersmann and Pollack 2003 and Ahearn 2006.
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Figure 18: EU-US WTO Dispute Settlement Complaints since 199549
Complainant
European Union

33

United States

19
Total

52

Source: World Trade Organization 2016. “Find disputes cases.”
These figures are indicative of some significant trends in the transatlantic
economic relationship. First, the EU and US have used international institutions as fora to
host competitions between their different regulatory regimes and even regulatory
traditions. The beef hormone dispute between the US and EU is one such example.
Following a European Commission health and safety regulation in 1989 banning imports
of beef treated with growth stimulants, the US brought a complaint against the EU for
blocking imports of its beef that had been given hormone shots (Johnson and Hanrahan
2010). The EU decision was followed by several other countries’ also banning meat
treated by hormones. Many instances of transatlantic regulatory competition manifest
because of the different regulatory traditions of the EU and US.50 A specialist in the
Congressional Research Service identified regulatory policy conflict as one of the three
sources of most trade conflicts between the EU and US, alongside traditional producer
protection and foreign policy clashes. (Ahearn 2006) The international regulatory regime

49

For the purposes of this chart, EU represents both European Community and European Union. This chart
does not include US complaints brought against specific EU member states. Data retrieved from the World
Trade Organization.
50
Michael Rogers of the European Commission’s Bureau of European Policy Advisors summarizes the
connection thusly: “The US and the EU have disagreed over the regulation of a number of health and
environmental risks, from genetically modified foods to climate change to beef. Underlying these specific
controversies has been a larger debate, namely, how regulators should act in the face of uncertainty about
risk” (Rogers 2002).
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was used to arbitrate clashes between the EU and US regulatory regimes in the 1990s and
early 2000s. Regulatory conflicts are embedded in social contexts and are more difficult
to resolve than traditional tariff barrier clashes, which may explain why the EU and US
relied on the dispute settlement mechanism rather than transatlantic regulatory dialogues.
EU and US: Divergent Regulatory Approaches
The European Union and United States are often characterized as having two
different regulatory traditions which would make their regulatory cooperation unlikely.
However, the financial crisis changed the incentives to cooperate by altering EU and US
power in international financial regulatory regime. This section demonstrates that the EU
and US overcame divergent regulatory approaches in order to create a transatlantic
financial regulatory regime.
The EU regulatory approach applies the precautionary principle and the US is
generally more responsive to demonstrated negative effects (Vogel 2001). The basis of
this difference is in an approach to managing risk through regulation. The precautionary
principle requires goods or practices to be proven safe before they are allowed in the
marketplace through proactive regulation. The European Commission has issued a
number of health and environmental regulations on the basis that products may pose a
risk. One example is the restriction of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). In food
products, the United States regulates by restricting access once something has been
demonstrated to pose a risk. However, Wiener and Rogers note that the US has also
applied the precautionary principle at times, and has a more conservative approach to risk
management than the EU in certain product areas (2002).
The other major area in which their regulation differs substantially is cultural
issues. The European Commission has exclusive competence to negotiate trade in goods
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and services, meaning the member states are sidelined except for issuing a negotiation
mandate in the intergovernmental Council. One policy domain in which the Commission
does not have exclusive competence to negotiate is intellectual property rights. The
French government insisted on a cultural exception to regulations regarding television
and radio programming, to preserve what it considers a vital balance between French
language and foreign language programming. This principle was introduced in the GATT
Uruguay Round and adheres to French laws that regulate what percentage of
programming must be French language.51 The French government succeeded in having
its cultural exception recognized in the EU regulatory regime and several other member
states have also protected their culture with domestic regulations. Agreements in audio
visual services have been limited at the multilateral and bilateral levels. In June 2013, EU
member state trade ministers negotiated for hours over whether audio visual services
would be on the table in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (AFP
2013).
Geographical indicators are another example of cultural protection and US-EU
regulatory regime divergence. In the European Union, there are three levels of protected
geographical indicators which essentially limit types of foods products to one origin of
production: Protected Designation of Origin (PDO), the narrowest distinction, Protected
Geographical Indication (PGI), second most narrow, and Traditional Specialty
Guaranteed (TSG), the most broad.52 Parmesan cheese is one example of an agricultural
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In 1993, France introduced a law which requires private radio channels to play at least 40% French
music (Cohen 1993).
52
The Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development distinguishes these categories thusly:
“Protected Designation of Origin - PDO: covers agricultural products and foodstuffs which are produced,
processed and prepared in a given geographical area using recognised know-how. Protected Geographical
Indication - PGI: covers agricultural products and foodstuffs closely linked to the geographical area. At
least one of the stages of production, processing or preparation takes place in the area. Traditional
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product given the most stringent classification. Following a twelve-year campaign by the
Consortium of Parmigiano-Reggiano Cheese, the European Court of Justice decided that
“only cheeses bearing the protected denomination of origin (PDO) 'Parmigiano-Reggiano'
can be sold under the denomination ‘Parmesan’ ” (Bodoni 2008; Parmigiano-Reggiano
2008). Before the ruling, although Parmigiano-Reggiano was distinguished as a PDO,
German producers used the translation ‘Parmesan’ cheese to evade the origin
requirement. The consequence is that foreign-produced Parmesan bearing the name
‘Parmesan cheese’ is banned from the EU market.
The US also uses geographic indicators but only as qualifications of a general
product. In the US it would be feasible to have a protected name for Idaho Parmesan, but
not the term Parmesan alone. In the TTIP negotiations, the EU is attempting to negotiate
to have the US cheese producers stop using EU protected geographical indicators such as
Parmesan and instead use labels such as Parmesan-like (Velasco 2014).
This is evidence that in previous instances of regulatory regime discord the US
and EU used the WTO to arbitrate disputes over their different regulatory approaches.
However, the US and EU are instead seeking to collaborate on a transatlantic financial
regulatory regime and have overcome the tendency to compete because of changes in the
global economy and the international financial regulatory regime.
Mid 1990s: Renewing Economic Cooperation
The 1990s saw an institutionalization of the relationship between the European
Union and the United States on several levels; more regularized settings were created to
facilitate the interactions between the EU and US. In 1995, the US and EU launched the
Speciality Guaranteed - TSG: highlights traditional character, either in the composition or means of
production” (Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development).
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New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in part to respond to the concern that with the
dissolution of the Soviet Union the main stimulus for a continuing close transatlantic
alliance had evaporated. Institutionally, the utility of the main bulwark of the transatlantic
alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was in question as well. The
Agenda offered new pillars of the transatlantic regulatory regime. The NTA furthered
regulatory cooperation in 1997 in several sectors by concluding “an EC/US Agreement
on Drug Precursors; an EC/US Customs and Co-operation Agreement; and an EU/US
General Mutual Recognition Agreement covering telecommunications, equipment,
electromagnetic compatibility, electrical safety, recreational craft, medical devices, and
pharmaceuticals” (Meyer and Luenen 2008, 13).
The NTA established several dialogues for different elements of civil society
alongside governmental interlocutors, including the TransAtlantic Business Dialogue
(TABD), the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), and the Transatlantic
Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD). In 2001, the Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD) was
formed.
The EU and US further institutionalized their economic cooperation in 1998 with
the launch of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP). The goals of the TEP were
both multilateral and bilateral. Multilaterally, the TEP was to establish a dialogue which
would take place ahead of WTO negotiations and ministerial meetings to create
“coordinated positions” and even develop “common positions or elaborate proposals to
be submitted in multilateral discussions and negotiations” (European Commission 1998,
1). However, as noted earlier in this chapter, trade disputes between the US and EU
continued after the TEP. Though the TEP institutionalization “cushioned the blow” it
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could not prevent a conflicts based on “a classic clash of EU and US economic and
political interests” (Steffenson 2005, 165). Bilaterally, the EU and US would address a
number of policy sectors with ministerial and official dialogues. These included technical
barriers to trade in goods, and notably a dialogue on mechanisms to enhance regulatory
cooperation.
The TEP also reaffirmed the desire to coordinate their consultative processes and
develop opportunities to involve all stakeholders. (European Commission 1998:1) In
reference to regulatory barriers, the TEP singles out the TransAtlantic Business Dialogue
(TABD) as a stakeholder with an interest in regulatory dialogues (European Commission
1998, 5). However, after the burst of activity in the 1990s, the TABD and other dialogues
were less active.
Since 2008: Emergence of a Stronger Transatlantic Regulatory Regime
Origins of Regulatory Cooperation
The US and EU have different approaches to timing of regulation as well as
preferences for institutional settings. As demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3, there are
significant differences in the EU and US financial regulatory regimes. The previous
section demonstrates that the EU and US would ordinarily compete but after the financial
crisis changes in the international financial regime spurred their cooperation. However,
the nature of finance also creates incentives for the US and EU to cooperate and create
one regime.
Regulatory conflicts between the US and EU can lead to competition to influence
global standards, as noted by Drezner (2007). In All Politics Is Global, Drezner postulates
that the US and EU will compete over regulatory standards with two rival standards if
their preferences diverge until third countries choose one set over the other. This model
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assumes that regulation is necessary to capture gains, which does not necessarily apply to
finance. Some states avoid regulating or deregulate elements of finance in order to
capture gains, particularly activity from industry actors using arbitrage. But harmonized
transatlantic finance standards, tied to preferential access to their markets in multilateral
trade agreements, would help the EU and US eliminate competition from states that cater
to financial industry firms using arbitrage.
Of the three types of trade disputes mentioned earlier in the chapter, regulatory
competition has the most direct effect on producers and business bears the cost of
compliance more often than consumers or countries. Therefore at the international level,
the desire to harmonize regulatory standards is purely to cater to business, not to improve
government trade balances or aid consumers. But harmonizing financial regulation has
the added bonus of contributing to gross domestic product because of financialization of
profits.
Regulatory and trade analysts are quick to suggest that mutual recognition
agreements are a way to avoid the conflict and distributional gains of harmonizing
regulatory standards while insuring that there is no risk posed by a foreign product.
Mutual recognition agreements are a formal legal agreement between two parties that sets
out a process to accept each other’s domestic standards as equivalent. For certain
regulatory issues, like which agricultural products can be labeled organic, this is a
sufficient solution. But for financial regulatory standards mutual recognition agreements
can have potentially destabilizing consequences and do not adequately address the
dynamic and ageographical nature of financial services.
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Most mutual recognition agreements concern the flow of goods, which are easily
stopped at borders. Financial flows and products are not as easily contained. For example,
international structured products, domestic products traded on global markets, can be an
amalgam of diverse products. Policy conditions in one country can impact the value of
the structured products held by a bank in another state. Recognizing a foreign state’s
regulation of the sale or formation of structured products as equal to domestic standards
in order to allow those instruments to be held by domestic financial institutions rests the
stability of domestic financial institutions on policy choices of another state that affect
the value of those products.
Structured products allow investors to hedge risk through a combination of
products. “There are structured products linked to interest rates, foreign exchange rates,
commodities, credit risk, inflation, carbon, insurance, hedge fund returns and many other
underlying variables, as well as hybrid products that combine some of these variables into
a single product” (Bennett 2013, 19). One prominent example of structured products from
Chapter 2 is mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
and collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), each generally containing several
mortgage-backed securities, are packaged in a complex way that obscures the true risk of
the mortgages within them. US government mortgage regulations, including government
guaranteed loans, and unemployment trends can impact the value and stability of these
products, which in turn can affect the balance sheets and stability of foreign financial
institutions and investors who hold these products. Deficiencies in US regulation of
mortgage lending contributed to a global recession because many foreign institutions held
these products. Mutual recognition agreements in most areas of finance will not lower or
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control risk posed by complex financial products. Finance requires a distinct regulatory
regime.
Harmonizing or establishing common regulatory standards in a transatlantic
regulatory regime is also the only option for EU-US cooperation after the financial crisis
because of reforms made to the US and EU regulatory regimes. Reforms in both the EU
and US made to support stability of their economies and financial institutions could
possible be evaded or eroded by mutual recognition agreements. Two examples of areas
with such a complication are asset risk weights and capital requirements.
Individual states and banks themselves create a system of asset risk weights for
bank and non-bank financial institutions to calculate the true risk of items on their
balance sheets. Risk weights are meant to measure assets or exposure on firms’ balance
sheets according to potential risk. The higher the percentage of risk weight, the riskier the
asset. “The models used to gauge the riskiness of a loan book were once provided by
regulators, with fixed weightings for categories such as business credit or loans to other
banks. But an update to the global regulatory guidelines, known as Basel II and adopted
just before the financial crisis, encouraged banks to come up with their own risk models.
After all, bankers should know better than bureaucrats how risky any given loan might
be. These home-made models have since been used to determine how much capital a
bank needs” (The Economist 2015). For example, government bonds from Greece would
be assigned a higher risk weight, perhaps 100%, compared to bonds from the US,
traditionally assigned 0% by US banks. The total of these weights is used to calculate the
capital adequacy ratio.
Following the financial crisis, the EU and US have changed their risk weighting
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systems. The US has much stricter rules, particularly in the way mortgage-backed
securities are weighted (Shearman and Sterling LLP 2013). The new EU guidelines
assign loans secured by residential property a 35% risk weight while the new US
guidelines assign either a 50% or 100% risk weighting depending on the quality of the
mortgage (Article 125 of Regulation (EU) No/2013; Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation 2016; Shearman and Sterling LLP 2013, 25). Previously the US regulation
did not account for the quality of residential mortgages when assigning a risk weight. The
new regulation is considered more risk sensitive than the previous regulation or EU
regulation for this reason (Saunders and Allen 2010, 294). The US also has higher risk
weights than the EU for claims secured by commercial property, exposures in default,
unsettled securities or commodities transactions, and retail and consumer loans. Member
state regulatory authorities can assign additional risk weight to mortgage-backed
securities.
Additionally, the European Central Bank has assigned a risk weight of zero to
sovereign debt, which has been criticized as underestimating risk by, inter alia, the
European Political Strategy Centre, “the European Commission’s in-house think tank”
(European Political Strategy Centre 2015). According to the Centre, “Zero-risk weighting
of sovereign debt in the EU, as well as the exemption from existing large exposure
requirements, are a source of vulnerability. This does not reflect a global regulatory
constraint – as the global Basel framework does not prescribe zero-risk weight for bank
exposures to sovereigns – but a regulatory choice made at [the] European and global
level” (European Political Strategy Centre 2015). As Sascha Steffen, Head of the
International Finance and Financial Management Research Group at the Center of
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European Economic Research, notes zero weighting sovereign debt is a political decision,
“I think the sovereign debt regulation was an issue of helping countries refinance. It was
a political choice. It’s also a political choice not to do anything to change it right now.
[…] You cannot just change the rules from one day to the other. The banks simply don’t
have enough capital. […] A change to reflect sovereign debt as having something other
than a zero risk would be an important issue for banks in the peripheral countries in the
EU because they hold a lot of their countries’ risky debt. They are basically the only ones
holding bonds of these countries at the moment” (Steffen 2014).
Sweden has already required that its banks assign a weight to sovereign debt and
the Basel Committee is reviewing the issue of how to risk weight sovereign debt. Andres
Dombret, a Bundesbank board member, has indicated that the anticipated revisions of the
Third Basel Accord will require sovereign debt to be assigned a risk weight (Groendahl
and Black 2016). For many EU banks, this would mean dramatically increasing their
capital.
If the US were to sign a mutual recognition agreement with the EU that covered
asset-backed securities or risk weighting generally, this could pose a serious risk to US
investors and financial firms because the EU underappreciates the risk of default
compared to the US.
Both the EU and US have changed capital requirements for banks after the
financial crisis to comply with regulations from the international regulatory regime.
Increasing capital requirements is considered a way to ensure stability of financial
institutions and protect investors. After the financial crisis, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision decided in the Third Basel Accord to raise capital requirements and
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introduced a leverage ratio and liquidity requirement. The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision is an informal forum in which representatives from central banks and
supervisory authorities develop standards and guidelines for banks. These standards are
then approved by the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision and
voluntarily implemented by the Committee’s member states.53 The capital requirements
of the Third Basel Accord are even higher for institutions deemed systemically important
financial institutions (SIFIs), or those ‘too big to fail.’ Increasing capital requirements
and leverage coverage ratios are strategies to ensure stability of financial institutions and
protect investors. EU bank leverage ratios are laxer than the reformed US rules (Wright
2014).
Harmonization achieved through a single regulatory regime is the only choice if
the EU and US are intent on jointly regulating finance because of the nature of financial
activities and the international pressures. This is a partial answer to this project’s second
research question of why the regulatory regime has changed after the financial crisis.
As we will see later in this chapter, American policymakers have been concerned
that seeking any form of cooperation in financial regulatory standards with the European
Union will dilute the content of hard fought regulations in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the US rules adopted to carry out the Third
Basel Accord. But the input from industry has consistently suggested that harmonized
standards would attract all other actors to comply.
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The current states with institutional membership on the Basel Committee are Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States (Bank for International
Settlements, “Basel Committee Membership”).
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Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime After the Financial Crisis
The pre-existing transatlantic regulatory regime revolved largely around low-level
regulatory dialogues and coordinating positions within international organizations. The
financial crisis prompted the EU and US to upgrade several elements of the transatlantic
regime. These upgrades manifest in several ways: level of cooperation, frequency or
consistency of dialogue or meetings, scope of content of cooperation, and permanence of
outcomes of cooperation.
In order to demonstrate how the transatlantic regime has changed, I created an
index rating the major transatlantic financial institutions in 2006, 2007, and 2015 across
two dimensions: activity and institutionalization.
The activity of each institution is rated on an index with two factors: the
frequency of meetings and the number of outcomes or deliverables. Frequency of
meetings is used as a measure of activity. Meetings are an important indicator of activity
for institutions. This is because institutions use iterated games to achieve cooperation in
game theory. In order to achieve cooperation, and concessions from some actors, all
actors must expect that they will meet again.
The number of outcomes or deliverables is used as the other indicator to measure
activity. This indicator does not attempt to assess the nature of the deliverables because
the diversity of the institutions and their outcomes makes this nearly impossible. For
example, while as an intergovernmental organization the Transatlantic Economic Council
is able to create new transatlantic institutions, as a civil society organization TABD and
TACD are not. Counting the number of deliverables is an equalizing measure of
productivity.
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The second dimension, institutionalization, is measured by two indicators:
existence and size of permanent staff and number of members. Permanency of staff is one
way to measure the degree of institutionalization and formality of an organization (Volgy
et al. 2008). However, nongovernmental institutions such as councils in particular may be
institutionalized with a sizeable membership but fewer staff.
Ideally, other dimensions such as influence over transatlantic regulation, could be
measured as directly. However, there are no clear deliverables at this stage of the
transatlantic financial regulatory regime to be counted and attributing any regulatory
outcome solely to the institutions below is problematic.
The full measurements for Figures 19, 20, and 21 are available in Appendix 5.
Figure 19: Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime, 2006
Institutional Dimension
Functional Dimension
Weak
Moderate

Weak

Moderate

Strong

TACD*,
TLD,
TALD
TABC/D*

Strong
*Information about the TABC/D and the TACD staff was unavailable.
Source: Author generated.
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Figure 20: Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime, 2007
Institutional Dimension
Functional Dimension

Weak

Moderate

Weak

TLD,
TALD

Moderate

TEC,
FMRD

Strong

TACD*

Strong

TABC/D

*Information about the TACD staff was not available.
Source: Author generated.

Figure 21: Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime, 2015
Institutional Dimension
Functional Dimension
Weak
Moderate
Strong

Weak

Moderate

TALD

TLD
TEC,
FMRD

Strong

TTIP,
TABC/D,
TACD

Source: Author generated.
US-EU Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue (FMRD), Trans-Atlantic Business
Council (TABC), TransAtlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), Transatlantic Consumer
Dialogue (TACD), Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD), Transatlantic Legislators’
Dialogue (TLD), Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP)
In 1995 the US and EU launched the New Transatlantic Agenda and a series of
advisory transatlantic civil society organizations. The TransAtlantic Business Dialogue
(TABD) was established as a formal channel for industry actors to provide their “unique

151

and indispensable perspective on trade liberalization” (Transatlantic Business Council).
However, following this period in the mid 1990s the activity in the TABD declined
because cooperation between the EU and US was not a priority (Meyer and Luenen, 17).
Planned meetings were scaled down or cancelled (Corporate Europe Observatory 2001).
The TABD has been revitalized in order to continue to offer its “business driven vision of
transatlantic trade and investment” (Vargo 1997). The Dialogue has changed to the
Trans-Atlantic Business Council (TABC) and represents individual firms and trade
associations representing businesses or entire industries. The TABC regularly has
stakeholders’ meetings ahead of official US-EU Transatlantic Economic Council
meetings. Members of the executive level Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue (TABD),
within the TABC, are C-suite level members (Chief Executive Officers, Chief Financial
Officers and Chief Operating Officers) who serve in an official advisory capacity to the
state-led Transatlantic Economic Council and have regular meetings with relevant EU
and US officials.
The Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) was established in 1998 in
order to offer a voice to the consumer groups of civil society in EU-US government
dialogues and negotiations during the launch of the New Economic Partnership. Its
members are the consumer advocacy organizations and non-profits in the EU and US.
The Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD) was established in 2001 but has not
had the robust cooperation that was anticipated. Knauss and Trubek (2001) addressed the
failings in the structure of the TALD, which was a “government-sanctioned” dialogue of
the two primary union representatives of the most prominent American union
organization, the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
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Organizations) and in the EU, ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation) (235). The
formal structure of the organization never took shape, regular meetings were not created,
and the organization is all but officially disbanded. This explains its movement in both
the institutional and functional dimensions from Figure 20 to Figure 21.
The Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (TLD) has not had the productive
dialogue desired either. Only members of the House of Representatives are eligible to
participate as representatives of the US Congress. Furthermore,
“other than the appointment of the Chair and Vice-Chair by the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, there is no formal
nomination of any other USTLD member. While many Members have
participated in past meetings, participation in the USTLD often seems to be on an
ad hoc basis, involving little continuity of participants and, in some instances,
largely dependent on the ability of the Chairman to convince Members to attend
the annual meetings. Observers believe this has led to an inability on the part of
the TLD to attract and maintain a broad group of Members willing to participate
on a permanent basis” (Ahearn and Morelli 2008, 10).
The TLD discussed financial services in 2011 and 2012 (Archick and Morelli
2013). However, those serving on the TLD were not sure that financial services were
within their jurisdiction and they deferred to the HLWG and FMRD.
The creation of the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) reorganized the work
of the civil society and industry channels: the TABD, TACD, and TLD became official
advisors to the TEC. In Chapter 5, the connections between these channels and the TEC
will be mapped.
The indices reveal that both the TABC/D and the TACD got stronger following
the financial crisis, both in terms of activity and membership. The TALD has never
officially disbanded, but is not producing or meeting. The explanation for these changes
in activity and membership will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Conclusions
This chapter presents evidence of voice and vote changes in the IMF and G20
after the financial crisis. These changes to the international financial regulatory regime
shifted power away from the US and EU and to emerging market economies and
developing countries. This evidence supports this project’s assertion that the financial
crisis of 2007-2009 was a critical juncture in the international financial regulatory
regime.
The challenge to EU and US leadership in the international financial regulatory
regime was an external pressure which encouraged them to collaborate and create the
transatlantic financial regulatory regime. This chapter also presents evidence that the
transatlantic regulatory regime changed after the financial crisis.
The evidence documents an increase in the institutional strength of the TABC/D
and the TACD from 2007 to 2015. It also documents an increase in the functional activity
of the TABC/D, TACD during the same period. The evidence also indicates a change in
the institutional and functional intensity of the TALD, which is effectively disbanded in
2015. The evidence of TABC/D and TACD activity and the contrast with the TLD
supports that industry actors are driving regulatory cooperation. The introduction of the
TEC, FMRD, and the TTIP further strengthened the transatlantic financial regulatory
regime.
The aggregate of this evidence supports the project’s claim that the financial
crisis was a critical juncture that precipitated changes in the transatlantic regulatory
regime that specifically addressed finance. The movement of both the TACD and
TABC/D also indicates that the civil society and industry institutions have become more
active and institutionalized than their intergovernmental counterparts, with the exception
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of the TTIP. The limitations of the evidence presented are the inability to document all
internal institutional processes and activity and the missing staff data for the TABC/D
and TACD.
The next chapter will map the relationships between the institutions of the
transatlantic financial regulatory regime and explain the way that civil society, and
industry actors as a part of it, has driven changes to the regime.
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Chapter 5: The TTIP: Reorienting the Transatlantic
Regulatory Regime
The previous chapter provided evidence that the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was
a critical juncture in the international and transatlantic regulatory regimes. This chapter
will explain that the EU and US reacted to the international regulatory regime changes
not only by intensifying their regulatory cooperation in existing for a, but by establishing
a transatlantic financial regulatory regime. This chapter will demonstrate that the EU and
US established the transatlantic financial regulatory regime both to respond to the
demands of industry, and to continue to dominate the international financial regulatory
regime. The chapter will do so by using the research method of process tracing to
document the developments in the run-up to the TTIP negotiations and by mapping the
connections of the institutions of the transatlantic financial regulatory regime. This
mapping will reveal industry’s privileged access and input into the regime.
The transatlantic relationship has sought to influence global regulatory standards
using a variety of strategies. Notably, the EU and US have used international
governmental organizations including the World Trade Organization and International
Monetary Fund to pursue their regulatory agendas. However, recently the EU and US
have eschewed the traditional regulatory forums in favor of a comprehensive
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). A leaked TTIP draft first
revealed that financial services would potentially be included in the free trade agreement
(Pinzler 2014). More recently the European Commission confirmed that there is a chapter
on financial services being negotiated (Directorate General for Trade 2016). This is
despite the Obama administration’s demonstrated reluctance to include financial services
in the agreement (Johnson and Schott 2013; Bracken 2014). However, in the run-up to

156

negotiations policymakers in the EU and US have privileged the input of industry by
creating institutions for industry to meet, organize and steer government action. Industry
associations and large firms have used these institutions to push for a transatlantic
financial regulatory regime that will primarily benefit multinational corporations and
financial institutions. The EU and US hope that by benefiting industry and the finance
industry that they will continue to dominate the international financial regulatory regime
and enjoy finance-led growth.
Steering and Rowing
Scholars have analyzed regulation of essential services at the state level by
examining the interaction between the activities of the state and civil society. In
Reinventing Government, Osborne and Gaebler assert that in an ideal division of
responsibilities the government is steering and civil society is rowing (1992). The term
steering refers to directing and guiding activities and rowing refers to entrepreneurial
activities and service provision. By steering the state would ensure essential service
provision but not necessarily provide the services itself; the service provision or rowing
would be left to civil society actors and industry.54 Their book discusses ways to
introduce market mechanisms in government that will inspire competition and choice in
public service provision. The division of tasks between steering and rowing is associated
with the larger movement in neoliberalism to privatize government services.
Braithwaite considers this particular division of labor part of the contemporary
regulatory state, which emerged in the 1980s with neoliberalism, but notes that other
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This analysis includes industry in civil society because the transatlantic financial regulatory regime treats
industry as a part of civil society. however many other authors categorize industry separately from civil
society. In the paradigm of the regulatory state, there are only two categories of actors: the state and all
other actors.
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models have preceded this one (Braithwaite 2000). From the nineteenth century until the
1930s, the Nightwatchman state saw civil society both steer and row, with a state role in
the background.55 In the postwar period, the state used Keynesian principles to play both
roles, directing and providing services. It is important to note that the Nightwatchman
and Postwar state have been developed with the US and UK as cases. The regulatory state
has been applied more broadly including to the European Union. Though these terms may
be applied to other countries, it might require altering the time periods.
The new regulatory state has been heralded by several policy scholars (Majone
1996; Moran 2002; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). Though neoliberal tenets favor free
market solutions such as deregulation and privatization, regulatory competition allowed
both neoliberalism and the regulatory state to develop simultaneously. Jurisdictions alter
their regulatory regimes in order to attract households, businesses and industries in
Tiebout’s regulatory competition model. Through this model, scholars have explained the
growth of the regulatory state (Majone 1996). The United States and the European Union
are the subjects of the majority of the scholarship on the regulatory state because of
ability of their domestic regulatory regimes to influence international regulatory regimes
and because the multilevel governance which characterizes their domestic regulatory
regimes allows for regulatory competition among different regulatory regimes.
However, the concept of the regulatory state fails to capture some of the external
pressures on domestic regulatory regimes that arise as a result of globalization and
particularly the globalization of civil society and industry. Although competitive
regulatory regimes arise as a result of globalization since firms and households have
increased mobility and access to information about regulatory regimes, the regulatory
55

Figure 1 illustrates these eras.
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state should still be steering the entrepreneurship and service provision. Scholars have
noted that transnational phenomena such as financial services and flows are not easily
constrained by traditional state-based regulation and that globalization has therefore
precipitated global governance arrangements in a number of policy areas (Sinclair 2001;
McGrew and Held 2002; Porter 2005). The negative externalities of these transnational
phenomena may be partially managed by individual states but the regulatory state is not
necessarily equipped to steer transnational activities unless it completely exports its
domestic regulatory regime. In the EU and US, civil society and industry actors are adept
at navigating and interacting with the domestic regulatory regime and global civil society
and industry actors interact with the international regulatory regime.
Industry as a Part of Civil Society?
This project does not seek to limit the definition of civil society to industryrelated interests. Rather, this project argues that the transatlantic regulatory regime is
privileging industry actors as representatives of civil society and demonstrates that
industry actors are the most frequent participants in consultations and stakeholder
presentations that are open to all civil society. Despite the fact that much of political
science literature that treats civil society as a distinct category from industry and the state,
this project includes industry groups in civil society because the regulatory state literature
does and because the transatlantic regulatory regime includes industry actors in the
institutions created for civil society.
The most organized groups related to a regulatory issue can represent the most
influential elements of civil society in a pluralist system. Gilens and Page (2014) have
found evidence that at the US level “economic elites and organized groups representing
business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while
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average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence”
(564). Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004) assert that a high degree of organization will make a
group play a more prominent role on behalf of civil society. Lindblom (1977) reveals that
when there are economic interests at stake, business has a privileged position in domestic
policymaking. However, none of these observations about the domestic level account for
the organization of transnational civil society and industry groups at the transnational
level.
Industry interests are often the most organized on the transnational level,
especially in the case of financial regulation, and have the opportunity to effectively
capture—or take over—the steering of international regulatory regimes. Koppell
documents this process in several global governance organizations, namely the World
Health Organization, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, the
International Telecommunications Union and the World Intellectual Property Rights
Organization (2006). He finds that interest actors are more effective if they have the
ability to mobilize their constituencies at the transnational level, are formally represented
in the decision-making processes, and can provide desired information to the process.
According to Koppell, transnational interest groups are more influential in global
governance than interest groups in a domestic context because they are often “direct
participants” in the policymaking which follows a “corporatist” rather than pluralist
model; this means that the bargaining takes place “between the state and ‘peak
associations’ representing key sectors of society” (Koppell 2006: 1-2). The financial
industry is considered a key sector of society in the transnational financial regulatory
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regime and industry actors have been granted a formal, privileged role in the policymaking process by advising the Transatlantic Economic Community.
Financial industry actors, by which this project refers to financial firms and
financial industry associations, have successfully organized on the transnational level and
effectively preempted some state and international level regulation because of the process
of financialization discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. If policymakers prioritize financial
growth by continuing to create regulation deemed friendly to the financial industry, it
would indicate that the financialization growth narrative is operationalized as if the direct
relationship between finance and GDP exists.
This narrative has operated to privilege the financial industry actors, and indeed
industry actors generally,56 above other civil society actors in the course of formulating a
transatlantic regulatory regime. In the transatlantic regulatory regime, industry actors
were granted institutionalized channels to the policymaking or harmonization process that
the labor groups were not, and participate more frequently than their counterparts in the
open consultations. The transatlantic financial regulatory regime has begun to conflate
civil society with industry actors. Including industry as a representative of civil society is
indicative of an ideological bias in favor of finance-led growth. The regime’s usage of the
term civil society has caused significant opposition to TTIP in the EU.
In April 2007 the EU and US launched the Transatlantic Economic Council
(TEC). The TEC is a high-level governmental organization that meets at least once a
year. It is chaired by one US official and one EU official and the other members are
officials from the European Commission and the US executive branch. The TEC is tasked

56

Many industry actors net a greater share of their profits from financial activities than manufacturing or
their other traditional ‘main street’ activities.
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with identifying and advancing new areas of economic cooperation and even “ economic
integration” (US Department of State 2009). The TEC has revitalized the civil society
dialogues that advise it. It has also formed a formal Group of Advisors composed only of
the directors of the Trans-Atlantic Business Council, Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue,
and Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (Jancic 2014). Notably, it excludes the
Transatlantic Labour Dialogue, which has been functionally disbanded.
After the financial crisis of 2007-2009, one of the early opportunities for civil
society participation in the transatlantic regulatory regime was the High-Level Working
Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG). In the aftermath of the global recession from
2008-2010, the EU and US formed the HLWG during the November 2011 US-EU
Summit designed to identify and report measures which would stimulate trade and
investment between them, increase their competitiveness, harmonize regulation where
possible, and create jobs. The HLWG was an advisory, governmental body to the
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) and was chaired by the US Trade Representative
(USTR) and the EU Trade Commissioner. The primary domestic motivations for the
creation of this institution were the immense existing trade and investment linkages
between the EU and US, and the similar positions of the US and EU in the global
economy (White House 2011). The financial crisis and recession was unsettling to the
industrialized countries because they disproportionately affected them compared to
developing countries and emerging market economies.57 This led to changes in the
institutional structures and procedures of the international financial regulatory regime that
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This is particularly true in the case of growth rates, which have been diverging for some time. See
D.Willem te Velde, ‘The global financial crisis and developing countries’, Overseas Development Institute
Background Note, October 2008 and ‘Emerging markets and recession: Counting their blessings’, The
Economist, 30 December 2009.
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removed some of the power of the US and EU. The shift in power towards global and
emerging market economies posed a challenge to the dominance of the EU and US and
pushed them to work together to make the foundations of global governance in financial
regulation. The EU and US overcame their differences to compete and be rule makers
rather than rule takers in financial regulation. The goal of the transatlantic financial
regulatory regime is to reassert dominance in the international financial regulatory
regime.
For the European Union and United States it was a strategic decision to identify
ways to further integrate their economies as a counterbalance to the emerging market
economies’ new power in the international financial regulatory regime. The HLWG held
a series of public consultations that were crucial in deciding potential areas for
cooperation and the submissions to the public consultations are presented in the next
section.
Other civil society actors have also participated in the transatlantic regulatory
regime through institutionalized channels created by the EU and US but have been
allowed limited opportunities for formal participation compared to industry
representatives. The chief way civil society has been organized is into sector specific
dialogues. Figure 22 charts these dialogues as well as the intergovernmental processes
before and after the financial crisis.
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Figure 22: Transatlantic Regulatory Regime by Sector, 2006 and 2015
Sector/Actor

Business

Institutions in
2006

Institutions in
2015

Change in institutional activity
after financial crisis

TABC/D

TABC/D: Position papers,
increased meetings, roadshows

Finance

FMRD

TABC/D, TEC
Group of Advisors,
The TTIP Advisory
Groups
FMRD

Property
Rights

IPRWG

TIPRG

Government

TLD, High-Level
Regulatory
Cooperation
Forum

Consumers

TACD

Labor

TALD

TLD, High-Level
Regulatory
Cooperation
Forum, TEC58,
HLWG, TTIP
TACD, TEC Group
of Advisors,
Commission EU
Advisory Group,
US PITAC
TALD

Upgrade discussion of financial
services from FMRD to the
TTIP
Small business serviced; seek
compliance of third states
Single market sought; launch
TEC; goal of transatlantic
regulatory regime explicitly to
impact international regime
Response to the HLWG and
TTIP calls, position papers,

AFL-CIO-ETUC joint response
to the TTIP, excluded from TEC
group of advisors

Source: Author generated.
FMRD (Financial Market Regulatory Dialogue), HLWG (High Level Working Group on
Jobs and Growth), IPRWG (Intellectual Property Rights Working Group), TABC (TransAtlantic Business Council),TABD (TransAtlantic Business Dialogue), TACD
(Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue), TALD (Transatlantic Labor Dialogue), TEC
(Transatlantic Economic Council), TIPRG (Transatlantic Intellectual Property Rights
Working Group), TLD (Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue), TTIP (Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership)
One of the dialogues, the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), has been
an active critic not only of the way negotiations have been conducted thus far but also of
the emergence of the a transatlantic regulatory regime. Members include Public Citizen,
58

In April 2007 during the EU and US summit the TEC was launched, however work did not start in most
areas until 2008.
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the Center for Food Safety, Citizens Advice, Consumer Reports, Consumer Watchdog,
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the European Association for the Coordination of
Consumer Representation, Privacy International, and The European Consumers’
Organisation. Despite the impetus behind for the creation of the TACD, representatives
of TACD have complained about the lack of access and transparency in the TTIP
negotiations. TACD US Co-Chair Ed Mierzwinski noted that the advisory group to the
US Trade Representative includes 600 representatives of industry and only one of
consumers. (TACD responds to USTR announcement) The TACD has, however,
managed to secure a position in the Group of Advisors to the TEC. The TEC established
a Group of Advisors composed of the chairs or directors of the major existing
transatlantic dialogues who would be representing stakeholders. The “major” transatlantic
dialogues represented in the Group of Advisors are the TABC/D, TACD, and TLD; the
three directors are the only members of the Group of Advisors (Jancic 2014).
The Transatlantic Labor Dialogue’s input to the TEC process has been naught
compared to the privileged access of the Trans-Atlantic Business Council. The
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue has been welcomed into the group of advisors and
revitalized by this inclusion. Unlike the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, the
Transatlantic Labor Dialogue has been excluded from the Group of Advisors to the TEC.
The European Trade Union Confederation’s (ETUC) made a contribution to DG Trade’s
public consultation as a part of the High Level Working Group in September 2012. The
response iterates the group’s frustration with a lack of labor access to the TEC and the
lack of substantive input it has been allowed: “The Transatlantic Business Dialogue has
been given pride of place in the relationship, notably in advising the TEC, while the
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European Trade Union Confederation and AFL-CIO, de facto constituting the
Transatlantic Labour [sic] Dialogue, have been given little access. The agenda has been
restrictive and non-strategic” (European Trade Union Confederation 2012).
US and EU labor groups, who are relatively organized members of domestic civil
society and whose endorsement of trade agreements is generally important in the
ratification process, have also noted that despite formal though not privileged
participation in the process, they do not feel they are being heard. In testimony to the
European Union Committee in the House of Lords of the United Kingdom Parliament on
the TTIP, Damon Silvers, Director of Policy at the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL- CIO), noted that he had spoken to the USTR
Michael Froman:
“ ‘about as many times as most people in the policy-making process in the
United States’. He suggested that it was not the case that the American labour
movement is radically isolated from the policy-making process, but rather that,
‘you can be talked to without genuinely participating.’ He noted that having
formal standing in the process did not mean being part of policy formulation,
and that the only way to be included in the policy formulation process was to
have a process that was sufficiently broadly open that you could marshal allies
in the conversation. The civil society participants invited to join the TTIP
process are almost entirely industry representatives” (House of Lords 2014, 85).
The complaints from labor and consumer groups about the advisory process led to
changes in the USTR’s advisory structure, but these were symbolic changes that
reinforced a two-tier system of access for members of civil society and industry.
Responding to broad criticism regarding the advisory process that led to the inclusion of
copyright and patent-holder friendly intellectual property provisions in drafting of
another trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, the USTR office
announced in February 2014 that a Public Interest Trade Advisory Committee (PITAC)
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would be formed. Negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership were conducted at the
same time as the TTIP negotiations and both agreements have faced criticism after their
perceived bias towards industry preferences.
The new PITAC was formed in response to a refusal of the influential Industry
Trade Advisory Committees (ITAC) to allow representatives of the public interest to
attend their meetings. Indeed, this institutionalization marginalized and “segregate[d]”
representatives of the public interest (Flynn 2014).
The corollary advisory group in the EU was convened by the EU Commission. It
convened a TTIP Advisory Group composed of stakeholders who represent broader
interests than the USTR advisors. These include representatives from consumer affairs
and environmental affairs, and labor groups (Directorate General for Trade 2014a).59 The
creation of the group was announced in January 2014 and the group’s first meeting took
place in March 2014, after three rounds of negotiations had been completed. If
negotiations had been completed on ‘one tank of gas’, as desired by both the EU and US
because of the timing of the US elections and the formation of the new Commission, the
Advisory Group may have not been formed (Froman 2013). The European Commission
Directorate-General for Trade (DG Trade) has also initiated public consultations about
aspects of the TTIP, US-EU economic relations and transatlantic regulatory issues,
among them two joint consultations with the US, to target all stakeholders. However,
most have garnered responses from business associations and large firms.
Figures 23, 24, and 25 map the connections between the major institutions in the
transatlantic regulatory regime before and after the financial crisis, indicating the
59

These EU-level advisors are also joined by the member state-level advisors, who influenced member
state government positions ahead of the Commission negotiation mandate, but this project will focus on
groups who have influence over the ongoing process.
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centrality of some institutions and the amount of input from advisory institutions. A solid
arrow denotes input and advice from one institution to another. The thickness of the
arrows signifies the amount of input that the institutions have.

Figure 23: Transatlantic Regulatory Regime Map, 2006

Source: Author generated.
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Figure 24: Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime Map, 2007

Source: Author generated.
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Figure 25: Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime Map, post 2007

Source: Author generated.
The maps above demonstrate that centrality of the TABC/D in the transatlantic
financial regulatory regime and its particular input into the HLWG and TTIP processes.
The TACD also maintains a strong connection to the TEC but has not participated as
frequently in advising the TTIP process. The input of labor actors is missing completely
from the regime as the Transatlantic Labor Dialogue has functionally disbanded. Though
the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue regularly meets, as discussed previously the group

170

has achieved very little and is not functionally contributing to the TEC group or the other
institutions in the regime.
The TTIP negotiations are conducted in relative secrecy and do not reveal drafts
of the agreement to governments and the public for comment, unlike WTO trade
agreements.60 Since the European Commission has exclusive competence to conduct
trade negotiations, the Council of Trade Ministers have agreed on a negotiation directive
(mandate) which gives instructions to the Commission regarding the content and
direction of negotiations (European Council 2013). While EU member state governments
and select European Parliament officials have access to EU texts, at the request of the US
they do not have access to US draft texts (House of Lords 2014, 10). DG Trade published
its initial negotiating positions; the US has not.
In the context of the TTIP, civil society and industry actors have been deliberately
organized by the US and EU in efforts to give a directing voice to industry. This voice
has begun to eclipse other voices in influencing the transatlantic regulatory regime and
has begun demanding service from domestic regulatory bodies; industry actors are
steering and the state is rowing by providing a new form of service: institution building.
In the dogma of mainstream international political economy, the role of the state has been
eroded by the processes of globalization. In the transatlantic financial regulatory regime,
the state has moved beyond the provision of traditional services and instead has a new
role building institutions for industry actors. These institutions are infrastructure that will
allow industry to compete globally. This is a paradigm shift in international political
economy.

60

There is evidence that significant developments in WTO negotiations take place outside of formal drafts,
but in the TTIP process EU member state governments have access to neither. See Jawara and Kwa 2004.
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Institutionalization of Industry as Civil Society
Mobilizing industry in an official advisory capacity is a significant piece of the
EU-US strategy to support the establishment of international regulatory regimes that
allow industry actors to contribute to the EU and US GDPs.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, members of the TABC have regular meetings with
officials in the TEC. Industry actors have voice opportunity at these meetings and are
encouraged to express the issues they face and the regulatory regimes they would like to
see established.
The TABD played a crucial role in the 1990s in “quadrilateral” negotiations
between the EU and US on regulatory issues and established breakthroughs towards
mutual recognition agreements (Cowles 2000). In testimony to the US House Committee
on International Relations, US Acting Assistant Commerce Secretary Franklin J. Vargo
made the following comments about the role of the TABD:
“What it has done is to focus business attention on the transatlantic marketplace
and to enable businesses on both sides of the Atlantic to agree on what the most
important remaining barriers are and to agree on a joint course of action to
recommend to the U.S. Government and the European Commission.It is difficult
to overstate the effect the TABD has had on trade liberalization. No other forum
has risen so rapidly to become as effective as the TABD. It has become the single
most important channel through which business can influence the bilateral
trade and commercial agenda of the U.S. Government and the European
Commission. The European Commission's Sir Leon Brittan summed up the
process well when he said, ‘whenever our two business communities can agree
jointly that an action is in the mutual interest of our two economies, it is
incumbent upon us to seek to implement their recommendation -- or at the
very least to sit down with them and explain why we cannot, and to try to work
out another approach’ ” (Vargo 1997, emphasis added).
Vargo’s testimony identifies the steering role played by the TABD in the mutual
recognition agreements between the EU and US; representatives of business identified
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areas for cooperation and then the US and EU followed by implementing their solutions.
The TABD did this not only by serving as direct interlocutors with representatives from
the US Department of Commerce, European Commission, and EU and US regulatory
agencies but also by organizing to influence domestic politics and opinions (Cowles
2000).
In the previous section this project has demonstrated that after the financial crisis
the connections between civil society groups and the transatlantic regulatory regime
changed. Next the project will review the quantities of submissions to the regulatory
regime.
The aforementioned High-Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG)
conducted a series of public consultations, in 2012 through DG Trade and then a joint
consultation with the USTR that allowed EU and US-based business organizations,
public authorities, firms, non-governmental organizations, and individuals to make
suggestions about the direction of EU-US cooperation. Below the responses to the
consultation are coded to see who “sets the agenda” of the TTIP talks since the HLWG
was tasked with doing so. Fahey and Curtin (2014) have recently asked “Who did the
HLWG listen to?” and partially answer their question by citing a private Commission
non-paper, “It is based on ideas put forward by EU and US industry and builds on
existing cooperation between EU and US regulators in this area” (Fahey and Curtin 2014:
217). It is beyond the scope of the authors’ analysis to identify who those industries are
so this project seeks to identify three factors from the submissions to the HLWG.
The responses to the public consultations are coded first by category of
organization: business, trade association representing business, trade union or
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organization representing trade unions, consumer protection agency or representative,
government institution or regulator authority, other non-governmental organization,
academic/research institution, citizen, and other. The purpose of counting frequency is to
determine which civil society actors have the most input into the process. These category
codes were created by DG Trade in this Second Consultation from September 2012 but
have been applied in this project to each consultation. The submissions are then coded if
they are supportive of including financial services or products in an agreement between
the EU and US.
Then each actor submitting a response is coded if the financial industry is
represented by the actor. Financial services industry or firms must be explicitly
mentioned by the organization in the membership description. In order to investigate the
transnational character and breadth of the support for the EU-US agreement, joint
submissions are also coded. Joint EU-US submission refers to a submission on behalf of
at least one industry, regulatory or consumer protection group from the EU and at least
one from the US. Finally, the results were coded to count the frequency of support for the
inclusion of finance in an EU-US agreement. The responses coded “supportive of
including finance in trade agreement” include language that does not merely mention
financial services or products but suggests they should be included in a trade agreement.
The full coding completed for this project is available in Annex 6.
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Figure 26: Agenda Setting Consultations
Organization
High Level Working Group
DG Trade
DG Trade-DG Enterprise and
USTR/OIRA
Source: Author generated.

Subject
Areas to cooperate
Future of EU-US trade and
economic relations
Solicitation on Regulatory
Issues

Closing Date
April 2012
September 2012
October 2012

Figure 27: EU-US Public Consultation Results
Legend
Indicator
Supportive of including finance in trade
agreement
Joint EU-US Submission
Finance industry represented in group/business
April 2012 Consultation
Code
Business
Trade association representing business
Trade union or organization representing trade
unions
Consumer protection agency or representative
Government institution or regulator authority
Other non-governmental organization
Academic/research institution
Citizen
Other
Total

Code
SIF
J
FIN

#
7
34

SIF
9

FIN
1
4

J
1

2
3
1
1
48

9

5

1
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DG Trade Public Consultation September 201261
Code
Self-Report
#
SIF
FIN
Business
28
13
2
Trade association representing business
47
42
5
1
Trade union or organization representing trade
8
3
2
unions
Consumer protection agency or representative
Government institution or regulator authority
3
1
1
Other non-governmental organization
5
6
1
Academic/research institution
1
1
Citizen
8
6
1
Other
14
Total
114
72
12
1

Joint EU-US solicitation on regulatory issues issued by DG Enterprise/DG
Trade and OIRA/USTR October 2012
Code
#
SIF FIN
J
Business
8
2
1
Trade association representing business
78
10
8
14
Trade union or organization representing trade
unions
Consumer protection agency or representative
2
Government institution or regulator authority
1
Other non-governmental organization
5
1
Academic/research institution
Citizen
Other
Total
94
12
9
15
Source: Author generated.
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Of 114 responses, 77 selected to make their submissions public. Duplicates have been removed to reveal
the total of 72. DG Trade asked that organizations self-report, however several associations
misappropriated codes. The full coding completed for this project is available in Appendix 5. Consultation
conducted by DG Trade closing September 2012.
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J

0

Figure 28: Responses to Public Consultation as Percentages, 2012

Source: Author generated.
The public consultation submissions were overwhelmingly in favor of a bold free
trade agreement between the EU and US and the key priorities were summarized as,
“trade in goods, trade in services, investment, public procurement, intellectual property,
rules of origin, the digital economy, access to raw materials, visa procedures and in
particular ‘21st century’ trade issues such as regulatory cooperation and non-tariff
barriers. Additionally, enhanced cooperation in relation to third countries and the
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importance of preserving the role of the WTO multilateral system has been highlighted”
(Directorate General for Trade Executive Summary, 2).
There are five developments in the public consultations relevant to this project.
First, industry associations and business together comprised 85 percent of the responses
to the calls. Second, sixteen groups of EU and US trade associations and
nongovernmental organizations replied with joint statements. For example, two large
automotive industry groups, AAPC (American Automotive Policy Council) and ACEA
(European Automobile Manufacturers Association) and the European Chemical Industry
Council (CEFIC) and American Chemistry Council (ACC), issued joint replies to the
joint solicitation on regulatory issues which was closed in October 2012. Those groups
that responded to the regulatory call replied with areas of regulations which could be
harmonized. Occasionally, groups also identified a way regulations could be harmonized
without distributional costs and providing benefits to industry actors on both sides of the
Atlantic. This directs DG Trade and the USTR to ways that they can provide service to
firms and industries by harmonizing regulation. It also supports this project’s assertion
that domestic civil society and industry actors are organizing at the transatlantic level,
which may increase their influence in the transatlantic regulatory regime.
Third, industry actors unrelated to finance made a push for finance to be included
in a trade agreement. In total thirty-three responses requested that financial services be
included in the agreement. The Chamber of Commerce organizations, some of which
represent finance organizations, were nearly universally supportive of the inclusion of
financial regulatory issues. Furthermore individual businesses (like Intel), labor unions,
and citizens also suggested financial regulation be included in a trade agreement. The

178

push from non-financial industry actors and associations to include financial services in
TTIP signifies an alignment of interests between general industry and the financial
industry. Because of financialization, corporations rely on financial products and
activities to make profits and give returns to their shareholders.
Fourth, the finance industry seemed to be surprised by the call and was
unprepared to contribute to it. (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
2012) Initially, the American Chamber of Commerce to the EU (AmChamEU), suggested
that in financial services, “[t]he volume and complexity of the issues to be addressed in
the financial services sector are better suited to a bespoke process amongst EU and US
rule-makers than an FTA. However, we believe that a set of key principles for regulatory
cooperation and convergence applying to all sectors, including financial services, should
be an integral element of an FTA, even if their application needs to be delivered through
sector-specific mechanisms” (AmChamEU 2012). However, since AmChamEU has
changed its position and requested regulatory cooperation on financial services be
included in TTIP (AmCham EU 2015).
Fifth, Latvia, Denmark, and the Administrative Conference of the US also
submitted responses to the public consultations.62 This suggests that government actors
also feel the need to reorganize at the transatlantic level in order to influence the
decision-making process directly.

62

“The Administrative Conference of the United States is an independent federal agency dedicated to
improving the administrative process through consensus-driven applied research, providing nonpartisan
expert advice and recommendations for improvement of federal agency procedures. Its membership is
composed” (Administrative Conference 2016). A chairperson and ten council members are appointed by
the President. Members are both private citizens and members of government.
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Few submissions addressed global competition as an impetus for the EU and US
to cooperate. However the Transatlantic Business Dialogue in its own contribution to the
April 2012 public consultation summarized quite well the impetus for the EU and US to
leverage their collective power to influence third countries:
“The notion is mistaken that we can ‘go it alone’ in trying to convince other
countries to reject protectionist trade policies, forego discriminatory industrial and
regulatory policies, and provide adequate and effective intellectual property
protection. This can also lead to serious missed policy opportunities for the
United States and the EU to raise the bar in terms of setting international norms
and standards. Strengthening transatlantic bonds is important not only in terms of
how Europeans and Americans relate to each other, but how we can harness the
potential of the transatlantic partnership to open markets in other countries,
especially the emerging growth markets, and strengthen the international
economic system” (Transatlantic Business Dialogue and the Business Roundtable
2012, 3).
Preserving the influence of the “core market economies” on the international
regulatory regime is indeed a major impetus behind the new spate of transatlantic
regulatory regime building. The HLWG final report conclusions suggested that the EU
and US “reach bilateral agreement on globally relevant rules, principles, or modes of
cooperation” in several sectors of the economy (EU-US High Level Working Group on
Jobs and Growth 2013, 6). The next step in establishing “globally relevant rules” was to
initiate negotiations.
During each TTIP negotiation round, negotiators listen to presentations by
registered stakeholders and then update them on the progress of negotiations in a briefing.
The negotiation rounds alternate between being hosted in the European Union and in the
United States. The host institution keeps the records of stakeholder presentations and
registration for the briefings. In the case of the EU, these records are disseminated by DG
Trade and in the case of the US these records are made available on the USTR’s blog,
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Tradewinds.63 The presentations and registered participants for the eight rounds of
negotiations are coded using the categories applied to the public consultation responses.
There have been eight rounds of negotiations through March 2015 but there are only data
for six of the stakeholder sessions. The second round of negotiations and stakeholder
presentations, scheduled for October 2013, was postponed until November 2013 because
of the United States federal government shutdown. Though the stakeholders briefing took
place on November 15, 2013 no schedule of presentations was made available publicly.
A list of registered participants is available however without voice participation. The
seventh round of stakeholder presentations, which took place on October 1, 2014, is not
publicly available either. This round was hosted by the United States but the record of
stakeholder presentations is not available on the USTR blog.64
Figure 29: TTIP Stakeholder Presentations Coding
Category

First

Third

Fourth

Fifth

Sixth

Eighth

Total

Academic or Research Institution
Business
Consumer Protection Agency or
Representative

3
6
5

2
5
5

3
1
5

6
2
5

2
0
4

0
1
2

16
15
26

Government Institution, State
Representative or Regulatory
Authority
Other Non-governmental
Organization
Other
Trade Association or Cross-sector
Business Association

1

2

1

4

1

1

10

7

10

13

12

11

16

69

0
27

0
28

1
60

1
43

3
46

3
55

8
259

1

1

7

3

5

3

20

76

70

Trade Union or Organization
Representing Trade Unions
Total
Source: Author generated.

63
64

50

53

91

81

421

USTR, “Tradewinds” https://ustr.gov/tradewinds
These records have been requested but are not currently available.

181

Figure 30: TTIP Stakeholder Presentations, through March 2015

Source: Author Generated.
The stakeholder presentations are consistent with the findings of the public
consultation responses in one regard: trade associations and cross-sector associations
dominate the responses. There is a notable uptick in government participation in two
rounds hosted in the US, round three with two presentations and round five with four
presentations. Of these, three presentations were by US state and regional trade
promotion offices (Vermont, Maine, and Virginia-Washington DC) that promote
domestic state businesses in other US states and internationally in economic
paradiplomacy.
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There are four points of interest in the stakeholder presentations. First, industry
representatives composed sixty-one percent of the total stakeholder presentations. While
this figure is less than the seventy-two percent of the HLWG public consultations, it is
still a significant majority compared to the participation percentages of the other
stakeholder groups.
The second point is the lack of diversity in some of the civil society categories.
Consumer protection representatives gave six percent of presentations, but most of these
were given by one organization on several different topics. Public Citizen gave eleven of
the twenty-six presentations in the consumer protection agency or representative
category. Consumer protection agencies and representatives are lacking in diversity of
voice at the transatlantic level.65 This is a stark contrast to the industry, which often has
two or three associations per industry giving presentations. This is despite the
organization of a Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, which was created as a counterpart
to the TABD/C. The voice of consumers in the TTIP is monotone. Of course, there is a
disparity in resources available to consumer advocacy groups and business and industry
groups and this disparity is likely reflected in their participation.
Third, there were only five joint EU-US stakeholder presentations in all six
stakeholder presentation sessions. Furthermore, the five joint presentations were all by
the same group of industry organizations: American Automotive Policy Council (AAPC),
European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (Association des Constructeurs
Européens d'Automobiles or ACEA) and, on all but one occasion, the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers (Auto Alliance). AAPC and ACEA also submitted a joint

65

Corporate Europe Observatory is very active in advocacy regarding the TTIP, but has not contributed as
extensively to the stakeholder presentations as Public Citizen.
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response to the joint EU-US public consultation on regulatory issues in October 2012.
This may indicate that the automotive industry is well organized at the transatlantic level
and has a high convergence in regulatory preferences compared to other industries. Since
the joint code is only applied to organizations with one domestic EU organization and
one domestic US organization, it does not represent the transnational and transatlantic
organizations that gave presentations. These include the Trans-Atlantic Business Council
and the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue as well as worldwide non-governmental
organizations.
Fourth, non-governmental organizations presentations largely account for the
increase in non-industry participation compared to the public consultations. Nongovernmental organizations increased their participation by eleven percent. Most NGOs
who participated in the consultations were environmental and animal welfare groups. In
fact, animal welfare groups participated in a joint response. However, the internal
composition of groups responding to the consultations did not change much over time.
Part of this increase may be attributable to the issue of sequencing and time. Negotiations
and stakeholder presentations have been held over nineteen months compared to the short
seven-month period in which the three consultations coded herein were conducted. Trade
negotiations also gain momentum and public attention and interest increases.
Nongovernmental organizations may also be more accustomed to participating in
stakeholder presentations organized around trade agreements than public consultations
conducted jointly by regulatory authorities and trade regulators.
The HLWG and TTIP consultations and stakeholder presentations attempt to elicit
direction from civil society and industry on the shape and content of the transatlantic
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regulatory regime. Industry actors participate more frequently than all other civil society
actors put together in both of these settings.
The HLWG and TTIP followed another successful transatlantic institution that
sought to determine and serve industry actors in a regulatory regime. In 2005 the US-EU
Intellectual Property Rights Working Group was established and has since been renamed
the Transatlantic Intellectual Property Rights Working Group (TIPRG). The high-level
working group has regular meetings and reports both to the Transatlantic Economic
Council and US-EU summits.
The commonalities in EU and US intellectual property rights (IPR) domestic legal
protections, the strength of knowledge-based industry in both of their economies, the
importance of securing intellectual property for sectors of their economies, and the
significant threat of international infringement of existing domestic IPR were impetuses
for the creation of the group.66 The TIPRWG Action Strategy is described as focusing on
three areas, “engagement on IPR issues in third countries, customs cooperation, and
public-private partnerships” (Transatlantic IPR Working Group Description).
The TIPRG has also sought to directly serve industry actors to help them
compete. In 2010 the Working Group developed web-based technology for small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) to access existing resources to address violations of IPR by
actors in third countries. The TransAtlantic IPR Web Portal brings together resources and
information in the form of “country kits” for smaller firms to more readily counter
violations of their IPR (TransAtlantic IPR Portal). This addressed the largest failing of
existing enforcement mechanisms which was the significant financial commitment
66

The U.S. Commerce Department refers to these sectors of the US economy as “IP intensive industries” in
a report which underscores the importance of secure property rights to the gross domestic product (U.S.
Department of Commerce 2012, ii).
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required to pursue IPR on the global level that allowed only large firms or coordinated
industries to be able to take advantage of foreign legal remedies or inspire a World Trade
Organization dispute.
The EU and US sought to provide services to intellectual property owners,
catering specifically to small and medium enterprise owners who have a difficult time
enforcing their intellectual property rights abroad unlike their large multinational
counterparts. This is indicative of the shift in regulatory roles for the state and for
industry in order to encourage regulatory competition which continues in the TTIP.

Government Support for a Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime
Financial services are currently addressed by a draft chapter in the TTIP
agreement. European Union officials have been clear that they prefer financial services
be included, as it is a stated priority of negotiations for France and the United Kingdom.
The EU Commission intends the chapter on financial services only to address the
coherency of the recent wave of post-crisis financial regulation, which is already in the
process of implementation in both the EU and US. In his written response to the
European Parliament about his priorities as Commissioner, EU Commissioner Jonathan
Hill named only the US in a section about the “international dimension” and explained
how the EU and US would seek to service financial industry actors: “I will seek to
deepen regulatory cooperation with the US on financial services, in particular to avoid
companies [sic] having to comply with two sets of similar but not identical rules” (Hill
2014, 4). In a speech at the Brookings Institute, Commissioner Hill explained exactly
how that enhanced regulatory cooperation would work to cement the positions of the US
and EU in the international financial regulatory regime:
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“Given the volume of business done between the EU and the U.S., it makes sense
for transatlantic cooperation to go into greater detail than the level currently seen
in international fora. Enhanced cooperation should allow us to consult each other
at an early stage in the regulatory process. And, importantly, our consistent
implementation of international standards and close supervisory cooperation would
mean that the EU and the U.S. would be able to rely on each other's rules. So the
benefits of transatlantic cooperation are clear. We'd provide a larger and more
efficient marketplace for financial firms, giving them greater capacity to provide
finance for the economy. Early troubleshooting and greater supervisory
cooperation would mean we could maintain financial stability more efficiently, and
we would solidify the leading role of the EU and the United States in financial
regulation” (Hill 2015, 10).
The US has a fragmented position. The Treasury Secretary, Jack Lew, and Office
of the USTR have articulated their position that the US position is willing to include
market access issues but not regulatory harmonization efforts, while members of
Congress, including both Republicans and Democrats, would like to see financial
services included in the TTIP (House of Lords 2014). In a meeting with former EU
Commissioner of Internal Market and Services Michel Barnier, in July 2013 Secretary
Lew reportedly emphasized that “prudential and financial regulatory cooperation should
continue in existing and appropriate global fora, such as the G-20, Financial Stability
Board, and international standard setting bodies, consistent with existing ambitious
international timelines” (Fairless and Trindle 2013).
American government resistance to including financial services in the TTIP
comes from several quarters. First, US officials reiterate that there is an ongoing bilateral
dialogue on harmonizing financial services regulation, via the Financial Market
Regulatory Dialogue (FMRD) which was established in 2002, as well as a multilateral
process through the Financial Stability Board (Atlantic Council 2014). Second, there is a
perception amongst government officials in the US that EU financial regulations are
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weaker than American regulations.67 Despite the fragmented position of US
governmental actors, the TTIP contains a chapter on financial services (Directorate
General for Trade 2016). This is an indication that the unified industry support for the
inclusion of financial services is driving the institutionalization of a transatlantic financial
regulatory regime.
The Atlantic Council, a nonpartisan think tank, has followed suit in developing a
call for deeper cooperation on financial services and involves domestic policymakers in
its call. The Council in partnership with Thomson Reuters published a report on The
Danger of Divergence: Transatlantic Cooperation on Financial Reform in October 2010.
The report co-chairs were Sharon Bowles, Member of the European Parliament and Chair
of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee in the European Parliament, then
Senator Chuck Hagel, who was serving as the Chairman of the Atlantic Council, and
Senator Mark Warner, member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs. The taskforce assembled to create the report included seven members of
the financial services industry, eight ambassadors, four academics, two representatives of
the Atlantic Council, two representatives of Thomson Reuters, and a rapporteur from the
Brookings Institute. This report does not mention cooperation with other foreign powers
other than two references to global competition as threats.68 Both references support the
assertion that international regulatory competition is driving transatlantic cooperation.

67

See pages 143-146 for the discussion about this perception, and specifically about the differences in
regulations on risk weights and capital requirements.
68
“There is a real possibility that US, or even Asian, remuneration packages will become significantly
more attractive to top bankers and traders than those available to workers in The City or other financial
centers in the EU. This could lead to a shift in financial market share away from the EU as other markets
find it easier to attract and retain top talent. Arguably, this is a form of economic competition that is
healthy, allowing different nations to take alternative approaches which eventually allow global best
practices to develop. However, it seems quite possible that excessive differences between the approaches
on the two shores of the Atlantic could create unnecessary disruptions of the existing financial system”
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In December 2013, the Council and Thomson Reuters were joined by TheCityUK
and assembled a task force of government officials, academics, lawyers and bankers to
address “The Danger of Divergence: Financial Reform and the G20 Agenda.” The cochairs of the report were Sharon Bowles, still a member European Parliament, Senator
Christopher Murphy, then Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
on European Affairs, US Senate and the report was prepared by Dr. Chris Brummer, C.
Boyden Gray Fellow on Global Finance & Growth at the Atlantic Council and Professor
of Law at Georgetown University. The foreword in December 2013 notes that:
“As the United States and Europe continue to work to secure their
financial markets after the crises of 2008-10, they also face new and
growing challenges in a rapidly evolving global economy. Countries such
as China, India, Brazil and other emerging markets are outpacing
growth rates in the transatlantic economies, and new investment
opportunities are arising around the world. […] [This report] calls on
leaders to work collaboratively to ensure the future stability and vitality
of the global financial system. We have come together to highlight a set
of crucial ongoing issues with transatlantic financial regulatory reform,
and offer an approach to addressing these. At the heart of the report is a
call for enhanced and more effective cooperation on this key
international challenge. We believe this is not only an economic and
financial imperative for our countries, but also of great international
strategic importance. Our two economies must continue to set the
global standard for financial regulation and recognize the significant
value in doing so” (Atlantic Council 2013, 1, emphasis added).
The Atlantic Council and policymakers politically securitize finance’s role in the
global competition facing the EU and US. The report demonstrates that state support for
the transatlantic financial regulatory regime is a response to international competition in
finance-led growth, that finance-led growth is the strategic goal of the regime, and that

(Atlantic Council 2010, 17-18); “The global nature of the markets that use these bodies makes it imperative
that regulators coordinate their approaches, even though harmonization may require that national
institutions face real global competition” (Atlantic Council 2010, 35).
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the transatlantic financial regulatory regime is seeking to impose its standards on the
international financial regulatory regime.
Government support for the transatlantic financial regulatory regime is clear in
the EU. In the US, despite a disjointed government position, the government has
participated in creating a transatlantic financial regulatory regime. This is indicative of
the steering role played by transnational industry actors in the transatlantic oarsmen
cooperative.
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
The TTIP negotiations formally launched in July 2013. While traditional trade
agreements are generally as narrow, one-off agreements on traditional tariff barriers to
trade, the TTIP is substantively distinct from these and is one of a new class of free trade
agreements. First, the TTIP will principally tackle non-tariff barriers to trade. As the EU
and US are service economies with few remaining tariff barriers between them
remaining, a primary goal of the TTIP is to address regulatory issues, including barriers
to market access. Second, the TTIP is an attempt to create a free trade area and, by
establishing a transatlantic regulatory regime in several sectors, integrate the transatlantic
economy. Studies that project significant economic benefits of the TTIP rely heavily on
this comprehensive approach. Third, the TTIP is reactive to the lack of progress in the
Doha round of negotiations in the WTO and attempts to position common EU-US
standards as those perpetuated by the international regulatory regime. This may either be
pursued by seeking the ‘multilateralization’ of these standards through inclusion in a
WTO agreement or through attractive power marked by the large percentage of global
trade, foreign direct investment, and gross domestic product for which the EU-US
economic relationship accounts (House of Lords 2014). Finally, the TTIP is being drafted
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to be a living agreement. That is, not just a trade agreement but rather one that establishes
mechanisms to provide continuing regulatory harmonization and settle potential disputes
over future regulatory developments—an ongoing transatlantic regulatory regime. One of
these mechanisms is a “Horizontal Chapter” which will establish a regulatory council to
resolve ongoing regulatory inconsistencies with the goal of avoiding WTO disputes
(Alemanno 2014).
One of the most controversial living elements of the TTIP is the investor-state
dispute settlement (ISDS) clause. Investor-state dispute settlement clauses are included in
some free trade agreements. The clauses give legal standing to foreign investors in the
host state in case they face barriers that violate the host state’s treaty obligations. A
dispute can be settled in arbitration proceedings or in host state domestic courts. If the
ISDS clause is included in the TTIP and the US or EU passes regulation which imposes
compliance costs on the other party’s firms or changes their market access, the foreign
firms can sue. Though settlement usually involves an international court or arbitration
procedure, the TTIP appears to be mimicking the Chapter 11 provision in the North
Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), such that its ISDS clause would allow injured
firms to bring a suit directly against the offending state. Consumer advocates and anticorporation groups suggest that this can lead to a lowest common denominator approach
to future regulation. If the US and EU avoid onerous regulation because it would invite
lawsuits from multinational firms, they would be left with the lowest common
denominator of regulation (Fielder and d’Imécourt 2014; Corporate Europe Observatory
2014a). This clause is one example of service provision by the state to industry actors as
it would effectively thwart new regulations. In financial regulation domestic regulators
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have created different rules for domestic and foreign institutions. The ISDS could prevent
regulators from applying discriminatory rules in the future.69 DG Trade opened a public
call in 2014 to address ISDS but the USTR did not. The EU and US stand firm that it will
be included.
Recognizing that the TTIP chapter negotiations were being perceived as a
“corporate wishlist” and ruled by the interests of large multinational corporations, the
USTR and DG Trade made efforts to convince small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
that the TTIP would benefit them as well (Brad Markell, Executive Director of the AFLCIO in House of Lords 2014, 84). SMEs are often less likely to be able to afford the cost
of navigating and overcoming regulatory barriers to entry compared to multinational
corporations with larger budgets and compliance departments. For this reason, the USTR
and DG Trade launched a campaign of public consultations to identify the obstacles faced
by SMEs and then provide information about how they may be overcome by the TTIP.
The result is a colorful brochure called the TTIP Opportunities for SMEs, joint-issued by
the USTR and DG Trade, that explains how the TTIP would help small businesses
(Directorate General for Trade and the U.S. Trade Representative). The US International
Trade Commission (USITC) also released a report which catalogues the “trade-related
barriers that U.S. small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) perceive as
disproportionately affecting their exports to the European Union (EU) relative to large
69

The banking sector is the most impacted by the domestic/foreign distinction. The Federal Reserve has
adopted new capital requirements for foreign banking organizations as well as annual stress tests. “The new
rules were approved unanimously by the U.S. central bank but fanned a long-running spat with the
European Union, where most of the affected banks are based. […]Michel Barnier, European commissioner
for the internal market, said in a statement: "We will not be able to accept discriminatory measures which
would have the effect of treating European banks worse than U.S. ones." […] Foreign banks have criticized
the move as exporting U.S. rules overseas, saying the requirements could conflict with home-country
regulations and force them to withdraw from the U.S. European banks have been considering measures to
get around or mitigate the rules, including moving parts of their U.S. businesses or, like Dutch lender
Rabobank, shrinking them below the Fed's asset threshold” (Armour and Tracey 2014).
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exporters to the EU” (United States International Trade Commission 2014, iii). There
may be a chapter included in the agreement on SMEs, which would shore up domestic
support for the agreement. The inclusion of this chapter is an example of the US and EU
providing services to industry on industry’s terms.
Industry actors have had an overwhelming influence over the agenda, content and
direction of the TTIP negotiations and are now steering two regulatory states on the
international level. Industry actor guidance has been cultivated through a formal
transatlantic channel established by the EU and US and their domestic industry actors
have reorganized at the transatlantic level; the state-level process has encouraged and
provided an industry-level process as an official advisor. Their input has been crucial in
deciding what mechanisms and sectors should be included in the TTIP. Industry is
steering the creation of global governance institutions. Following the example of robust
transatlantic regulatory cooperation in intellectual property rights, the US and EU have
begun to provide service to firms seeking to compete on the international stage through a
transatlantic financial regulatory regime.

Conclusions
This chapter analyzed the connections between the institutions in the transatlantic
financial regulatory regime. The evidence presented indicates that compared with other
civil society actors industry enjoys a privileged position in the process, participates more
frequently in open consultations, and has an agenda-setting power. Mapping the input and
formal advisory roles between institutions revealed that the TABC/D has the most
connections to the other institutions and that industry is overrepresented in the USTR and
DG Trade advisory groups. Analyzing the frequency of the contributions to the HLWG
public consultations and the TTIP stakeholder presentation sessions, there is a clear
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predominance of industry actor participation. The industry desire to have finance
included in the TTIP is contrasted with TACD, Corporate Europe Observatory, Public
Citizen, the USTR and US Treasury Secretary who argue that regulatory harmonization
of financial services should be excluded.
The next chapter will argue that the empirical evidence presented in this chapter
indicates that a new stage of the relationship between the state and industry is emerging
in the transatlantic financial regulatory regime.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions
The Transatlantic Oarsmen Cooperative
In this chapter the theoretical departure point is the regulatory state and the
division of labor between the state and civil society. The empirical evidence from the
previous chapter indicates that a new stage of the relationship between the state and civil
society is emerging in the transatlantic financial regulatory regime. In this stage, industry
actors cast in a role as civil society are steering and the state is rowing. The changes to
the international regulatory regime posed a challenge to the dominance of the EU and US
in the international economic system. The threat incentivized industry to leverage the
significant transatlantic investment relationship and seek a transatlantic solution. I call
this the transatlantic oarsmen cooperative and propose the oarsman state to explain this
division of labor.
Transnational financial industry actors are now seemingly united in wanting
financial services to be addressed by the TTIP. Under scrutiny in the aftermath of the
financial crisis, the industry has been active through transnational lobbying groups and
these groups are consistent respondents to public calls and consultations. A coded list of
these groups replying to each of the consultations appears in Appendix 6.
The upgrade of financial services cooperation from the Financial Markets
Regulatory Dialogue (FMRD) to the TTIP is an example of oarsmen cooperative service
to industry. The financial industry considers the FMRD a failure, often citing the lack of
progress and lack of high-level political participation in the dialogue. (House of Lords
2014) “While there exists a ‘Financial Services Regulatory Dialogue’ led by DG Markt
[Internal Market and Services Directorate General] and the US Treasury, which brings
together financial services regulatory authorities and central banks, it is not within the
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ambit of the TEC. Furthermore, these dialogues are not producing, so far, binding
results” (European Services Forum 2012, 3). The US Chamber of Commerce and DG
Internal Market and Services have also supported the view that the FMRD is not working
(House of Lords 2014, 34; Calvino 2013). However, the FMRD itself is an example of
the US and EU trying to provide services to the financial industry. The FMRD is being
outpaced by industry activity lobbying to upgrade collaboration on financial services
regulation from the dialogue to the TTIP.
Some consumer protection groups suggest that the financial industry sees the
TTIP as an opportunity to renegotiate and reduce the financial regulation which was
passed after the financial crisis (Corporate Europe Observatory 2014c). This is a
particular concern in the US because several provisions of the Dodd-Frank act have yet to
be implemented and financial industry actors are still lobbying the executive and
independent agencies responsible for the details of implementation.70
The voice of financial firms has been clearer and more organized within the larger
group of industry actor advisors to the TTIP process but has not been isolated. Nonfinancial industry actors have also requested that regulation of financial services be a
priority in the negotiations. Large multinational corporations, such as General Electric
and Intel, are non-bank financing companies who face many of the same regulatory
challenges as banks. As the Global Director of Trade and Investment Policy for Dow
Chemical explains, “[…] as large-scale manufacturers, a lot of other companies had also
been weighing in on [financial services in the TTIP], as access to capital is crucial to run
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Much of this lobbying is completed as public comments on calls for public input published by the
agencies in the interest of transparency. For example, an ongoing SEC call for public input on the “SEC
Regulatory Initiatives under the Dodd-Frank Act” details the many proposed regulations and allows
comments on each has been open since 2010 (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
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their operations” (House of Lords 2014, 91). Financialization is critical to corporate
operations and profit and this shared industry ideology has spurred an alliance of
financial and non financial industry actors in the transatlantic regulatory regime.
DG Trade has revealed that financial services is tackled by a draft chapter in the
TTIP agreement, despite US government and civil opposition. This demonstrates that
industry is directing the institutionalization of the transatlantic financial regulatory
regime. If financial services are included in a completed agreement and—as proposed by
industry associations—establish not merely coherent but retooled harmonized financial
services regulations, it would be a clearer indication that the state is no longer steering by
providing the content of the regime. The existing bilateral channel for EU-US regulatory
cooperation on financial services, FMRD, will be upgraded so that the state can provide
greater service to the financial industry. Many elements of civil society, including labor
organizations, consumer protection agencies, and environmental groups have opposed
TTIP because it is perceived as putting industry in the driving seat. This opposition has
been more organized and vocal in the EU.
Civil society played a dual steering and rowing role in the early 1900s in the
absence of a state with regulatory expertise and bureaucracy. Prominent scholars see the
development of neoliberalism as congruent to the rise of the regulatory state (Jordana and
Levi-Faur 2004), however this project demonstrates that financialization, regulatory
competition and economic interdependence have heralded a new role for
transnational civil society, including industry actors,: steering the state in institution
building.
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Figure 31: Oarsman State
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According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, an oarsman is, “a person who rows
a boat especially as a member of a racing team” (Merriam-Webster). The European
Union and United States are attempting to create a team provide services to industry in
order to compete globally; they are attempting to form a transatlantic oarsmen
cooperative. A cooperative is an organization “organization that is owned and run jointly
by its members, who share the profits or benefits” (Oxford 2016b). The EU and US
conjointly run and benefit from the transatlantic regulatory regime, befitting the term
cooperative. Each, as an oarsman state, creates domestic regulations that will support and
attract industry. In the cooperative, they collaborate to provide the service of institution
building to transnational civil society; most institutions are constructed to serve industry
actors.
One prominent feature of the oarsman state is the nature of the service it provides
civil society, and mostly industry, through rowing. In the aftermath of the financial crisis
the oarsman state has gone beyond traditional service provision and is building
institutions and architecture at the international level for different groups in civil society.
This project has documented that the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was a critical juncture
in the international financial regime that resulted in the US and EU altering the
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transatlantic regulatory regime to continue to compete with a strategy of finance-led
growth. The institutions the transatlantic oarsmen cooperative is building are intended to
help industry, and specifically the finance industry, compete globally. In the transatlantic
regulatory regime, the EU and US have created transatlantic institutions dedicated to
allowing transatlantic civil society to organize and direct state activity. The TABC,
TALD, and TACD are designed to give civil society a directing role and their input
guides the activity of the TEC. The other institutions created by the EU and US provide
more traditional service to industry, such as the TIPRG, which provides centralized
access to intellectual property enforcement tools to SMEs.
This new dimension of service provided by the state to industry and the
emergence of the phase of the oarsman state are connected to larger changes in the role of
the state. International relations literature has questioned the autonomy of the state as
global governance institutions give power to institutions, civil society, and other states.
The oarsman state empowers civil society by (i) creating institutions for global civil
society to organize, (ii) creating institutions for domestic industry to compete globally,
and (iii) giving members of civil society advisory groups a steering role in the regulatory
regime.
The oarsman state takes direction from civil society on which institutions are
needed and what services should be provided. The transatlantic oarsmen cooperative is
being steered directly by industry actors representing civil society. This project has
documented that in the transatlantic regulatory regime the High Level Working Group on
Jobs and Growth was steered to certain policy areas for regulatory cooperation by
contributions to consultations by industry. Future research could also investigate the role
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states or cooperatives have played in creating settings for other elements of transnational
civil society, such as environmental dialogues and forums, to communicate their
preferences, for state action.
The oarsman state is a concept which offers new insights into the prevalence of
different forms of regulatory regimes, such as public-private partnerships and private
regulatory authorities. Private industry actors seek representation in public-private or
private regulatory authorities to set the agenda of regulatory cooperation between states.
Industry enjoys privileged status in the TTIP and other global governance
arrangements because globalization has increased pressure on jurisdictions to attract
industries and corporations through regulatory competition. Tiebout’s model of
regulatory competition suggests that the US and EU are harmonizing their regulations to
compete as one jurisdiction. Some regulations impose clear costs on business activity; for
example, the proposed financial transaction tax. However, some regulations have unclear
implications for business activity and the costs of compliance for consumers and
businesses. Jurisdictions may prefer to have the costs of regulation be as clear as possible
to attract, or repel, an industry. For example, jurisdictions publicize tax breaks for film
production in an attempt to lure film productions to their jurisdictions. One strategy
governments can utilize to understand the unforeseen costs of regulation is ask the
regulated what the costs might be.
Regulatory competition is therefore a process that enhances the incentives for
governments to listen to business about the unintended consequences of regulation. In the
case of US and EU financial regulatory regimes the governments should be especially
clear about consequences that would lead to slow or no GDP growth. The EU and US are
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both facing incredible regulatory competition from jurisdictions with lower regulatory
standards for several industries and higher growth rates. Their competition strategy is to
harmonize transatlantic regulatory standards to dominate international regulatory
standards. They are capable of creating these club standards because of the large size of
their collective economic footprint (Drezner 2007). To be successful this choice of
strategy requires the EU and US to understand what regulations are hampering growth
and shaping industry and firm locational preferences. It requires the EU and US to
collect, privilege and address the opinions and desires of industry. The transatlantic
regulatory regime has created several institutions designed to collect this input.
Regulatory competition is perhaps never a higher-stakes game for the EU and US
than it is in the area of the financial industry. Financialization has led countries to
increasingly depend on the financial industry for growth. Financial regulation seen as
hostile to the industry could lead to lower growth if industry actors vote with their feet
and move to jurisdictions with regulation they prefer. Therefore in the oarsmen
cooperative, the EU and US may continue to allow the financial industry to steer
regulation that policymakers believe will increase the growth of their economies and
provide service by creating dedicated, institutionalized bilateral channels. The TTIP is
indicative of the new era of the oarsman state.

Broader Implications of the Oarsman State
The empirical findings of this project are that several aspects of the transatlantic
financial regulatory regime have changed after the financial crisis, and more surprisingly
some endure. The regime has reorganized and added a trade negotiation and economic
council to its decision-making structures. The regime has politically securitized the
finance industry and this has led to an increase of the salience of financial industry actors
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to the regime. The regime’s new decision-making procedures are giving industry actors a
privileged position compared to the other civil society groups not only in the pre-existing
institutionalized channel of the TABC but also through advisory groups to the TTIP
process. The goal of creating a new harmonized set of rules is to compete against other
jurisdictions. The norms and ideology of the regime remain constant: financialization and
finance-led growth is ideal to compete. The original empirical contribution of this project
is demonstrating that after the financial crisis the reverberations from EU, US, and
international regulatory regime changes prompted the US and EU to create a transatlantic
financial regulatory regime to compete in the international financial regulatory regime.
Civil society actors at all levels are reacting to the rupture in the regimes after the
2007-2009 financial crisis and some are contributing their preferences to shape them.
Domestic civil society actors, such as AAPC and ACEA, are organizing at the
transatlantic level with joint responses to public consultations and stakeholder
presentations. Multinational corporations and broader industry actors, such as Intel and
General Electric, have supported the financial industry actors’ demands for a harmonized
transatlantic financial regulatory regime to lower compliance costs and facilitate financial
flows. The institutionalized transatlantic dialogues, with the exception of the defunct
Transatlantic Labor Dialogue, are advising the Transatlantic Economic Council and
analyzing developments in TTIP. Industry actors are the most frequent participants in the
regime, but consumer advocacy groups are mobilizing against what they consider the EU
and US pursuing a corporate wishlist in TTIP. Civil society participating in international
regulatory regimes could continue to be dominated by actors with the infrastructure,
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access, information, and financial resources to organize at the transnational level:
business associations and multinational corporations.
This constellation of civil society might be aided, as it is now by the transatlantic
regulatory regime, by states and global governance organizations privileging industry’s
input and creating institutions for that purpose. The EU and US are casting industry in a
role as civil society. This may be an attempt to legitimize the creation of a transatlantic
regulatory regime that results in regulation in the interest of the regulated.
The transatlantic regulatory regime is allowing civil society, and specifically
industry actors in the TABC/D, EU Expert Group, USTR ITAC, HLWG public
consultations, and TTIP stakeholder presentation sessions, to steer and the EU and US
governments are rowing to provide the services that would suit industry preferences. This
empirical finding supports the concept of the oarsman state, an extension of the theory of
the regulatory state to a new stage. The oarsman state has been precipitated by
competition between regulatory regimes and in the case addressed in this project by an
intensification of competition after the financial crisis.
One major implication of this new stage in the relationship between civil society
and the state is that regulatory regimes will be steered by the civil society actors who are
considered most vital to winning regulatory competition amongst jurisdictions. In many
types of regulatory regimes, this civil society actor will be industry actors, including
multinational corporations and industry associations. Industry actors may direct the
content of regulation in regimes formulated at the international level through new
dynamic trade agreements and technocratic dialogues. As trade agreements like the TTIP
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are developed to not only enhance trade but also promote investment, financial industry
actors will steer.
Traditional trade agreements have a direct connection to labor and citizens
because of tariffs and their overt and politicized distributional consequences, but an
agreement like the TTIP that focuses on mostly non-tariff barriers to trade that are
regulatory in nature may be more difficult for the public to relate to. The EU has made an
effort to make its negotiating positions and the general trade process more transparent,
but there is no evidence that the US is taking similar steps. For advanced service
economies such as the EU and US, trade agreements will increasingly target regulatory
incompatibility rather than tariffs and thereby lead industry to play a steering role. This
new mode of trade regulatory policy could prove more challenging to stimulate broad
civil society participation than in traditional trade agreements that publics and other civil
society actors are familiar with because their input is deemed less valuable and less
relevant. DG Trade and the USTR have responded to calls for greater civil society
participation in a number of ways, but this study reveals that it has not dramatically
broadened the participation of civil society actors in existing fora.71
There are also broader consequences for not just the transatlantic regulatory
regime but also other international regulatory regimes. Domestic civil society actors and
domestic regulatory actors both may face challenges related to the new level of
regulatory activity. Domestic civil society, and especially labor and citizen groups, will
need to consider organizing at the transatlantic level and participating in the channels
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DG Trade has responded by creating a TTIP Advisory Group with civil society participants and
maintaining a Civil Society Dialogue, the members of which meet with negotiators after every two rounds
of negotiations. The USTR announced in February 2014 it would create a Public Interest Trade Advisory
Committee (PITAC).
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available to them to challenge the regulatory capture established by industry. This will
likely require them to pool their limited resources. For example, Public Citizen and
Corporate Europe Observatory could present on each other’s behalf at the TTIP
stakeholder presentations that take place outside of their jurisdictions. Additionally
domestic regulatory agencies and members of the legislative branch must prepare to face
international challenges to existing domestic regulatory regimes.
The consequence of international regulatory regimes that are formulated to
service industry actors organized at the international level and to win regulatory
competition among jurisdictions is domestic regulatory regimes that cater to a transient
elite. Multinational corporations and other civil society actors with financial resources are
able to change jurisdictions to enjoy more favorable regulations. With the mobility and
means to cross jurisdictions and with their perceived importance to GDP, global financial
firms can shape the content of the international regulatory regime. Corollary industries
may potentially also be politically securitized, creating a basis for future research.
The oarsman state also raises the more traditional concerns about supranational
organizations. Domestic policymakers and consumer protection groups have warned
against the rise of autocratic policymaking meant to serve industrial interests (Nader
1999; Chandler and Mazlish 2005). The centralization of regulatory policymaking
removes it from domestic, democratic accountability mechanisms.

An Epilogue: Brexit
This dissertation was written before the Brexit referendum. On June 23, 2016 a
referendum was held in the United Kingdom on UK membership in the European Union.
By a margin of 3.78%, voters indicated their desire to leave the European Union. It is
likely in the next year that the UK will invoke Article 50 of the Treaty of the European
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Union and begin the process leaving the EU. The process of negotiating the separation of
an EU member state can last up to two years after Article 50 has been invoked.
In September 2016, the UK Parliament will consider a petition requesting a
second referendum on EU membership. The future of the UK’s membership in the EU is
unclear.
If the UK does leave the EU, there could be repercussions for the EU,
transatlantic and international financial regulatory regimes. Without the UK driving
financial regulation at the EU level, member states that favor more restrictive financial
regulation, for example Germany and France, might prevail. Finance firms are already
seeking to move their London operations. The London-New York nexus might not drive
preferences at the transatlantic level without the UK as a party to TTIP and a member of
the other EU-US institutions. However, the ideological and shallow capture of EU
policymakers by financialization ideology might be so significant that the oarsmen
cooperative will continue to build the regime even without the UK as a party to it.
Another viable possibility is that because of the London-New York nexus the UK
and US will sign an agreement on financial regulation and create a separate regulatory
regime. An Anglo-American financial regulatory regime would likely become the de
facto international regulatory regime because of New York and London’s importance as
financial hubs. It would also eliminate the need for an EU-US financial regulatory
regime. If without the UK in the EU the US and EU do not pursue a transatlantic
financial regulatory regime, this will confirm this project’s assertion that the LondonNew York nexus was crucial to the buildup of the transatlantic financial regulatory
regime from 2008-2016. This project has explained the transatlantic response to the
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financial crisis. If Brexit does become a critical juncture it could position the UK and US
on different trajectories or make them the center of a new oarsmen cooperative.
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Appendix 1

Account at a formal =inancial institution
(% age 15+) 2011
Romania

44.59163
52.8249

Bulgaria
Poland

70.19429

Italy

71.00853

Hungary

72.67432

Lithuania

73.7552
77.93986

Greece

79.58302

Slovak Republic
Czech Republic

80.65119

Portugal

81.22942
85.23765

Cyprus
United States

87.95786

Croatia

88.39102

Latvia

89.65883

Spain

93.2776

Ireland

93.88835

Luxembourg

94.58679

Malta

95.27007

Belgium

96.30613

Estonia

96.82428

France

96.98389

Austria

97.08174

Slovenia

97.14371

United Kingdom

97.20129

Germany

98.13362

Netherlands

98.65853

Sweden

98.99195

Finland

99.65125

Denmark

99.73679
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Source: Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion 2011.
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Appendix 2
Saver’s Credit Amounts
The amount of the credit is 50%, 20% or 10% of your retirement plan or IRA
contributions up to $2,000 ($4,000 if married filing jointly), depending on your adjusted
gross income (reported on your Form 1040 or 1040A). Use the chart below to calculate
your credit.
2013 Saver's Credit
Credit Rate

Married Filing
Jointly

Head of Household

All Other Filers*

50% of your
contribution

AGI not more than
$35,500

AGI not more than
$26,625

AGI not more than
$17,750

20% of your
contribution

$35,501 - $38,500

$26,626 - $28,875

$17,751 - $19,250

10% of your
contribution

$38,501-$59,000

$28,876 - $44,250

$19,251 - $29,500

0% of your
contribution

more than $59,000

more than $44,250

more than $29,500

*Single, married filing separately, or qualifying widow(er)
2014 Saver's Credit
Credit Rate

Married Filing
Jointly

Head of Household

All Other Filers*

50% of your
contribution

AGI not more than
$36,000

AGI not more than
$27,000

AGI not more than
$18,000

20% of your
contribution

$36,001 - $39,000

$27,001 - $29,250

$18,001 - $19,500

10% of your
contribution

$39,001-$60,000

$29,251 - $45,000

$19,501 - $30,000

0% of your
contribution

more than $60,000

more than $45,000

more than $30,000

Source: Internal Revenue Service.
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Appendix 3
EU Public Opinion Polling on the Financial Transaction Tax, 2011

Source: Reproduced from Directorate General for Communications 2011: 11.
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Appendix 4
EU Home Ownership Interest Rate Tax Advantages 2008

Source: Doling et al. 2012: 35.
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Appendix 4

Source: International Monetary Fund 2011: 126.
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Appendix 5
Index of Transatlantic Institutions, institutionalization and activities
Methodology
To assess the internal dynamic of the changes I categorize the two dimensions of function
and institutionalization in the relevant transatlantic institutions as weak, moderate or
strong in 2006, 2007 and again in 2015. For the dimension of function the activity of
each institution is rated on an index with two factors: the frequency of meetings and the
number of outcomes or deliverables. The degree of institutionalization is rated on an
index with two factors: the number of staff and the number of members.
I counted the documents produced by each institution as well as the staff listed in official
documents and on the organizations’ websites. An asterisk denotes a figure was not
available to the author.
Totals
0 to 2
3 to 4
5 to 6

Weak
Moderate
Strong

Meetings
Less than annually
Annually
More than annually
Members
No members
Less than 10
More than10

1
2
3

Deliverables
0-1 annually
2-5 annually
More than 5 annually

1
2
3

1
2
3

Staff
No staff
Less than 10 secretariat
More than 10 staff

1
2
3

Index of TA Institution Activities 2006
TTIP
TABC/D
TACD
TLD
TALD
TEC
FMRD

Frequency
NA
2
1
1
0
NA
2

Outcomes
NA
2
1
1
0
NA
1

Total
4
2
2
0
3

NA
Moderate
Weak
Weak
Weak
NA
Moderate

Index of TA Institutions Institutionalization 2006
Staff
Members
Total
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TTIP
TABC/D
TACD
TLD
TALD
TEC
FMRD

TTIP
TABC/D
TACD
TLD
TALD
TEC
FMRD

NA
NA
NA
1
2
NA
1

NA
3
3
3
1
NA
3

3
3
4
3
4

Index of TA Institution Activities 2007
Frequency Outcomes
Total
NA
NA
3
3
6
3
3
6
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
3
2
2
4

NA
Moderate*NA
Moderate*NA
Moderate
Moderate
NA
Moderate

NA
Strong
Strong
Weak
Weak
Moderate
Moderate

Index of TA Institutions Institutionalization 2007
Staff
Members
Total
TTIP
NA
NA
NA
TABC/D
3
3
6
Strong
TACD
NA
3
3
Moderate*NA
TLD
1
3
4
Moderate
TALD
1
2
3
Moderate
TEC
2
2
4
Moderate
FMRD
1
3
4
Moderate

TTIP
TABC/D
TACD
TLD
TALD
TEC
FMRD

Index of TA Institutions Activities 2015
Frequency Outcomes
Total
3
3
6
Strong
3
3
6
Strong
3
3
6
Strong
1
1
2
Weak
0
0
0
Weak
1
3
4
Moderate
2
2
4
Moderate
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Index of TA Institutions Institutionalization 2015
Staff
Members
Total
TTIP
3
2
5
Strong
TABC/D
3
3
6
Strong
TACD
3
3
6
Strong
TLD
1
3
4
Moderate
TALD
1
1
2
Weak
TEC
2
2
4
Moderate
FMRD
1
3
4
Moderate
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Appendix 6
Coding of High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth Public Consultations
In this section I code the responses to the three public consultations conducted by the
High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth in 2012. The categories applied to each
respondent are adapted from those applied by DG Trade to the April 2012 submissions.
The additional coding identifies a submission from an organization or business that
represents the financial industry; a submission from both an EU and US organization; and
a submission with content that is supportive of including financial services in an
agreement between the EU and US.
In order to be coded as “financial industry represented in group/business”, the financial
services industry or individual financial firms must be explicitly mentioned by the
organization in the membership description.
The responses coded “supportive of including finance in trade agreement” include
language that does not merely mention financial services or products but suggests they
should be included in a trade agreement.
Categories
Business
Trade association representing business
Trade union or organisation representing trade
unions
Consumer protection agency or representative
Government institution or regulator authority
Other non-governmental organisation
Academic/research institution
Citizen
Other
Legend
Indicator
Supportive of including finance in trade
agreement
Joint EU-US Submission
Finance industry represented in group/business

Initial Joint Public Consultation April 2012
Alstom
American Chamber of Commerce to the European
Union (Amcham EU)

BIZ
TASSC
TRUN
CPA/R
GOVT
NGO
ACA/R
CITZ
OTH

Code
SIF
J
FIN

SIF
SIF

Joint Code
BIZ
TASSC

FIN
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American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
International

NGO

Aromics
Association of German Banks
Association of German Chambers of Commerce and
Industry (DIHK)
BMW Group
BT Group
BusinessEurope-U.S. Chamber of Commerce joint
submission

BIZ
TASSC
TASSC

Cecilia Siddi
Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK)
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE)
Danish Agriculture & Food Council
Denmark
Ernst & Young
EUCOLAIT- European Association of Dairy Trade
EuroCommerce
European Apparel and Textile Confederation
(EURATEX)

SIF
SIF

fin

BIZ
BIZ
TASSC

SIF

ACA/R
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
GOVT
BIZ
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC

European Chemical Industry Council (Cefic) and the
American Chemistry Council (ACC)

TASSC

European Food and Drink industry
(FoodDrinkEurope)

TASSC

European Fresh Produce Association (Freshfel
Europe)

TASSC

European Generic Medicines Association (EGA)
European Services Forum (ESF)
European Sugar Producers Association (CEFS)
European Telecommunications Network Operators'
Association (ETNO)
European-American Business Council (EABC)
European-American Business Organization (EABO)
Federation of German Chemical Industries (VCI)
Federation of German Industries (BDI)
Food and Drink Federation

TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC

fin

TASSC
BIZ
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
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Foreign Trade Association (FTA)
Futures and Options Association (FOA)
German Engineering Federation (VDMA)
Global Financial Markets Association (GFMA) The
Financial Services Roundtable, the International
Banking Federation (IBFed), and the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)
International Chamber of Commerce United
Kingdom (ICC UK)
La Asociación Española de Fabricantes de Juguetes
(AEFJ)

SIF
SIF

SIF

J

TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC

fin

TASSC
TASSC

Latvia
Noël Scauflaire
Orgalime - The European Engineering Industries
Association

GOVT
CITZ
TASSC

Plateforme contre le transatlantisme
The Association of European Chambers of Commerce
and Industry (EuroChambers)

NGO
TASSC

TheCityUK
Trade Commission of Spain
Transatlantic Animal Welfare Council (TAWC)
Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD)
UVAX Concepts
Total
2. DG Trade Public Consultation September 2012
Alliance For Intellectual Property
American Chamber of Commerce in Germany
American Chamber of Commerce to the European
Union (AmCham EU)
Association le Crunch
Association Nationale Pommes Poires (France)
Association of European Airlines
Association of German Chambers of Commerce and
Industry (DIHK)
Associazione italiana commercio estero (AICE)
Belgium citizen
Bösch Boden Spies
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Romania
(CCIR)
citizen

fin

SIF

SIF
9
SIF
SIF
SIF

TASSC
TASSC
NGO
TASSC
BIZ
1
J Code
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC

fin

5
FIN

TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
CITZ
BIZ
TASSC
CITZ
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citizen France
COCERAL is the European association of cereals,
rice, feedstuffs oilseeds, olive oil, oils and fats and
agrosupply trade.
Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
Consultiaa
Contined b.v.
Conservation of employeers and industries of Spain
(CEOE)
Danish Agriculture & Food Council
Deron
Dienes Werke GmbH & Co. KG
DGLOM
EUCOLAIT - European Association of Dairy Trade
Eurometaux
European-American Business Organization, Inc
European Apparel and Textile Confederation
(EURATEX)
European Automobile Manufacturers Association
European Branded Clothing Alliance
European Chemical Industry Council (Cefic)
European Community Shipowners' Association
(ECSA)
European Dairy Association
European Dredging Association
European Federation of Origin Wines (EFOW)
European Feed Manufacturers' Federation (FEFAC)
European Generic Medecines Association (EGA)
EU Member State
European Sugar Producers Association (CEFS)
European Services Forum (ESF)-2
European Trade Union Committee for Education –
ETUCE
European Trade Union Confederation
Federation Francaise de la Couture du Pret-a-Porter
des Courtiers et des Createurs du Mode
Federation of Agricultural Producers and Forest
Owners (MTK)
FENAP
FoodDrinkEurope
Foreign Trade Association (FTA)
French business confederation (MEDEF)

CITZ
TASSC
SIF

SIF

SIF

TASSC
BIZ
BIZ
TASSC
TASSC
NGO
BIZ
NGO
TASSC
TASSC
BIZ
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC

SIF
SIF
SIF
SIF

TASSC
TASSC
NGO
TASSC
TASSC
GOVT
TASSC
TASSC
TRUN

fin

TRUN
TASSC
NGO

SIF

TRUN
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
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German Engineering Federation (VDMA)
I'm not a membre of something. I'm just free.
Intel Corporation
International Confederation of EU Beet Growers
(CIBE)
International Fur Trade Federation
IP Federation
J.O. Sims Ltd
Les entreprises du médicament (LEEM)
Lufthansa German Airline
Nexus Foundation
Ocean Spray International, Inc.
Orgalime - The European Engineering Industries
Association
Organisation of Tomato Industries (OEIT)
personal contribution
Plateforme d’opposition au marché transatlantique-3
Pominter sarl
private citizen
Remote Gambling Association
Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA)
TechAmerica Europe
The International Air Cargo Association (TIACA)
The Mentor Partnership
Trade Secrets and Innovation Coalition (TSIC)
University of Leiden, The Netherlands
voestalpine Edelstahl
Wendy Cockcroft Web Design
Total
3. October 2012 Joint solicitation on regulatory issues,
DG Enterprise/DG Trade and OIRA/USTR
AAPC-ACEA Joint Contribution
Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients Committee
(APIC), European Fine Chemicals Group (EFCG),
Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates
(SOCMA)
Administrative Conference of the United States
Advanced Medical Technology Association
(AdvaMed)
Airlines for America
Airports Council International - North America,

SIF

TASSC
CITZ
BIZ
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
BIZ
TASSC
BIZ
NGO
BIZ
TASSC

SIF

TASSC
CITZ
NGO
BIZ
CITZ
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
BIZ
TASSC
ACA/R
BIZ
BIZ

12
0
SIF Joint Code

1
FIN

TASSC
J TASSC

GOVT
TASSC
TASSC
J TASSC
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Airport International Council Europe
Almond Board of California
American Apparel and Footwear Association
American Chamber of Commerce to the European
Union (AmCham EU)
American Chemical Society
American Feed Industry Association
American Forest and Paper Association
American Frozen Food Institute
American Meat Institute
American National Standards Institute
American Soybean Association
Amway
Association of the European Self-Medication Industry
(AESGP) + Consumer Healthcare Products
Association (CHPA)
Asociación Española de Productores de Vacuno de
Carne (ASOPROVAC)
Asociación de Fabricantes de Material Eléctrico
(AFME)
Association of German Banks (Bankenverband)
Association of the German Chambers of Industry and
Commerce (DIHK)
ASTM International
Biowest
British American Business
Business Europe + US Chamber of Commerce
Business Roundtable (BR), Trans-Atlantic Business
Dialogue (TABD), European Roundtable of
Industrialists (ERT)
British Telecom (BT Group)
Confederation of Danish Industry (DI)
Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI)
Cosmetics Europe + Personal Care Products Council
(PCPC)
Deutsche Post DHL
Digital Europe
Ebay Inc.
EuropaBio + BIO (Biotechnology Industry
Organization)
European Apparel and Textile Confederation
(EURATEX)

TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
NGO
TASSC
BIZ
J TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC

SIF
SIF

fin

NGO
BIZ
TASSC
J TASSC
TASSC

fin

TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
J TASSC

SIF

BIZ
TASSC
BIZ
J TASSC
TASSC
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European Association of Automotive Suppliers
(CLEPA) + Motor & Equipment Manufacturers
Association (MEMA)
European Association of Dairy Trade (EUCOLAIT)
European Boating Industry
European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) +
American Chemistry Council (ACC)
European Crop Protection Association (ECLA) +
CropLife America (CLA)
European Electronic and Fire Security Industry
(EURALARM)
European Engineering Industries Association
(ORGALIME)
European Express Association (EEA)
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries
and Associations (EFPIA) and Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
European Generic Medicines Association (EGA) +
Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA)
European Radiological, Electromedical and
Healthcare IT industry (COCIR) + Medical Imaging
& Technology Alliance (MITA)
European Renewable Ethanol (E-Pure)
European Services Forum (ESF) + US Coalition of
Services Industries (CSI)
European Starch Industry Association (AAF) + Corn
Refiners Association (CRA)
European Telecommunications Network Operators
(ETNO)
European Tyre and Rubber Manufacturers'
Association (ETRMA)
EU-US Coalition on Financial Regulation
Express Association of America
Federazione Nazionale Orafi Argentieri Gioellieri
Fabbricanti (Confindustria Federorafi)
Food and Water Watch
German Engineering Federation (VDMA)
Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA)
Handmade Toy Alliance / euroSource LLC
Humane Society International
Information Technology Industry Council
Insurance Europe
International Confederation of Music Publishers

J TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
J TASSC
J TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
J TASSC
J TASSC
J TASSC

SIF

TASSC
J TASSC

fin

J TASSC
SIF

TASSC
TASSC

SIF

J TASSC
J TASSC
TASSC

fin

CPA/R
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
J NGO
TASSC
TASSC
J TASSC

fin
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(ICMP), National Music Publishers Association in the
US (NMPA US)
International Fur Trade Federation (IFTF)
International Serum Industry Association
Minor Crop Farm Alliance (MCFA)
National Association of Manufacturers
National Cattlemen's Beef Association
National Corn Growers Association
National Electrical Manufacturers' Association
(NEMA)
National Foreign Trade Council, Inc.
National Milk Producers Federation & U.S. Dairy
Export Council
National Pork Producers Council
National Renderers Association
North American Meat Association
PETA International Science Consortium
Plateforme contre le Transatlantisme
Procter and Gamble (P&G)
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America
(PCI)
Rubber Manufacturers Association
Ships and Maritime Equiment Association (SEA)
Sidley Austin LLP
Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (SIFMA)
Spanish National Association of Manufacturers of
Capital Goods (SERCOBE)
Syndicat National des Fabricants de sucre de France
(SNFS)
Toy Industries of Europe and US Toy Industry
Association
Transatlantic Animal Welfare Council (TAWC)
Transatlantic industry contribution (collective)
US Chamber of Commerce on TBT/SPS issues
The Wolf Group
Underwriter Labratories (UL)
United States Council for International Business
U.S. Meat Export Federation
Wine Institute and WineAmerica

SIF

SIF

TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
NGO
CPA/R
BIZ
TASSC

SIF

TASSC
TASSC
BIZ
TASSC

fin

TASSC
TASSC
J TASSC

SIF
SIF
SIF

12

NGO
J TASSC
TASSC
BIZ
BIZ
TASSC
TASSC
TASSC
16

fin
fin
fin

9
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